Intellectualism in US Diplomacy

When someone is honestly 55 percent right, that's very good and there's no use wrangling. And if someone is 60 percent right, it's wonderful, it's great luck, and let him thank God. But what's to be said about 75 percent right? Wise people say this is suspicious. Well, and what about 100 percent right? Whoever says he's 100 percent right is a fanatic, a thug, and the worst kind of rascal.An Old Jew of Galicia1George W Bush ordered the invasion of Iraq to test out an idea that had been gestating for 25 years. In the late 1970s, an ambitious young Pentagon analyst named Paul Dundes Wolfowitz identified Iraq as a likely future threat to American interests. A trained political scientist and ardent anticommunist, Wolfowitz distrusted the ruthless Saddam Hussein and thought him susceptible to Soviet influence.2 Yet he also recognized that abhoring a despot's methods was not sufficient cause to effect his removal. Wolfowitz instead formulated a radical theory that the Middle East represented fertile ground on which to plant American-style values. He concluded that this oil-rich, Muslim-majority region would embrace westernization and that Israel represented a beacon of sorts. The Zionist movement had proved that democracy and rapid economic growth could take root in arid, forbidding climes. Could not Muslims and Kurds do the same in Iraq?Wolfowitz thought that America was better placed than any other nation to give Iraq a gentle nudge in the direction of liberty. The birth-pangs of democracy are not edifying, but this self-assured Pentagon staffer believed that the human costs of war were well worth paying. With Saddam gone, a nation that had flourished-in earlier centuries as Mesopotamia-would become a laboratory for economic and democratic liberalization. Rebuilt from the top down, Iraq would follow the same trajectory as postwar Japan and Germany-two nations dismantled comprehensively by the US military before rising from the flames. Wolfowitz believed that as soon as their personal liberty was restored, Iraq's Shias, Sunnis, and Kurds would overcome their historical grievances to establish a free and prosperous Iraq. As the durability of Iraq's transformation became apparent, the rest of the Middle East would be persuaded to follow its example. Wolfowitz's mantra was that actions speak louder than words, and that the sincerity of the catalyzing idea was the key to its realization.As President Ronald Reagan found common cause (against Iran) with Hussein's regime through the 1980s, conservative realists began to view Wolfowitz warily as an idealistic crank. Originally hired by Reagan to direct the policy planning council at the State Department, Wolfowitz was appointed assistant secretary for east Asian and Pacific affairs in 1982, and was dispatched to Jakarta four years later to serve as the US ambassador to Indonesia. With each move eastward, Wolfowitz became increasingly detached from Middle East policymaking. And when Reagan completed his second term, the election of the arch-realist George H. W Bush promised further marginalization for this visionary neoconservative. But when Iraq invaded Kuwait in August 1990, Wolfowitz's promotion prospects improved dramatically. His views on the threat posed by Saddam Hussein's Ba'ath regime began to look perceptive rather than delusional.Wolfowitz was delighted that the president had declared war on Iraq to restore Kuwait's sovereignty. It took little time for him to become disillusioned, however, when Bush decided that an occupation of Iraq would yield few tangible results beyond a possible quagmire. The first President Bush was cautious-an instinctive pragmatist-and he held serious reservations about Wolfowitz's notion that the United States could recast the Middle East in America's image. As Bush explained later, Whose life would be on my hands as the commander-in-chief because I, unilaterally, went beyond the international law, went beyond the stated mission, and said we're going to show that we're macho

Ancient history · Democracy · Diplomacy · Luck · Middle East · Political science · Politics · Sociology · Theology · Westernization · History · International Relations and Foreign Policy · Law · Philosophy · Religious studies