Canada and Nuclear Weapons

Canadian politics have been plagued with the issue of nuclear weapons for Canadian forces for over four years. Public discussions of the issue, parliamentary debates and government statements have rarely served to enlighten citizens as to the military requirements, policy arguments pro and con, and the political implications of a final Canadian decision to accept these weapons. It has seemed to Americans interested in these matters that neither the Progressive Conservatives nor the Liberals have been as much concerned over the important task of redefining Canadian defence interests and responsibilities as they have been uncertain and agitated over the effect on voters of a decision to incorporate nuclear weapons into the armed forces. Thus the acquisition of BOMARC missiles and of interceptors requiring nuclear weapons but not accepting the warheads for thesehas appeared to friends of Canada to be inexplicable on rational grounds; only political expediency would seem to explain the hesitation, (but scarcely justify it). In January of this year, the frustrations of Canadians, expressed in Parliament, over these unresolved defence issues helped break the government of Prime Minister Dief enbaker. During the climactic debates, Mr. Diefenbaker's repeated misrepresentations of American policy resulted in a decision by the U.S. Department of State to correct the record, publicly, and in the midst of the Canadian debate. It is wrong to ascribe the defeat of Mr. Dief enbaker to the U.S. government action; it is right to regard its statement as a document which contributed to the forcing of Mr. Diefenbaker either to amend his policies or to accept the consequences of resignations from his own cabinet. He chose the latter

Nuclear weapon · Political science · Canadian Policy and Governance · International Relations and Foreign Policy · Law · Military and Defense Studies · Nuclear Issues and Defense