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All Politics is Local

Germany, the Bundeswehr, and Afghanistan

Bibliographic Data

ID9940964
AuthorsBen Lombardi (0000-0001-9352-8039, corresponding author)
Year2008
Volume63
Issue3
Pages587-606
Publication date2008-09-01
Peer ReviewedYes
Open AccessYes
TypeARTICLE
VenueInternational Journal Canada s Journal of Global Policy Analysis (JOURNAL)
Journal identifiersISSN: 0020-7020 • E-ISSN: 2052-465X
PublisherSAGE Publications (PUBLISHER • US)
DOI10.1177/002070200806300310
OpenAlexW2217255756
LanguageEN
Citations received2

Given the debates over the current NATO mission in Afghanistan, it might be assumed that German interest in that country is unprecedented. Yet history holds a different record, for an earlier generation of German leaders also paid considerable attention to Afghanistan. In 1915, Germany (aided by its Ottoman ally) hoped to ignite Islamic fervour throughout the Middle East and, in particular, persuade the Afghan emir to invade India with his army and deal a deathblow to the British empire. Kaiser Wilhelm Mohammed, a caricature created by Berlin's propagandists, would then advance the Muslim cause elsewhere to the detriment of Germany's Russian and British enemies. However, such heady dreams of conquest remained just that. Despite the enormous courage of the small military expedition to Kabul, the emir could not be moved and Germany's Afghanistan strategy collapsed.Nine decades later, German military personnel are again in Afghanistan. This time, however, Berlin's is far removed from fomenting jihad. Instead, the German contingent of approximately 3500 troops is part of the 40,000-strong NATO-led international security assistance force (ISAF), of which the German component is the third largest after those of the United States and Great Britain. As in 1915, a direct link has been asserted between the fate of that distant central Asian country and more immediate national interests. Shortly after the initial deployment of Bundeswehr troops, then- Defence Minister Peter Struck asserted, in an oft- cited phrase, that a military contribution to the ongoing allied effort was necessary because Germany's front line of defence ran along the Hindu- Kush. Despite important differences in foreign policy, the past two governments, the Red- Green (1998-2005) composed of the Green party and Social Democratic party led by Gerhard Schroder and the current grand of Chancellor Angela Merkel, have publicly endorsed that perspective.Nevertheless, German leaders often seem reluctant to voice this view. Merkel has been criticized for not leading from the front on Afghanistan, despite a willingness to do so on other foreign issues, such as Russia, China, and transatlantic relations. In a speech entitled new questions of foreign policy delivered only two days after the September 2005 general election, Frank- Walter Steinmeier (now foreign minister) failed to mention Afghanistan at all.1 And the agreement (November 2005) that established guidelines for the current government (composed of the Christian Democratic Union-CDU, Christian Socialist Union-CSU, and the Social Democratic party-SPD), is hardly more vocal. The stabilization of the western Balkans is declared a vital interest, but Afghanistan is only very briefly touched upon in a short passage about nation-building. Such reticence highlights the caution that has been adopted toward the Afghan missions.THE DIMENSIONS OF A CONTROVERSIAL COMMITMENTGermany's latest involvement in Afghanistan began in response to the events of 11 September. Shortly after, Gerhard Schroder pledged unqualified solidarity with the US, and a month later promised a military contribution to the coming campaign in Afghanistan. That pledge was quickly tested when the Bush administration formally requested assistance and, on 6 November, the chancellor announced that 3900 troops would be made available for the US-led operation Enduring Freedom. The Schroder government was nevertheless disquieted early on by Washington's use of a coalition of the willing to go after the Taliban. That US military operations quickly outpaced any efforts at postconflict planning was also a concern. The belief that Germany, without an imperial past in central Asia, would be seen as neutral led the government to host the international gathering that fashioned the Bonn agreement for a provisional Afghan government and an approach for the political reconstruction efforts in that country

Afghan · Ancient history · Courage · Economic history · Front (military · Geography · German · Political economy · Political science · Politics · Sociology · Global Peace and Security Dynamics · History · International Relations and Foreign Policy · Law

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Unique citing works2
Citations per year0,13
Citation span2010 - 2014 (5)
Citation velocityhistorical
Highly citedNo
Citation typesNeutral: 2

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