Does Combating Corruption Reduce Clientelism
Bibliographic Data
| ID | 9949841 |
|---|---|
| Authors | Gustavo J Bobonis (0000-0003-4023-7902, University of Toronto), Paul Gertler (0000-0003-0280-7513, University of California System), Paul J Gertler (University of California, Berkeley), Marco Gonzalez-Navarro (0000-0002-4572-3398, University of California, Berkeley), Simeon Nichter (0000-0002-1005-6724, University of California San Diego) |
| Year | 2025 |
| Volume | 136 |
| Issue | 675 |
| Pages | 1107-1124 |
| Publication date | 2025-09-05 |
| Open Access | Yes |
| Type | ARTICLE |
| Venue | The Economic Journal (JOURNAL) |
| Journal identifiers | ISSN: 0013-0133 • E-ISSN: 1468-0297 |
| Publisher | Oxford University Press (OUP) (PUBLISHER) |
| DOI | 10.1093/ej/ueaf082 |
| OpenAlex | W4414058221 |
| Language | EN |
| References cited | 42 |
Does combating corruption reduce clientelism? To investigate this question, we focus on a policy that has been widely used across the world: anti-corruption audits. We examine the impact of Brazil’s prominent audit programme on clientelism using a novel survey of rural citizens. Randomised audits reduce politicians’ provision of campaign handouts, decrease citizens’ demands for private goods, and reduce requests fulfilled by politicians. We investigate mechanisms by which audits may reduce clientelism, and find that audits significantly reduce citizens’ willingness to supply clientelist votes
Corruption and Economic Development · Politics and Society in Latin America · Taxation and Compliance Studies
Votes for Survival
Peer Effects, Teacher Incentives, and the Impact of Tracking
Clientelism in Indian Villages
Double/debiased machine learning for treatment and structural parameters
Corruption in Developing Countries
Targeting the Poor
Remedying Education
Patrons, Clients and Policies
Mobilizing for Elections
Brokers, Voters, and Clientelism
The Political Resource Curse
Who Must Pay Bribes and How Much? Evidence from a Cross Section of Firms
Exposing Corrupt Politicians
Vote Buying in Brazil
Reducing bureaucratic corruption
Temptation in vote-selling
Persuading voters to punish corrupt vote-buying candidates
Buying votes versus supplying public services
Do Government Audits Reduce Corruption? Estimating the Impacts of Exposing Corrupt Politicians
Is Vote Buying Effective? Evidence from a Field Experiment in West Africa
Traditional politics and regime change in Brazil
Corruption and Government
When Does Information Influence Voters? The Joint Importance of Salience and Coordination
Brokers, Social Networks, Reciprocity, and Clientelism
Varieties of Clientelism
Vote Buying and Social Desirability Bias
Whither Clientelism? Good Governance and Brazil's Bolsa Família Program
Clientelism, Credibility, and the Policy Choices of Young Democracies
The Political Economy of Clientelism
Clientelism
Perverse Accountability
Corruption, Machine Politics, and Political Change
How Clients Select Brokers
| Highly cited | No |
|---|