Moral Hazard Versus Liquidity and the Optimal Timing of Unemployment Benefits
Dados Bibliográficos
| ID | 9950101 |
|---|---|
| Autores | Rodolfo G Campos (0000-0002-7585-3652, Bank of Spain), José Ignacio García Pérez (0000-0002-9074-7313, Fundación de Estudios de Economía Aplicada), J Ignacio García-Pérez (Universidad Pablo de Olavide , Seville, Spain & FEDEA, Spain), Iliana Reggio (0000-0003-0772-1452, Universidad Autónoma de Madrid) |
| Ano | 2022 |
| Volume | 132 |
| Fascículo | 648 |
| Páginas | 2674-2701 |
| Data de publicação | 2022-05-31 |
| Peer Reviewed | Sim |
| Open Access | Sim |
| Tipo | ARTICLE |
| Periódico | The Economic Journal (JOURNAL) |
| Identificadores do periódico | ISSN: 0013-0133 • E-ISSN: 1468-0297 |
| Editora | Oxford University Press (OUP) (PUBLISHER) |
| DOI | 10.1093/ej/ueac034 |
| OpenAlex | W2747288945 |
| Idioma | EN |
| Referências citadas | 14 |
We develop a novel way of identifying the liquidity and moral hazard effects of unemployment insurance exclusively from how job-finding rates respond to unemployment benefits that vary over an unemployment spell. We derive a sufficient statistics formula for the dynamically optimal level of unemployment benefits based on these two effects. Using a regression kink design (RKD) that simultaneously exploits two kinks in the schedule of unemployment benefits, we apply our method to Spain for the years 1992–2012 and find that moral hazard effects dominated liquidity effects, suggesting that Spanish unemployment benefits exceeded the optimal level in that period
Actuarial science · Econometrics · Economics · Hazard · Hazard ratio · Incentive · Labour economics · Macroeconomics · Market liquidity · Microeconomics · Monetary economics · Moral hazard · Schedule · Spell · Statistics · Unemployment · Employment and Welfare Studies · Gender, Labor, and Family Dynamics · Labor market dynamics and wage inequality · Mathematics
| Velocidade de citação | historical |
|---|---|
| Altamente citado | Não |