Do you value topic-continuity? The moral foundations of Cappelen’s insistence on ‘topic-continuity’ and reasons for resisting them
Bibliographic Data
| ID | 9951175 |
|---|---|
| Authors | Yvonne Huetter‐Almerigi (0000-0003-1204-6228, University of Bologna, corresponding author), Yvonne Huetter-Almerigi (University of Bologna) |
| Year | 2022 |
| Volume | 67 |
| Issue | 3 |
| Pages | 891-911 |
| Publication date | 2022-12-12 |
| Open Access | Yes |
| Type | ARTICLE |
| Venue | Inquiry (JOURNAL) |
| Journal identifiers | ISSN: 0020-174X • E-ISSN: 1502-3923 |
| Publisher | Taylor & Francis (PUBLISHER • GB) |
| DOI | 10.1080/0020174x.2022.2155237 |
| OpenAlex | W4311178391 |
| Language | EN |
| Citations received | 1 |
| References cited | 43 |
The article reveals the pragmatic implications of Herman Cappelen's account of 'topics' in his contribution to the conceptual engineering literature. I show that Cappelen's introduction of the category of 'topics' serves the pragmatic goal of having a convenient handle to account for 'continuity in revision', and that his general insistence on 'continuity' is motivated morally and strategically. In asking what accounts for continuity, Cappelen's 'topics' are not defined by content or any other fixed set of rules or criteria. Topics are metaphysically lightweight and defined pragmatically and as we go: speakers talk about the same topic when we (and they) attribute that they do. But why should we do that? Why should we aim for continuity and why should we think it is possible in general? I contrast Cappelen's insistence on continuity with Rorty's appeal for discontinuity, and trace both of their positions back to their respective moral background assumptions and their assumptions about what communication is (and is for) and, in turn, what philosophy is (and is about). Further, I question the role the 'continuity' claim plays in the current redefinition of linguistic philosophy after the 'death of the linguistic turn
Philosophy of language · TRACE (psycholinguistics) · Value (mathematics · Epistemology, Ethics, and Metaphysics · Feminist Epistemology and Gender Studies · Pragmatism in Philosophy and Education
Replacing Truth
Fixing Language
A Pragmatic Method for Normative Conceptual Work
Going On, Not in the Same Way
On the Very Idea of a Conceptual Scheme
Which Concept of Concept for Conceptual Engineering
Why Conceptual Engineers Should Not Worry About Topics
Conceptual change in perspective
Improving concepts, reshaping values
How to conceptually engineer conceptual engineering
Downplaying the change of subject objection to conceptual engineering
Making progress
Verbal disputes and topic continuity
Inferentialist conceptual engineering
Construction and continuity
Conceptual engineering and the implementation problem
Conceptual Engineering and Conceptual Ethics
Rorty on Hermeneutical Injustice, Liberal Redescription and Utopian Imagination
Two Forms of Realism
The Creative Interpreter
The good, the bad and the insignificant—assessing concept functions for conceptual engineering
Deflating the functional turn in conceptual engineering
Conceptual engineering, truth, and efficacy
Conceptual domination
Origins of analytical philosophy
Resisting Reality
Agency, Power, and Injustice in Metalinguistic Disagreement
| Citations per year | 1 |
|---|---|
| Citation span | 2025 - 2025 (1) |
| Highly cited | No |