Deconstructing migration studies and identity studies

The need for an alternative scientific lens

Bibliographic Data

ID9953597
AuthorsAyhan Kaya (0000-0003-4431-3220, Istanbul Bilgi University Istanbul Turkey, corresponding author)
Year2024
Volume62
Issue3
Pages124-130
Publication date2024-05-21
Peer ReviewedYes
Open AccessYes
TypeARTICLE
VenueInternational Migration (JOURNAL)
Journal identifiersISSN: 0020-7985 • E-ISSN: 1468-2435
PublisherWiley (PUBLISHER • GB)
DOI10.1111/imig.13271
OpenAlexW4398184249
LanguageEN
Citations received1
References cited16

In the post-war era, European political competition primarily focused on socio-economic issues such as employment, wages, taxation, social rights, and the development of the welfare state. However, in the 1990s, there was an unfortunate shift in the centre of political competition from material concerns to non-material and cultural aspects. The prominence of identity politics has surged, leading to an increased emphasis on the study of identities. In response to this trend, I introduced a novel term for the study of identities: IDology, a term derived from the combination of ‘id’ (identity) and ‘logy’ (study, science) (Kaya, 2018). I employ this term critically to assert that IDology appears to be an ideological discipline, potentially confining both researchers and the public to a culturalist and ideational perspective that aligns with the ideologies of neoliberalism and consumerism. Identity Studies (IDology), along with the ideologies of neoliberalism and consumerism, does not aim to eliminate cultural identities; instead, it provides a space for their coexistence and evolution (Meyer, 2001: 6). The contemporary emphasis on celebrating differences has become a significant challenge, carrying the potential risk of guiding individuals or groups towards a process described by Emmanuel Levinas (1998) as ontological imperialism – the struggle for ‘to be.’ This ontological conflict, often waged without respect for the ‘other,’ may lead to a new ‘state of nature’ in the Hobbesian sense. By prioritising differences over uniqueness, individuals tend to essentialise their cultural, religious, national, and ethnic identities. Consequently, the essentialisation of identities could potentially fuel widespread ontological conflicts worldwide, as evidenced by cases of ethnic and/or cultural cleansing in various regions including India, Bosnia-Herzegovina, Burundi, Afghanistan, Iraq, Libya, Syria, Nigeria, Sudan, Yemen, Israel, and Gaza. Social scientists, heavily influenced by postmodernist discourse, have increasingly focused on studying differences and identities, sometimes overlooking the commonalities shared by individuals regardless of their migration status or native background. These commonalities stem from the universal experiences of being human, including concerns such as access to housing, healthcare, employment, education, and social welfare. Migrants and their descendants living in Europe for many decades have been exposed to various intellectual, social, cultural, and political processes of transformation. Trying to come to terms with their new social and political conditions characterised by deindustrialisation, marginalisation, unemployment, subordination, exclusion, financial crisis, Islamophobism (Kaya, 2015), European integration and refugee crisis, they have generated different tactics in everyday life (Kaya, 2012). Their intellectual, cultural, and artistic endeavours have been questioned in the quest for finding answers to the questions of whether they are uprooted, where their home is, who they are, whether they are in-between, or whether they are parochial or cosmopolitan. Many of them have understood that they do not have any other choice but to be trapped in this binary Cartesian opposition between all these categories imposed on them by their sending and receiving societies/states. Migration Studies and Identity Studies have so far singled out the life-worlds of migrant-origin populations as distinct from the life-worlds of native populations. Both fields have contributed to the essentalisation of ethno-cultural and religious boundaries between in-groups and out-groups in a way that overlooks the socio-economic, political, spatial, and material similarities. Migrant-origin individuals are often perceived as integrated or segregated, or in other words as insiders or outsiders. They are asked to either become like the natives adapting themselves to the new culture, or stay as they are without mingling with the natives. The main issue here is that if the newcomers are mainly assimilable or not. They either become one of us, or not. Is there a third position that individuals of migrant origin can embrace to move away from the dichotomies imposed by both the receiving and sending states and societies in general? This question has been of paramount importance across various scientific fields, including philosophy, anthropology, sociology, migration studies, and cultural studies. Similarly, several philosophers and scholars have sought to dismantle the duality in philosophy, cultural studies and social anthropology by introducing the concept of the third, the third space, or the third culture (inter alia Bhabha, 1990; Gilroy, 1987; Guattari, 2000; Hall, 1991; Levinas, 1998). The third space is a space where distinctions between black and white blur, where beauty coexists with ugliness, the inside blends with the outside, and the ‘good’ object intertwines with the ‘bad’ along with the self-merging with the other. William Connolly's (2003) contribution in this regard is particularly insightful, as he challenges the politics of identity across various contexts and explores the connection between identity and difference within a broader framework. Connolly (2003) asserts that there is no inherent or true identity, as every identity is specific, relational, and constructed. Identities cannot be definitively defined but can only be traced. Questions posed to migrant-origin individuals, such as ‘Are you feeling German or Turkish?’ or ‘French or Algerian?’ or ‘Where do you feel more comfortable, here or there?’ lose their significance. These inquiries essentially highlight the limitations of the person asking them. This suggests that the identities of migrants, or any other minority collective, are partially shaped in relation to the majority society surrounding them. Therefore, if there is perceived to be a problematic aspect of the minority's identity, it follows that the majority society also grapples with similar challenges in how it establishes the rules, codes, and norms to which minorities are subjected. I posit that the process of identity formation is a dynamic and interactive social phenomenon, moulded through discourse within a specific social and historical context, and intricately entwined with economic and power dynamics (Eisenstadt, 2000). This assumption suggests that in the examination of identity, the focus should be on exploring the relationship between individuals and their immediate context – the historical circumstances under which identity emerges – rather than providing a descriptive account of the content of identity and cultural practices of a particular group or individuals. In this sense, the proposition aligns with Fredrik Barth's theory (1969), which characterises ethnic identity as a result of the negotiation of boundaries, rather than an inherent trait of an individual or group. the more power one has, the less culture one enjoys, and the more culture one has, the less power one yields. If they [minorities] have an explicit monopoly on authentic culture, we [majority] have an unspoken one on institutional power. (Rosaldo, 1989: 202) Such philosophical and anthropological insights help shed light on the understanding that ethno-cultural and religious resurgences among minorities and migrant-origin communities often serve as symptoms arising from the structural limitations of neoliberal political governance. These limitations, characterised by a neglect of redistributive justice and fairness, can be addressed through state-implemented redistributive justice, potentially liberating marginalised groups from identities or conditions they have not willingly chosen. The politics of identity generated by weak groups, particularly those who are socio-economically disadvantaged and lack significant power, can be viewed as a response to the structural outsiderism imposed by neoliberal governance on migrant-origin groups and other subaltern groups. The global landscape is marked by a growing sense of civilisational polarisation and fragmentation, creating a stark division between ‘us’ and ‘them’. In this scenario, traditional political channels no longer function effectively, leading individuals to resort to unconventional forms of politics in their daily lives. Democracies worldwide face considerable fragility, encountering numerous challenges coming from anti-systemic political and societal formations such as right-wing populism. A notable development is the emergence of a Schmittean-style ultra-politics – an intricate process marked by the radicalisation of politics, evolving into open warfare. This is evident in the pervasive ‘us-against-them’ mentality reflected in various practices and discourses. The securitisation of migration during the neoliberal era by both state and non-state entities is a key component of this phenomenon. Many governments and state actors increasingly adopt a civilisationalist and populist approach, framing socio-economic and political issues in a Manichean manner that polarises the world into friends and enemies, or us and them. Amidst this radical escalation of tension between opposing forces, democratic deliberation and communication are conspicuously absent. Drawing on Zizek's interpretation of Carl Schmitt, one could aptly label this phenomenon as ultra-politics (Huysmans, 2006; Walters, 2021; Zizek, 1999). Operating as a form of governmentality, the current state of ultra-politics relies on polarising populist ideologies and discourses, shaping the contours of contemporary migration and identity dynamics. Whether individuals are long-standing citizens or recent arrivals, their responses to state actors' ultra-political strategies at both national and local levels are often rooted in elements from their politico-cultural repertoires (Tilly, 1977). These repertoires can encompass a wide range of identities, including cosmopolitan, ethno-nationalist, religious, civilisational, and/or communitarian. Faced with the destabilising impact of such polarising and Manichean forms of ultra-politics in the era of late modernity, where formal political engagement appears to wane globally, individuals employ diverse responses and tactics in their everyday lives (De Certeau, 1984). How do individuals respond to such polarising and Manichean forms of ultra-politics in the age of neoliberalism? Do individuals respond through legitimate political channels such as voting polls and parliamentary platforms? Ulrich Beck (1999) has previously argued that contemporary politics transcends traditional parliamentary debates or elections, urging an exploration of its emergence in unconventional spaces, such as the everyday activities, personal choices, and often spontaneous actions of social movements, even within private domains. To characterise these new realms of politics and distinguish them from conventional ones, Beck (1999) coined the term ‘sub-politics.’ In a broad sense, the concept of sub-politics pertains to small-scale, often individual decisions that carry direct political implications or attain political significance through aggregation. More specifically, sub-politics is associated with operating beneath the nation-state, yet, in a broader context, it can be seen as a type of politics that exists ‘outside and beyond the representative institutions of the political system of nation-states’ (Beck, 1996: 18). The ‘sub’ prefix does not suggest that this form of politics is less important than formal politics; rather, it indicates that it is less institutionalised. Therefore, the term sub-politics encompasses non-conventional forms of politics that individuals utilise to navigate the Manichean aspects of ultra-politics. The direction of sub-politics varies from place to place and from individual to individual, sometimes serving as a means of aligning with the magnetism of ultra-politics and at other times as a form of rebellion against it. The neoliberal state appears to cultivate the conditions in which individuals formulate various forms of sub-politics, countering the hegemonic nature of ultra-politics. In the era of neoliberalism, individual actors, families, migrants, marginalised and subordinate groups residing in suburban or rural areas that are often labelled as ‘places which no longer matter’, (Rodrigues-Pose, 2018) and the descendants of migrant-origin families ill-equipped to confront growing global injustices, are expected to take charge of their own well-being (Inda, 2006: 13). Over recent decades, the public provision of welfare and social protection has ceased to be a central component of governing the well-being of the population. Neoliberal states no longer prioritise the promotion of what is considered social. Instead, the focus has shifted to prudentialism (Defert, 1991) and communitarianism (Bauman, 2001; Rose, 1996). This entails the expectation that individuals will independently manage their well-being within the parameters of existing free-market conditions, as the social welfare state is no longer present to finance and safeguard the population's well-being. Consequently, prudent, responsible, self-managing, and ethically aware political subjects are entrusted with assuming this role (Inda, 2006). Prudentialism can be regarded as a governmental technology that allocates responsibility to individuals for various risks, including those associated with unemployment, health, poverty, security, and crime. It is a practice that moulds individuals into being accountable for their destiny, with the support of various private enterprises and independent experts who play pivotal roles in the free-market economy. While this approach may be feasible for upper-middle-class, highly qualified, and cosmopolitan individuals, it poses undeniable challenges for those who are unqualified, working-class, under-class, or even middle-class individuals residing outside urban centres and in communities grappling with socio-economic deprivation. While prudentialism constitutes one aspect of neoliberal forms of governmentality, the other facet involves the promotion of communities. Many nation-states no longer espouse universal welfare policies. Empirical evidence suggests that those unable to adhere to prudentialist principles due to a lack of social, economic, and cultural capital are, in a way, encouraged to seek refuge within essentialised ethno-cultural, religious, and tribal communities (Bauman, 2001). Over the past three decades, we have witnessed a reconfiguration of welfare policies, shifting their emphasis from ‘society’ to ‘communities,’ aligning with the tenets of neoliberal governmentality. It seems that rationalities and techniques are emerging to govern without directly managing society, opting instead to govern through regulated choices made by discrete and anonymous actors within the framework of their specific commitments to families and communities (Rose, 1996: 328). Furthermore, the social realm might be ceding ground to ‘the community’ as a novel domain for administering individual and collective existence – a fresh space or surface where micro-moral relations among individuals are conceptualised and managed in parallel with the politics of identity (Rose, 1996: 331). It is crucial to adopt a scientific perspective for examining the socio-economic, political, spatial, local, and psychological factors driving the politics of identity in everyday life, regardless of whether individuals are of migrant or native origin. This scientific approach necessitates a focus on understanding the daily experiences of individuals without confining them within distinct civilisational, ethno-cultural, or religious groups. Such an approach may enable social scientists to uncover that the ongoing tensions between nativist and migrant-origin individuals do not necessarily stem from differences in their cultural, ethnic, national, or religious identities, but rather from socio-economic, political, spatial, and epistemic injustices and inequalities. I posit that social scientists ought to concentrate on examining the socio-economic, political, psychological, and spatial practices, policies, discourses, and processes that give rise to the formation of new communities. These communities often find themselves marginalised, and compelled to constitute new minorities as a result of perceived experiences of deprivation, discrimination, humiliation, alienation, and exclusion. Such circumstances can potentially lead to the emergence of various manifestations of resentment, carrying the risk of deepening societal divisions and fragmentations, and of creating new minorities vis-à-vis the majorities. Policymakers and state officials in Europe often state that they value ethno-cultural diversity (Crul, 2016; Vertovec, 2019). However, the pro-diversity rhetoric often seems to be contributing to the consumptuous celebration of ethno-cultural differences, and it does not translate to the local neighbourhood level in many parts of Europe. The homogeneity of many neighbourhoods in European cities reflects a striking mismatch between these aspirations and reality. Our latest study (Kaya et al., 2023) provides empirical evidence for this mismatch and contends that a considerable amount of young migrant-origin Muslims and right-wing nativist individuals prefer to live in neighbourhoods where they feel comfortable with their secluded, like-minded community members, in the form of a kind of local minority (Lazëri, 2023). They make similar choices in terms of living with or near enough to a similar other to carry out their shared lifestyle or values together. One could see many parallels and similarities between individuals with different geographical, ethno-cultural, and religious backgrounds if one takes off the culturalist lens and puts on the social-anthropological lens. of whether individuals are of native or migrant they similar challenges in their everyday lives. Their encompass similar aspects such as leading a life, under conditions, providing their with education, and a These are they all confront challenges in their daily including socio-economic deprivation, unemployment, poverty, exclusion, alienation, humiliation, and perceived These material injustices may individuals to feel like a kind of being a minority with an ethno-cultural or religious group. Instead, it encompasses more and entails the relationship between material and cultural Migration Studies and Identity Studies have become distinct fields in social to other fields of study such as and both fields have been with the of ethno-cultural and religious differences in a way that the socio-economic, political, spatial, and psychological boundaries between and migrant-origin individuals the that many of those are in the socio-economic The on cultural and religious differences seems to to the of the social – an existing process that is by the neoliberal forms of that prudentialism and communitarianism at the of the and of the social. have been the age of such as financial crisis, the refugee crisis, in a way that Manichean and polarising is one of these that heavily on the of of resentment, and by various political and societal actors who have a in the of civilisational, cultural and religious boundaries in I argued that a understanding of ultra-politics that politics as an ontological between and or us and has become the in formal politics and political institutions has I also argued that it is the of ultra-politics that has individuals and social groups to new political tactics and collective actions to their through social This is what Ulrich Beck it seems to that we are all between and populist forms of ultra-politics and The between the from the lack of and redistributive forms of justice that is to be generated by formal democratic political which are expected to the structural in societies such as socio-economic, political, and spatial forms of deprivation. A question here for social scientists in and for Migration Studies and Identity Studies scholars in how to to the of the to this question in parallel with what and Their was that we a is that we a in social that could help us similarities among individuals who through similar socio-economic, political, psychological and spatial endeavours rather than ethno-cultural and religious differences and The in this are those of the and do not necessarily the of the for Migration

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