Commentary

How is Covid‐19 Reshaping Labour Migration

Bibliographic Data

ID9953922
AuthorsDemetrios G Papademetriou (0000-0001-6228-4318, Migration Policy Institute Washington, D.C, corresponding author), Kate Hooper (Migration Policy Institute Washington, D.C)
Year2020
Volume58
Issue4
Pages259-262
Publication date2020-07-30
Peer ReviewedYes
Open AccessYes
TypeARTICLE
VenueInternational Migration (JOURNAL)
Journal identifiersISSN: 0020-7985 • E-ISSN: 1468-2435
PublisherWiley (PUBLISHER • GB)
DOI10.1111/imig.12748
OpenAlexW3046180974
LanguageEN
Citations received9
References cited3

The COVID-19 pandemic swiftly halted most labour migration in its tracks. Most countries closed their borders and instituted travel restrictions or outright bans to try and stem the spread of COVID-19, and most visa and immigration case processing was paused. As a result, even migrants holding employment offers were unable to reach their destination. While mobility of all types has been disrupted by restrictions on travel and immigration, it is the economic devastation from the pandemic that will likely have the sharpest and longest effect on migration to advanced economies, and by extension, to prospective migrants and their households, and countries of origin. The decision taken by many governments to shutter their economies undoubtedly saved many lives, but it came at a staggering economic cost. As demand cratered in sectors ranging from retail of virtually all types (groceries and food delivery have been major exceptions) and hospitality, travel and tourism, to personal services, vast numbers of people have been laid off, furloughed or faced cuts to their hours and pay. The unemployment numbers and projected hits to economic output across the globe illustrate this devastation. The United States, for example, went from having the lowest unemployment rate in 50 years in February 2020 (at 3.5 per cent) to the highest unemployment rate since the Great Depression in April 2020 (14.7 per cent) (U.S. Bureau of Labor Statistics, 2020). And in Europe, while the rise in unemployment has been more modest, governments are spending billions to support workers who are furloughed or facing cuts to their work or wages. There is consensus among the World Bank, the OECD and other multilateral institutions that the still unfolding recession will outpace the “Great Recession” of 2008-9 by far and rival the recessions experienced after the two World Wars and during the Great Depression of the 1930s (World Bank Group, 2020; OECD, 2020). Moreover, there remains great uncertainty about what proportion and which jobs will return, and on what timeline. In another example from the United States, while the unemployment rate fell modestly in May and June 2020, researchers estimate that as much as half of all recent job losses will ultimately become permanent (Barrero et al., 2020). And the economic and jobs damage to developing countries who are experiencing the virus’ fury (even as the spread slows enough in most of the developed north to begin reopening their economies) will be incalculable. The unavoidable conclusion is thus clear: in the space of four months, COVID-19 has transformed the economic picture for almost all countries and has upended the context for labour migration to high-income immigrant destination countries. And in the absence of an effective and widely available vaccine, or enormous progress in treatment, it is impossible to predict when migration and mobility might fully restart. Furthermore, even when restrictions are lifted, the worker demand side of the migration equation will remain blurry and uncertain. Nonetheless, and even as overall demand for workers has fallen, the crisis has revealed the continuing dependence of many higher income countries on “essential” workers in sectors ranging from perishable crop agriculture and food production and processing, to logistics and infrastructure that provide critical services and keep supply chains running, to health care and eldercare. These are sectors in which immigrants already make up a disproportionate share of the workforce. Unsurprisingly, as borders closed, acute shortages quickly emerged in some of these industries. The health emergency inspired governments to take measures to accelerate the credentialing of immigrants with medical training, extend the visas and work permits of foreign medical workers, and in the United States, remove geographical restrictions on the work visas for some foreign medical personnel and introduce legislation to import new medical workers from abroad. But it is in the agricultural sector where countries demonstrated the greatest imagination—a testament to both the importance of food security across the board and the political power of the “farm lobby”. Producers across Europe and North America quickly moved to recruit enough workers to harvest seasonal crops. Even as governments extended visa and work permits for seasonal workers already in the country, and in some cases launched initiatives to recruit unemployed residents to take these jobs, many destination countries (including much of Europe, Canada and the United States) have continued to admit workers in seasonal agriculture. Immigration policymakers are thus facing the conundrum of how to admit these essential workers even in the context of a massive economic downturn, and in doing so, how to reduce the risks currently associated with travel and admission. Governments have responded by introducing measures at different stages of the journey so as to reduce risk, including screening people at the point of departure (whether through health questionnaires or medical certificates) and during transit (such as temperature checks or COVID-19 tests), and requiring quarantine on arrival—a policy idea that has spread across many countries. But none of these measures are foolproof, especially given the unknown number of carriers who may be asymptomatic, and they require significant resources and investments in infrastructure that may be out of reach for all but the wealthiest countries and travellers. Reducing the risks to migrants does not stop at the border. It will also require governments to work closely with employers to ensure safe working and living conditions, and to consider additional screening or quarantine measures as workers prepare to return to their homes to minimize the risk of transmission there. Looking further ahead, a bigger question for policy analysts is whether COVID-19 may also lead governments to revisit their labour migration priorities, including who they admit, when (that is, under what economic circumstances), and on what terms. In a scenario where COVID-19 continues to menace most societies, public health considerations may shape migration pathways as much as economic considerations. Even as infection caseloads and deaths plateau and fall in most of Europe, Canada, Australia and many other developed countries, the virus continues to wreak havoc in countries in Africa, Asia and Latin America. One of the pandemic’s possible migration consequences may thus be reducing certain countries’ reliance on some by now established routes and refocusing on migration corridors between neighbouring countries, thus returning migration to its regional roots, and, at least initially, refocusing mobility to groups of countries that share similar epidemiological conditions. To date, however, the “travel bubbles” that have emerged in the Baltics and in Scandinavia (barring Sweden for now, due to its higher caseload), or which are under discussion in Australia and New Zealand, and in Singapore and Taiwan, are between high-income countries—and are thus focused primarily on mobility and its economic advantages, rather than labour market needs. The economic and jobs harm the pandemic has already caused is immense. Its full effect, however, will unfold in the months ahead and for those who have lost their jobs, clawing back up from the abyss will take time. And the “economic scarring” for younger workers will be long and, in many instances, could last throughout most of their working lives. These realities raise the question of which types of workers governments should be focused on admitting. In recent years, immigration policymakers across the wealthy north but also in major emerging economies have tended to focus on high-skilled migration and the competition for “talent”. The ongoing crisis, however, has shed light on another area of dependence: essential workers at all skill levels, including in many low- and middle-skilled roles. And while the nature of their work has required essential workers and many blue-collar employees to continue reporting to their workplaces despite the obvious risks, many white-collar professionals have transitioned to working remotely with little clarity on when (and even if) they will need to return to their offices. Will the crisis encourage policymakers to think more imaginatively on how and under what visa types they should admit essential workers across the skill spectrum? And with unemployment and underemployment being the dominant economic and political issue for the near-to-mid-term (six months to three years), will governments be able to navigate the political backlash that returning to large-scale immigration is likely to generate in many countries? Perhaps even more to the point, will employers be willing to lobby actively for more workers from abroad, rather than investing deeper in training and retraining resident workers and traditionally disadvantaged groups with tenuous attachment to the labour market that exist in all countries, as well as recently arrived asylum seekers and refugees? COVID-19 may also shape immigrants’ calculus about when and where to move. Migration has become much riskier for prospective immigrants, not only in terms of the health risks associated with travel, but also in terms of the uncertainty that may await many of them in destination countries, including being accepted where they settle, their ability to find employment or look for another job if they are laid off, and to bring their family members with them. Some prospective immigrants may be unwilling to assume these risks for now, especially for a temporary visa with no prospects for converting such visas into permanent status and its associated rights. But others who rely on migration to support their families may see few alternatives. In this scenario, will the crisis further expose the fault line between those who see labour migration as an opportunity and those who depend on it as an economic lifeline? Finally, in the context of a historic recession, governments will need to take a step back from their short-term crisis mode and reflect on the role that immigration could—and should—play in meeting labour market needs in the coming months and years. The lifting of shutdown measures while constraints on migration remain in place offers an opportunity to re-examine why some employers struggle to recruit locally and scrutinize what the best policy responses may be. For example, if the issue is one of the skills mismatch, are there avenues to rethink training and education priorities to better meet employers’ skills needs? Similarly, couldn’t some locational (geographic) mismatches be partly addressed by improving the economic, social and cultural infrastructure of regions that are experiencing population decline, especially among their younger and most dynamic residents? And where jobs may be going begging despite policy interventions, is there scope to improve compensation and working conditions, or to improve productivity through thoughtful automation in some of these sectors or industries? With economic downturns often associated with a fall in public support for immigration (Goldstein and Peters, 2014; Finseraas et al., 2014), policymakers will need to clearly communicate both their strategies for supporting hard-hit residents to find training and employment opportunities, and where appropriate, the rationale for continuing some admissions through labour migration channels. The peer review history for this article is available at https://publons.com/publon/10.1111/imig.12748

2019-20 coronavirus outbreak · Coronavirus disease 2019 (COVID-19 · Infectious disease (medical specialty · Outbreak · Pandemic · Political science · Severe acute respiratory syndrome coronavirus 2 (SARS-CoV-2 · Employment and Welfare Studies · Medicine · Migration and Labor Dynamics · Migration, Health and Trauma · Virology

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