Majority Rule vs. Great Power Agreement in the United Nations

I. The Rationale of the Veto At the time of San Francisco, and intermittently since, five separate but interrelated arguments have been advanced to support the veto privilege: I) that the terms of Article 27 (3) of the Charter, by requiring big power negotiations before a vote is taken, in fact guarantee preservation of international peace; 2) that, since big powers cannot and will not submit to being voted into a war by small and medium states, the chain of events theory is valid and a big power should be permitted to exercise a veto on a subject which might eventually lead to enforcement action by the United Nations; 3) that the veto acts as a kind of safety valve preserving the status quo and preventing controversial changes which might cause conflict among the Big Five; 4) that the veto enables states in a minority position to protect their vital interests against infringement by the majority; and finally, 5) that the veto has, in fact, been used as a bargaining weapon by small states or by a minority

Charter · Economics · Enforcement · Law and economics · Negotiation · Political science · Politics · Power (physics · Privilege (computing · Status quo · Veto · Global Peace and Security Dynamics · International Law and Human Rights · Law · World Trade Organization Law

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  Open Access•Elizabeth Mcintyre•International Organization•1954

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• Bloc Voting in the General Assembly

  Open Access•M Margaret Ball•International Organization•1951

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