Howard Rosenthal

Biographic Data

ID266244
NAMEHoward Rosenthal
GIVEN NAMESHoward
FAMILY NAMERosenthal
SIGNATUREROSENTHAL H
AFFILIATIONSHoward Rosenthal, a Fellow of the American Academy since 1992, is Roger Williams Straus Professor of Social Sciences, Emeritus, at Princeton University, and Professor of Politics at New York University. His numerous publications include “Partisan Politics, Divided Government, and the Economy” (with Alberto Alesina, 1995) and “Ideology and Congress” (with Keith T. Poole, 2007). He also edited “Credit Markets for the Poor” (with Patrick Bolton, 2005)
VERIFIEDNo
TOTAL WORKS70
TOTAL CITATIONS2693
AUTHOR COUNT69
EDITOR COUNT1
FIRST PUBLICATION YEAR1965
LATEST PUBLICATION YEAR2017
H-INDEX20

  • Ideology and the Ideologists

    Lewis S Feuer, Howard RosenthalBOOKIdeology and the Ideologists2017

    The revival of ideology, which began early in the second half of the last century, has led to reconsideration of the following questions: What underlies the pattern of the rise and decline of the ideological mode of thought? What leads young intellectuals to search for an ideology? What accounts for the changes in ideological fashion over time and nation, and shifts from one set of philosophical tenets to another? Who indeed are the ""intellectua…

  • What Do We Owe Each Other

    David J Rothman, Howard L Rosenthal et al.BOOKWhat Do We Owe Each Other?2017

    What Do We Owe Each Other? includes essays by some of the finest social and political policy researchers in the United States. They address critical issues in contemporary American society. These range from the making of public opinion, the nature of the presumed social contract between government and its people, the special place of corporate governance and institutional investors with respect to social stability, the search for educational equa…

  • Ideology & Congress

    Keith T Poole, Howard Rosenthal et al.BOOKIdeology and Congress2017

    In Ideology and Congress, authors Poole and Rosenthal have analyzed over 13 million individual roll call votes spanning the two centuries since Congress began recording votes in 1789. By tracing the voting patterns of Congress throughout the country's history, the authors find that, despite a wide array of issues facing legislators, over 81 percent of their voting decisions can be attributed to a consistent ideological position ranging from ultra…

  • Polarized America

    Adam Bonica, Howard Rosenthal et al.BOOKPolarized America2016Cited by: 405

  • RSF

    Howard Rosenthal, Atif R Mian et al.BOOKRSF : The Russell Sage Foundation…2016

  • Congressional Polarization and Its Connection to Income Inequality

    Open AccessAdam Bonica, Nolan Mccarty et al.CHAPTERAmerican Gridlock2015

    This essay updates our findings on political polarization in Congress and elite political actors who work through Congress to affect public policy. We also link various threads of our research with the other essays in this volume. We begin with a discussion of the methodologies that enabled us to identify the emergence of political polarization in Congress, and then turn to substantive results.

  • Some Simple Tests of Rational Voting and Agenda Setting

    Open AccessSean P Corcoran, Sean Corcoran et al.ARTICLEPolitical Science Research and…2015References: 16

    This article analyzes election data that permit simple tests of rational voting and agenda setting. The voting test pertains to aggregate election results. The prediction is that when voters have single-peaked preferences, there will be more opposition to the second of two budget proposals that are voted on simultaneously. Unlike the standard binary choice setting, not all voters have weakly undominated voting strategies, but the game among the v…

  • Why Hasn’t Democracy Slowed Rising Inequality?

    Open AccessAdam Bonica, Nolan Mccarty et al.ARTICLESSRN Electronic Journal2013

  • Political Bubbles

    Nolan Mccarty, Keith T Poole et al.BOOKPolitical Bubbles2013

  • The Structure of Utility in Spatial Models of Voting

    Open AccessRoyce Carroll, Jamie B Lewis et al.ARTICLEAmerican Journal of Political…2013Cited by: 28References: 42

    Empirical models of spatial voting allow legislators' locations in a policy or ideological space to be inferred from their roll‐call votes. These are typically random utility models where the features of the utility functions other than the ideal points are assumed rather than estimated. In this article, we first consider a model in which legislators' utility functions are allowed to be a mixture of the two most commonly assumed utility functions…

  • Why Hasn't Democracy Slowed Rising Inequality

    Open AccessAdam Bonica, Nolan Mccarty et al.ARTICLEThe Journal of Economic…2013Cited by: 85References: 20

    During the past two generations, democratic forms have coexisted with massive increases in economic inequality in the United States and many other advanced democracies. Moreover, these new inequalities have primarily benefited the top 1 percent and even the top .01 percent. These groups seem sufficiently small that economic inequality could be held in check by political equality in the form of "one person, one vote." In this paper, we explore fiv…

  • Political fortunes

    Open AccessNolan Mccarty, Keith T Poole et al.ARTICLEDaedalus2010Cited by: 3

    Both during and after bubbles, political outcomes reflect the same forces that operate even in normal times. Such forces include decision-making based on ideologies – free market conservatism, egalitarianism, and populism. Political decisions (and non-decisions) also reflect checks and balances across branches of the federal government, across layers of government in a federal system, and institutional checks, such as bicameralism and filibusters…

  • Favorite counseling and therapy techniques

    Howard RosenthalBOOKFavorite counseling and therapy…2010

  • Measuring Bias and Uncertainty in DW-Nominate Ideal Point Estimates via the Parametric Bootstrap

    Open AccessRoyce Carroll, Jamie B Lewis et al.ARTICLEPolitical Analysis2009Cited by: 45References: 9

    DW-NOMINATE scores for the U.S. Congress are widely used measures of legislators' ideological locations over time. These scores have been used in a large number of studies in political science and closely related fields. In this paper, we extend the work of Lewis and Poole (2004) on the parametric bootstrap to DW-NOMINATE and obtain standard errors for the legislator ideal points. These standard errors are in the range of 1%–4% of the range of DW…

  • Comparing Nominate and Ideal

    Open AccessRoyce Carroll, Jamie B Lewis et al.ARTICLELegislative Studies Quarterly2009Cited by: 40References: 24

    Empirical models of spatial voting allow us to infer legislators' locations in an abstract policy or ideological space using their roll‐call votes. Over the past 25 years, these models have provided new insights about the U.S. Congress, and legislative behavior more generally. There are now a number of alternative models, estimators, and software packages that researchers can use to recover latent issue or ideological spaces from voting data. The…

  • Does Gerrymandering Cause Polarization

    Open AccessNolan Mccarty, Keith T Poole et al.ARTICLEAmerican Journal of Political…2009Cited by: 93References: 16

    Both pundits and scholars have blamed increasing levels of partisan conflict and polarization in Congress on the effects of partisan gerrymandering. We assess whether there is a strong causal relationship between congressional districting and polarization. We find very little evidence for such a link. First, we show that congressional polarization is primarily a function of the differences in how Democrats and Republicans represent the same distr…

  • American Politics X

    Ronald Andersen, Robert Andersen et al.ARTICLENew Labor Forum2008

  • On party polarization in Congress

    Open AccessKeith T Poole, Howard Rosenthal et al.ARTICLEDaedalus2007Cited by: 6

  • Gerald H. Kramer. 1971. “Short-Term Fluctuations in U.S. Voting Behavior, 1896–1964.” American Political Science Review 71 (March)

    Open AccessHoward Rosenthal, Howard L RosenthalARTICLEAmerican Political Science Review2006

    Gerald Kramer, Steven Brams, Peter Ordeshook, Samuel Popkin, and I were MIT undergraduates interested in political science in the late 1950s. Kramer, after taking a job at Rochester under the new chairman, William Riker, spent 1966–1967 at the Cowles Foundation at Yale University studying econometrics under Marc Nerlove. He began investigating the question of whether macroeconomic fluctuations had any effect on voting behavior. After discovering,…

  • Analyzing Roll Calls with Perfect Spatial Voting

    Open AccessHoward Rosenthal, Howard L Rosenthal et al.ARTICLEAmerican Journal of Political…2004Cited by: 77References: 29

    A recent methodological advance in legislative roll‐call analysis is especially relevant to the study of legislative behavior outside the setting of the United States Congress. We argue that Poole's (2000) optimal classification method for roll‐call analysis is preferable to parametric methods for studying many legislatures. This is because the nature of party discipline, near‐perfect spatial voting, and parliamentary institutions that provides i…

  • Analyzing Roll Calls with Perfect Spatial Voting

    Howard Rosenthal, Howard L Rosenthal et al.ARTICLEAmerican Journal of Political…2004Cited by: 7

    A recent methodological advance in legislative roll-call analysis is especially relevant to the study of legislative behavior outside the setting of the United States Congress. We argue that Poole's (2000) optimal classification method for roll-call analysis is preferable to parametric methods for studying many legislatures. This is because the nature of party discipline, near-perfect spatial voting, and parliamentary institutions that provides i…

  • Political Polarization and Income Inequality

    Open AccessNolan Mccarty, Nolan M Mccarty et al.ARTICLESSRN Electronic Journal2003

  • Political Intervention in Debt Contracts

    Patrick Bolton, Howard Rosenthal et al.ARTICLEJournal of Political Economy2002Cited by: 6References: 4

    This paper develops a dynamic general equilibrium model of an agricultural economy in which poor farmers borrow from rich farmers. Because output is stochastic (we allow for idiosyncratic and aggregate shocks), there may be default ex post. We compare equilibria with and without political intervention. Intervention takes the form of a moratorium and is decided by voting. When bad economic shocks are highly likely, state-contingent debt moratoria …

  • D-Nominate after 10 Years

    Open AccessKeith T Poole, Howard Rosenthal et al.ARTICLELegislative Studies Quarterly2001Cited by: 109References: 6

  • The Hunt for Party Discipline in Congress

    Open AccessNolan Mccarty, Keith T Poole et al.ARTICLEAmerican Political Science Review2001Cited by: 133References: 5

    We analyze party discipline in the House of Representatives between 1947 and 1998. The effects of party pressures can be represented in a spatial model by allowing each party to have its own cutting line on roll call votes. Adding a second cutting line makes, at best, a marginal improvement over the standard single-line model. Analysis of legislators who switch parties shows, however, that party discipline is manifest in the location of the legis…