Why Hasn't Democracy Slowed Rising Inequality

Bibliographic Data

ID4029250
AuthorsAdam Bonica (0000-0002-3004-9441, Assistant Professor of Political Science, Stanford University, Stanford, California.), Nolan Mccarty (0000-0002-0538-1928, Susan Dod Brown Professor of Politics and Public Affairs, Woodrow Wilson School, Princeton University, Princeton, New Jersey.), Keith T Poole (Philip H. Alston Jr. Distinguished Professor of Political Science, University of Georgia, Athens, Georgia.), Howard Rosenthal, Howard L Rosenthal (0000-0001-5051-1341, Professor of Politics, New York University, New York City, New York.)
Year2013
Volume27
Issue3
Pages103-124
Publication date2013-08-01
Peer ReviewedYes
Open AccessYes
TypeARTICLE
VenueThe Journal of Economic Perspectives (JOURNAL)
Journal identifiersISSN: 0895-3309 • E-ISSN: 1944-7965
PublisherAmerican Economic Association (PUBLISHER • US)
DOI10.1257/jep.27.3.103
OpenAlexW2058508584
LanguageEN
Citations received150
References cited26

During the past two generations, democratic forms have coexisted with massive increases in economic inequality in the United States and many other advanced democracies. Moreover, these new inequalities have primarily benefited the top 1 percent and even the top .01 percent. These groups seem sufficiently small that economic inequality could be held in check by political equality in the form of "one person, one vote." In this paper, we explore five possible reasons why the US political system has failed to counterbalance rising inequality. First, both Republicans and many Democrats have experienced an ideological shift toward acceptance of a form of free market capitalism that offers less support for government provision of transfers, lower marginal tax rates for those with high incomes, and deregulation of a number of industries. Second, immigration and low turnout of the poor have combined to make the distribution of voters more weighted to high incomes than is the distribution of households. Third, rising real income and wealth has made a larger fraction of the population less attracted to turning to government for social insurance. Fourth, the rich have been able to use their resources to influence electoral, legislative, and regulatory processes through campaign contributions, lobbying, and revolving door employment of politicians and bureaucrats. Fifth, the political process is distorted by institutions that reduce the accountability of elected officials to the majority and hampered by institutions that combine with political polarization to create policy gridlock

Democracy · Deregulation · Economic inequality · Economics · Gridlock · Income distribution · Inequality · Labour economics · Legislature · Market economy · Polarization (electrochemistry) · Political economy · Political science · Politics · Population · Redistribution (election) · Sociology · Electoral Systems and Political Participation · Housing, Finance, and Neoliberalism · Law · Social Policy and Reform Studies