Sandy Berkovski
Biographic Data
| ID | 5997464 |
|---|---|
| NAME | Sandy Berkovski |
| GIVEN NAMES | Sandy |
| FAMILY NAME | Berkovski |
| SIGNATURE | BERKOVSKI S |
| AFFILIATIONS | Bilkent University |
| VERIFIED | No |
| TOTAL WORKS | 3 |
| TOTAL CITATIONS | 0 |
| AUTHOR COUNT | 3 |
| EDITOR COUNT | 0 |
| FIRST PUBLICATION YEAR | 2011 |
| LATEST PUBLICATION YEAR | 2022 |
| H-INDEX | 0 |
Mandeville on self-liking, morality, and hypocrisy
I explore Mandeville’s account of moral judgement and its implications for the understanding of hypocrisy. According to Mandeville, we have a psychological need to like ourselves sufficiently, so as to carry on with our lives. Because our self-liking necessarily depends on the opinions others form of us, we are extraordinarily sensitive to praise and condemnation. The practice of moral judgement exploits this sensitivity. Hypocrisy is an intrinsi…
The Possibility of Modified Hedonism
A popular objection to hedonist accounts of personal welfare has been the experience machine argument. Several modifications of traditional hedonism have been proposed in response. In this article I examine two such responses, recently expounded by F eldman and S umner respectively. I argue that both modifications make hedonism indistinguishable from anti‐hedonism. Sumner's account, I claim, also fails to satisfy the demands of theoretical unity
Reichenbach and Weyl on apriority and mathematical applicability
No prominent works on this page.
Reichenbach and Weyl on apriority and mathematical applicability
The Possibility of Modified Hedonism
A popular objection to hedonist accounts of personal welfare has been the experience machine argument. Several modifications of traditional hedonism have been proposed in response. In this article I examine two such responses, recently expounded by F eldman and S umner respectively. I argue that both modifications make hedonism indistinguishable from anti‐hedonism. Sumner's account, I claim, also fails to satisfy the demands of theoretical unity
Mandeville on self-liking, morality, and hypocrisy
I explore Mandeville’s account of moral judgement and its implications for the understanding of hypocrisy. According to Mandeville, we have a psychological need to like ourselves sufficiently, so as to carry on with our lives. Because our self-liking necessarily depends on the opinions others form of us, we are extraordinarily sensitive to praise and condemnation. The practice of moral judgement exploits this sensitivity. Hypocrisy is an intrinsi…
Epistemology (3 works) · Philosophy (3 works) · A priori and a posteriori (1 works) · Academic and Historical Perspectives in Psychology (1 works) · Argument (complex analysis) (1 works) · Blank (1 works) · Economic Theory and Institutions (1 works) · Economics (1 works) · Emile Durkheim and Sociology (1 works) · Hedonism (1 works)