The Possibility of Modified Hedonism
Bibliographic Data
| ID | 20143089 |
|---|---|
| Authors | Sandy Berkovski (Bilkent University, corresponding author) |
| Year | 2012 |
| Volume | 78 |
| Issue | 3 |
| Pages | 186-212 |
| Publication date | 2012-09-01 |
| Peer Reviewed | Yes |
| Open Access | Yes |
| Type | ARTICLE |
| Venue | Theoria (JOURNAL) |
| Journal identifiers | ISSN: 0040-5825 • E-ISSN: 1755-2567 |
| Publisher | Wiley (PUBLISHER • GB) |
| DOI | 10.1111/j.1755-2567.2012.01141.x |
| OpenAlex | W2154969497 |
| Language | EN |
| References cited | 22 |
A popular objection to hedonist accounts of personal welfare has been the experience machine argument. Several modifications of traditional hedonism have been proposed in response. In this article I examine two such responses, recently expounded by F eldman and S umner respectively. I argue that both modifications make hedonism indistinguishable from anti‐hedonism. Sumner's account, I claim, also fails to satisfy the demands of theoretical unity
Argument (complex analysis) · Economics · Epistemology · Hedonism · Positive economics · Economic Theory and Institutions · Philosophical Ethics and Theory · Philosophy · Political Philosophy and Ethics
The Pursuit of Unhappiness
The Greeks On Pleasure
The Principles of Moral and Political Philosophy
Three Faces of Desire
What Is This Thing Called Happiness?
Rethinking Intrinsic Value
Explanation and Scientific Understanding
Well-Being, Agency and Freedom
Welfare, Happiness, and Ethics
The Subjectivity of Welfare
The Meaning of άγαθόν in the Ethics of Aristotle
Whole Life Satisfaction Concepts of Happiness
Why Idealize
Personal Value
The Retreat of Reason
Pleasure and the Good Life
| Citation velocity | historical |
|---|---|
| Highly cited | No |