Sellars vs. the Given
Bibliographic Data
| ID | 10345924 |
|---|---|
| Authors | Daniel Bonevac (0000-0001-8666-1771, The University of Texas at Austin, corresponding author) |
| Year | 2002 |
| Volume | 64 |
| Issue | 1 |
| Pages | 1-30 |
| Publication date | 2002-01-01 |
| Peer Reviewed | Yes |
| Open Access | Yes |
| Type | ARTICLE |
| Venue | Philosophy and Phenomenological Research (JOURNAL) |
| Journal identifiers | ISSN: 0031-8205 • E-ISSN: 1933-1592 |
| Publisher | Wiley (PUBLISHER • GB) |
| DOI | 10.1111/j.1933-1592.2002.tb00140.x |
| OpenAlex | W2086911875 |
| Language | EN |
| Citations received | 9 |
| References cited | 14 |
John McDowell, Richard Rorty, and Robert Brandom invoke Sellars's arguments against the Myth of the Given as having shown that the Given is nothing more than a myth. But most of Sellars's arguments attack logical atomism, not the framework of givenness as such. Moreover, they do not succeed. At crucial points the arguments confuse the perspectives of a knower and those attributing knowledge to a knower. Only one argument—the “inconsistent triad” argument—addresses the Myth of the Given as such, and there are several ways of escaping its conclusion. Invocations of Sellars's refutation of the Myth of the Given are empty
Argument (complex analysis · Epistemology · Mythology · Nothing · Theology · Epistemology, Ethics, and Metaphysics · Philosophy · Philosophy and History of Science · Philosophy and Theoretical Science
Sellars's ontological nominalism
Where Objective Facts and Norms Meet (and What this Means for Law)
A Myth resurgent
Taking Experiential Givenism Seriously
Sellars on Perceptual Knowledge
On the very idea of normative foundations in critical social theory
What is the myth of the given
Introspection
Pragmatism, Experience, and the Given
| Unique citing works | 9 |
|---|---|
| Citations per year | 0,53 |
| Citation span | 2009 - 2023 (15) |
| Citation velocity | historical |
| Highly cited | No |
| Citation types | Neutral: 9 |