Why I Am Not a Boltzmann Brain
Bibliographic Data
| ID | 10693176 |
|---|---|
| Authors | Sinan Dogramaci (The University of Texas at Austin), Miriam Schoenfield (The University of Texas at Austin) |
| Year | 2025 |
| Volume | 134 |
| Issue | 1 |
| Pages | 1-33 |
| Publication date | 2025-01-01 |
| Peer Reviewed | Yes |
| Open Access | No |
| Type | ARTICLE |
| Venue | The Philosophical Review (JOURNAL) |
| Journal identifiers | ISSN: 0031-8108 • E-ISSN: 1558-1470 |
| Publisher | Duke University Press (PUBLISHER • US) |
| DOI | 10.1215/00318108-11591068 |
| OpenAlex | W4407303356 |
| Language | EN |
| Citations received | 2 |
| References cited | 22 |
This article gives a Bayesian argument showing that, even if your total empirical evidence confirms that you have zillions of duplicate Boltzmann Brains, that evidence does not confirm that you are a Boltzmann Brain. The article also attempts to explain what goes wrong with several of the sources of the temptation for thinking that such evidence does have skeptical implications
Physics · Philosophy · Philosophy and History of Science · Philosophy and Theoretical Science · Quantum Mechanics and Applications
The Unity of Perception
Problems for Dogmatism
The Boltzmann Brains Puzzle
Center indifference and skepticism
Elusive knowledge
Dragging and Confirming
The Simulation Argument
Defeating Dr. Evil with Self‐Locating Belief
Should We Respond to Evil with Indifference
Main Trends in Recent Philosophy
Are We Living in a Computer Simulation
| Unique citing works | 2 |
|---|---|
| Citations per year | 2 |
| Citation span | 2025 - 2026 (2) |
| Citation velocity | current |
| Highly cited | No |
| Citation types | Neutral: 1 |