Dragging and Confirming
Bibliographic Data
| ID | 10694653 |
|---|---|
| Authors | Matthew Kotzen (0000-0003-0305-4736, corresponding author) |
| Year | 2012 |
| Volume | 121 |
| Issue | 1 |
| Pages | 55-93 |
| Publication date | 2012-01-01 |
| Peer Reviewed | Yes |
| Open Access | No |
| Type | ARTICLE |
| Venue | The Philosophical Review (JOURNAL) |
| Journal identifiers | ISSN: 0031-8108 • E-ISSN: 1558-1470 |
| Publisher | Duke University Press (PUBLISHER • US) |
| DOI | 10.1215/00318108-1426364 |
| OpenAlex | W2023223828 |
| Language | EN |
| Citations received | 4 |
| References cited | 23 |
This essay addresses the question of when evidence for a stronger claim H1 also constitutes evidence for a weaker claim H2. Although the answer “Always” is tempting, it is false on a natural Bayesian conception of evidence. This essay first describes some prima facie counterexamples to this answer and surveys some weaker answers and rejects them. Next, it proposes an answer, which appeals to the “Dragging Condition.” After explaining and arguing for its use of the Dragging Condition, the essay argues that the Dragging Condition provides a general account of, and solution to, the counterexamples with which the essay began. The essay briefly discusses the relevance of the Dragging Condition to the recently much-discussed topic of “transmission failure” in epistemology, applies the Dragging Condition to the problem of “bootstrapping” in epistemology, and discusses three important objections to the view defended in the essay
Bootstrapping (finance) · Counterexample · Econometrics · Economics · Epistemology · Natural (archaeology) · Political science · Prima facie · Relevance (law) · Epistemology, Ethics, and Metaphysics · History · Law · Mathematics · Philosophy · Philosophy and History of Science · Philosophy and Theoretical Science
Problems for Dogmatism
What's Wrong with Moore's Argument?
I—Crispin Wright
Aspects of Scientific Explanation
Epistemic Permissiveness
Weinberg on QFT
On having no reason
Slightly More Realistic Personal Probability
When Transmission Fails
Basic Knowledge and the Problem of Easy Knowledge
Change in View
(Anti‐)Sceptics Simple and Subtle
Fact, fiction, and forecast
Transfer of Warrant, Begging the Question and Semantic Externalism
| Unique citing works | 4 |
|---|---|
| Citations per year | 0,31 |
| Citation span | 2013 - 2025 (13) |
| Citation velocity | recent |
| Highly cited | No |
| Citation types | Neutral: 4 |