Intentionalism Defended
Bibliographic Data
| ID | 10693394 |
|---|---|
| Authors | Anthony Byrne (0000-0003-3652-1492, corresponding author), Alex Byrne |
| Year | 2001 |
| Volume | 110 |
| Issue | 2 |
| Pages | 199-240 |
| Publication date | 2001-04-01 |
| Peer Reviewed | Yes |
| Open Access | No |
| Type | ARTICLE |
| Venue | The Philosophical Review (JOURNAL) |
| Journal identifiers | ISSN: 0031-8108 • E-ISSN: 1558-1470 |
| Publisher | Duke University Press (PUBLISHER • US) |
| DOI | 10.1215/00318108-110-2-199 |
| OpenAlex | W4250854927 |
| Language | EN |
| Citations received | 91 |
| References cited | 54 |
Research Article| April 01 2001 Intentionalism Defended Alex Byrne Alex Byrne Search for other works by this author on: This Site Google The Philosophical Review (2001) 110 (2): 199–240. https://doi.org/10.1215/00318108-110-2-199 Cite Icon Cite Share Icon Share Facebook Twitter LinkedIn MailTo Permissions Search Site Citation Alex Byrne; Intentionalism Defended. The Philosophical Review 1 April 2001; 110 (2): 199–240. doi: https://doi.org/10.1215/00318108-110-2-199 Download citation file: Zotero Reference Manager EasyBib Bookends Mendeley Papers EndNote RefWorks BibTex toolbar search Search Dropdown Menu toolbar search search input Search input auto suggest filter your search Books & JournalsAll JournalsThe Philosophical Review Search Advanced Search The text of this article is only available as a PDF. Cornell University2001 Article PDF first page preview Close Modal Issue Section: Front Matter You do not currently have access to this content
Citation · Download · Icon · Information retrieval · Section (typography) · World Wide Web · Computer Science · Epistemology, Ethics, and Metaphysics · Philosophical Ethics and Theory · Philosophy and Theoretical Science
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Wittgenstein and Qualia 1
Factive Phenomenal Characters
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Précis of The Phenomenal and the Representational
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Visual Awareness of Properties
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Transparency and Representationalist Theories of Consciousness
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Non-Propositional Attitudes
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Colour concepts and colour experience
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Pain Perception
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Percepts and Color Mosaics in Visual Experience
Qualities and Qualia
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| Unique citing works | 91 |
|---|---|
| Citations per year | 4,33 |
| Citation span | 2005 - 2026 (22) |
| Citation velocity | current |
| Highly cited | No |
| Citation types | Neutral: 89 |