Strong representationalism and bodily sensations

Reliable causal covariance and biological function

Bibliographic Data

ID21592014
AuthorsSabrina Coninx (0000-0003-1209-4609, Institute for Philosophy II, Ruhr University Bochum, Bochum, Germany, corresponding author)
Year2021
Volume34
Issue2
Pages210-232
Publication date2021-02-17
Peer ReviewedYes
Open AccessNo
TypeARTICLE
VenuePhilosophical Psychology (JOURNAL)
Journal identifiersISSN: 0951-5089 • E-ISSN: 1465-394X
PublisherInforma UK Limited (PUBLISHER • GB)
DOI10.1080/09515089.2020.1858476
OpenAlexW3111689607
LanguageEN
Citations received9
References cited83

Bodily sensations, such as pain, hunger, itches, or sexual feelings, are commonly characterized in terms of their phenomenal character. In order to account for this phenomenal character, many philosophers adopt strong representationalism. According to this view, bodily sensations are essentially and entirely determined by an intentional content related to particular conditions of the body. For example, pain would be nothing more than the representation of actual or potential tissue damage. In order to motivate and justify their view, strong representationalists often appeal to the reliable causal covariance between bodily sensations and certain kinds of bodily conditions or to the corresponding biological function that these bodily sensations are supposed to fulfill. In this paper, I argue on the basis of recent empirical research that arguments from reliable causal covariance and biological function cannot motivate the introduction of corresponding intentional content. In particular, I argue that bodily sensations are caused by a heterogeneous class of physiological and psychological factors and their biological functions are too diverse to be reduced to the representation of a particular bodily condition. Responses are available to strong representationalists, but they either require substantial alterations to their core assumptions or incur a significant empirical burden

Cognitive psychology · Direct and indirect realism · Epistemology · Feeling · Nothing · Perception · Neuroscience · Pain Management and Placebo Effect · Philosophy · Psychology · Psychology of Moral and Emotional Judgment · Psychosomatic Disorders and Their Treatments · Social Psychology