Assertion, Knowledge, and Rational Credibility
Bibliographic Data
| ID | 10694620 |
|---|---|
| Authors | Igor Douven (0000-0003-3413-080X, KU Leuven, corresponding author) |
| Year | 2006 |
| Volume | 115 |
| Issue | 4 |
| Pages | 449-485 |
| Publication date | 2006-10-01 |
| Peer Reviewed | Yes |
| Open Access | No |
| Type | ARTICLE |
| Venue | The Philosophical Review (JOURNAL) |
| Journal identifiers | ISSN: 0031-8108 • E-ISSN: 1558-1470 |
| Publisher | Duke University Press (PUBLISHER • US) |
| DOI | 10.1215/00318108-2006-010 |
| OpenAlex | W2068468488 |
| Language | EN |
| Citations received | 94 |
| References cited | 52 |
Research Article| October 01 2006 Assertion, Knowledge, and Rational Credibility Igor Douven Igor Douven Search for other works by this author on: This Site Google The Philosophical Review (2006) 115 (4): 449–485. https://doi.org/10.1215/00318108-2006-010 Views Icon Views Article contents Figures & tables Video Audio Supplementary Data Peer Review Share Icon Share Facebook Twitter LinkedIn Email Tools Icon Tools Permissions Cite Icon Cite Search Site Citation Igor Douven; Assertion, Knowledge, and Rational Credibility. The Philosophical Review 1 October 2006; 115 (4): 449–485. doi: https://doi.org/10.1215/00318108-2006-010 Download citation file: Zotero Reference Manager EasyBib Bookends Mendeley Papers EndNote RefWorks BibTex toolbar search Search Dropdown Menu toolbar search search input Search input auto suggest filter your search Books & JournalsAll JournalsThe Philosophical Review Search Advanced Search The text of this article is only available as a PDF. Cornell University2006 Article PDF first page preview Close Modal Issue Section: Front Matter You do not currently have access to this content
Assertion · Citation · Credibility · Epistemology · Icon · Information retrieval · Programming language · Section (typography) · World Wide Web · Computer Science · Epistemology, Ethics, and Metaphysics · Philosophy · Philosophy and History of Science · Philosophy and Theoretical Science
Knowledge as Acceptable Testimony
Norms of Assertion
On proper presupposition
Knowledge and Assertion
Assertion and Practical Reasoning
What Is Assertion*?
Knowledge, Dexterity, and Attention
Knowledge As Acceptable Testimony
Justification and the Truth-Connection
Belief, credence, and norms
Expertise
On Predicting
Certainty and Assertion
Communicating Testimonial Commitment
Expert Assertion and Knowledge
Constitutive Norms of Assertion and the Common Ground, or How and Why Do We Play the Assertion game
Moral Deference, Moral Assertion, and Pragmatics
Cook Wilson on judgement
True clauses and false connections
Being in a Position to Know is the Norm of Assertion
Empirical Studies on Truth and the Project of Re‐engineering Truth
Attitudes, conditional and general
Assertion
Right Reason Accounts of the Norm of Assertion
Evidentially Hedged Assertions and the Knowledge Norm of Assertion
Authoritative Knowledge
Scientific conclusions need not be accurate, justified, or believed by their authors
The knowledge norm of assertion in dialectical context
There is No (Sui Generis) Norm of Assertion
The epistemic normativity of conjecture
Truth and perspective
Testimonial contractarianism
More paradoxical Moore-paradoxical sentences
Hedged conjunctions and norms of assertion
Moorean Promises
Should I say that? An experimental investigation of the norm of assertion
Counterevidentials
Hedging and the Norm of Belief
Moorean utterances and the illocutionary dynamics of assertion
Unreasonable Selflessness
Unger's Argument for Skepticism Revisited
Moore′s paradox generalized
The myth of true lies
P, but you don’t know that P
A Speech-Act Perspective on the Rules of Assertion
Normal Future Assertions
Assertoric mindreading
Degrees of Assertability
Problems with Norms of Assertion
Assertion and its Constitutive Norms
The Duty to Object
Expert Opinion and Second‐Hand Knowledge
On a Case for Truth‐Relativism
After form. The credibility thesis meets property theory
The Epistemic Norms of Intra-Scientific Testimony
Assertions, joint epistemic actions and social practices
Two claims about epistemic propriety
Evidence of factive norms of belief and decision
Assertion and safety
Assertion and the “How do you know?” challenge
Assertion and grounding
No hope for conciliationism
Norms of assertion and communication in social networks
Assertion, uniqueness and epistemic hypocrisy
Knowledge, hope, and fallibilism
Knowledge and the norm of assertion
Selfless assertions
An epistemic modal norm of practical reasoning
Discursive justification and skepticism
Knowing-how, showing, and epistemic norms
Contextualism and fallibility
How to be an anti-reductionist
The Self-Knowledge Gambit
Two accounts of assertion
Blame as performance
Non-assertoric speech acts
The evidential support theory of conditionals
A case for a certainty norm of assertion
The C account of assertion
Quantum probabilities and the conjunction principle
Lying, more or less
Fricker on testimonial justification
Assertion, Evidence, and the Future
A Note on Existentially Known Assertions
The Lottery Paradox Generalized
Inference to the Best Explanation in Uncertain Evidential Situations
Lotteries, Knowledge, and Irrelevant Alternatives
Must, knowledge, and (in)directness
Aesthetic Testimony and Aesthetic Authenticity
Experimental work on the norms of assertion
Moore's Paradox in Thought
The Importance of Knowledge Ascriptions
The Ethics of Belief
Moore's Paradox in Speech
Laws and Symmetry
Decision Theory as Philosophy
Belief's Own Ethics
Knowledge and its Limits
Betting on Theories
Skepticism, relevant alternatives, and deductive closure
Context and Logical Form
On Conditionals
The paradox of the preface
A Causal Theory of Knowing
Logic and Conversation
Hume's Problem
Frege
What Conditional Probability Could Not Be
The epistemic virtues of consistency
Probability and Conditionals
Assertion, Knowledge, and Context
Probabilities of Conditionals and Conditional Probabilities
On Assertion and Indicative Conditionals
Assertion and Conditionals
Nelkin on the Lottery Paradox
Nomic Probability and the Foundations of Induction
Ignorance
Epistemic Possibilities
Knowing and Asserting
The Lottery Paradox, Knowledge, and Rationality
The Structure of Empirical Knowledge
The A Priori Rules of Rationality
The Coherence Theory of Knowledge
Generalizing the Lottery Paradox
A New Solution to the Paradoxes of Rational Acceptability
Contemporary theories of knowledge
| Unique citing works | 94 |
|---|---|
| Citations per year | 4,95 |
| Citation span | 2007 - 2026 (20) |
| Citation velocity | current |
| Highly cited | No |
| Citation types | Neutral: 89 |