Ignorance
A Case for Scepticism
Bibliographic Data
| ID | 10698823 |
|---|---|
| Authors | John Koethe, John L Koethe, Peter Unger |
| Year | 1978 |
| Volume | 87 |
| Issue | 1 |
| Pages | 154 |
| Publication date | 1978-01-01 |
| Peer Reviewed | Yes |
| Open Access | No |
| Type | ARTICLE |
| Venue | The Philosophical Review (JOURNAL) |
| Journal identifiers | ISSN: 0031-8108 • E-ISSN: 1558-1470 |
| Publisher | JSTOR (PUBLISHER) |
| DOI | 10.2307/2184366 |
| OpenAlex | W2040715774 |
| Language | EN |
| Citations received | 107 |
In this controversial volume (originally published in 1975) Peter Unger suggests that, not only can nothing ever be known, but no one can ever have a reason at all for anything. A consequence of this is that we cannot have any realistic emotional ties: it can never be conclusively said that someone is happy or sad about anything. Finally he argues that no one can ever say, let alone believe, that anything is the case. In order to get beyond this apparent bind - and this condition of ignorance - Unger proposes a radical departure from the linguistic and epistemological systems we have become accustomed to. Epistemologists, as well as philosophers of mind and language will undoubtedly find in this study of the limitations of language an invaluable philosophical perspective
Contemporary philosophy · Epistemology · General interest · Ignorance · Skepticism · Epistemology, Ethics, and Metaphysics · Philosophy · Wittgensteinian philosophy and applications
The Internal Structure of Perfective Adjectives
The Scope and the Subtleties of the Contextualism-Literalism-Relativism Debate
Evidence
The Demandingness of Virtue
Moral Vagueness and Epistemicism
Knowledge by constraint
Conditional emotions
Enough is Enough
Deception and Evidence 1
Ignorance
Vision, knowledge, and assertion
Ajdukiewicz on skepticism
Is assertion social
Knowledge, Perception and Analysis
Knowledge and Belief
Incoherent but Reasonable
The Puzzle of Metacoherence
Contextualism and the Problem of the External World
Rational Moral Ignorance
Knowledge and Other Norms for Assertion, Action, and Belief
Skepticism, Contextualism, and Discrimination
Closure and Epistemic Modals
Intuition Fail
Imagining as a Guide to Possibility
Practical Certainty
An explanationist account of genealogical defeat
Epistemic Invariantism and Speech Act Contextualism
Perspective‐Taking and the Attribution of Ignorance
Waste and Its Disguises
Epistemic Contextualism, Unarticulated Constituents and Hidden Variables
Assessment Sensitivity Relative Truth And Its Applications
Comparisons of Equality With German so…wie , and the Relationship Between Degrees and Properties
Knowledge, Dexterity, and Attention
Autonomous Knowledge
Knowledge As Acceptable Testimony
Ignorance, History of Concept
Explorations in Ancient and Modern Philosophy
One Kind of Asking
What Kind of Ignorance Excuses? Two Neglected Issues
A Note on Existentially Known Assertions
Saving epistemology from the epistemologists
On the nature of indifferent lies, a reply to Rutschmann and Wiegmann
Lucky Ignorance, Modality and Lack of Knowledge
The signaling function of sharing fake stories
‘Absolute’ adjectives in belief contexts
Knowledge in the face of conspiracy conditionals
Authoritative Knowledge
Evaluating the multiple proposition strategy
Knowledge, true belief, and the gradability of ignorance
Ignorance and awareness
Fancy loose talk about knowledge
Admiration, Appreciation, and Aesthetic Worth
Elementary Knowledge
Newman's Distinction Between Inference and Assent
Unger's Argument for Skepticism Revisited
Common Sense and Evidence
Are Gaps Preferred to Gluts? A Closer Look at Borderline Contradictions
Force, content and the varieties of subject
Fallible reasons on behalf of fallibilism
Two claims about epistemic propriety
Two kinds of a priori infallibility
The New and Old Ignorance Puzzles
Lotteries, knowledge, and inconsistent belief
The Self-Knowledge Gambit
Knowledge and normality
The Evil Demon argument as based on closure plus meta-coherence
Evidence of factive norms of belief and decision
Epistemology Factualized
Four grades of ignorance-involvement and how they nourish the cognitive economy
Lying and knowing
A different kind of dream-based skepticism
A case for a certainty norm of assertion
Knowledge and cancelability
Explication as a strategy for revisionary philosophy
On the generality argument for the knowledge norm
Fallibilism and the value of knowledge
In defense of an epistemic probability account of luck
The nature of doubt and a new puzzle about belief, doubt, and confidence
Assertion and safety
Warrant and action
Emotions, evidence, and safety
True lies and Moorean redundancy
Error possibility, contextualism, and bias
Truth and ignorance
Remembering entails knowing
Do we really need a knowledge-based decision theory
Knowledge and the norm of assertion
Empirical evidence claims are a priori
The disvalue of knowledge
Acting for reasons, apt action, and knowledge
Knowledge and implicatures
The pragmatics of pragmatic encroachment
In defence of virtue epistemology
Advice for Infallibilists
P, but you don’t know that P
How's of why's and why's of how's
Against an inferentialist dogma
Strong knowledge, weak belief
Evolutionary debunking
The logical form of perception sentences
| Unique citing works | 107 |
|---|---|
| Citations per year | 2,28 |
| Citation span | 1979 - 2024 (46) |
| Citation velocity | recent |
| Highly cited | Yes |
| Citation types | Neutral: 77 |