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John Koethe

Biographic Data

ID363757
NAMEJohn Koethe
GIVEN NAMESJohn
FAMILY NAMEKoethe
SIGNATUREKOETHE J
AFFILIATIONSUniversity of Wisconsin–Milwaukee
VERIFIEDNo
TOTAL WORKS21
TOTAL CITATIONS6
AUTHOR COUNT21
EDITOR COUNT0
FIRST PUBLICATION YEAR1978
LATEST PUBLICATION YEAR2014
H-INDEX1
  • Late Wisconsin Spring

    John Koethe•BOOK•Late Wisconsin Spring•2014

  • Perplexity and Plausibility

    John Koethe•ARTICLE•Common Knowledge•2014

    As part of an exchange of views on what Jan Zwicky calls "lyric philosophy," this contribution suggests a way of understanding it that brings out affinities between it and the standard discursive model of philosophy with which she is dissatisfied. Good discursive philosophy is based on perplexity and plausibility: on finding that protophilosophical experiences give rise to philosophical puzzlement, and then finding that some ways of responding to…

  • Meaning in Life and Why It Matters

    Open Access•John Koethe, Susan Wolf et al.•BOOK•Meaning in Life and Why It Matters•2010

  • Scepticism, knowledge, and forms of reasoning

    John Koethe•BOOK•Scepticism, knowledge, and forms…•2005

  • Wittgenstein's Thought in Transition

    John Koethe, Dale Jacquette•ARTICLE•Philosophy and Phenomenological…•2001

  • Sketches of Landscapes

    John Koethe, John R Koethe et al.•ARTICLE•The Philosophical Review•2000

  • Sketches of Landscapes

    John Koethe•ARTICLE•The Philosophical Review•2000

    Book Review| April 01 2000 Sketches of Landscapes: Philosophy by Example SKETCHES OF LANDSCAPES: PHILOSOPHY BY EXAMPLE. By Avrum Stroll. Cambridge: The MIT Press, 1998. Pp. Xiv, 282. John Koethe John Koethe Search for other works by this author on: This Site Google The Philosophical Review (2000) 109 (2): 293–295. https://doi.org/10.1215/00318108-109-2-293 Cite Icon Cite Share Icon Share Twitter Permissions Search Site Citation John Koethe; Sketc…

  • The Contiguity of Wittgenstein's Thought

    Heather J Gert, John Koethe et al.•ARTICLE•Philosophy and Phenomenological…•2000

  • Poetry at One Remove

    John Koethe•ARTICLE•New Literary History•1999

    New Literary History - Volume 30, Number 1, Winter 1999

  • The Romance of Realism

    John Koethe•ARTICLE•New Literary History•1997

    New Literary History - Volume 28, Number 4, Autumn 1997

  • Warrant

    John Koethe, Alvin Plantinga•ARTICLE•The Philosophical Review•1995

  • And they ain't outside the head either

    Open Access•John Koethe•ARTICLE•Synthese•1992•References: 15

  • Stanley Cavell and Literary Skepticism

    John Koethe, John R Koethe et al.•ARTICLE•The Philosophical Review•1992

  • Contrary Impulses

    John Koethe•ARTICLE•Critical Inquiry•1991•Cited by: 1

  • Philosophical Relativity

    John Koethe, John R Koethe et al.•ARTICLE•The Philosophical Review•1986

  • The Late Wisconsin Spring

    John Koethe•BOOK•Late Wisconsin Spring•1984

  • An Interview with John Ashbery

    John Koethe, John Ashbery•ARTICLE•SubStance•1983

    John Koethe: When you first started writing poetry, or when you were writing in the fifties, there seemed to be a very different poetry scene than there is nowsomething you could call an academic establishment, with which you didn't ally yourself. Could you describe the way you saw poetry then and the way the poetry world strikes you now, since it seems to be somewhat different? John Ashbery: Actually, I did identify a lot with much of the poetry…

  • Meaning and the Moral Sciences

    John Koethe, John L Koethe et al.•ARTICLE•The Philosophical Review•1979

  • Putnam's Argument Against Realism

    John Koethe•ARTICLE•The Philosophical Review•1979•Cited by: 4

    IN Realism and Reason' Hilary Putnam attempts to show that certain picture the relation of any correct theory to all or part of is incoherent. According to this picture, which he dubs metaphysical realism, there is a determinate relation of reference between terms in [any language L] and pieces (or sets of pieces) of WORLD, 2 in terms of which truth for L is to be defined. Moreover, THE WORLD is supposed to be independent of any particular repres…

  • Paradoxes of Knowledge

    John Koethe, John L Koethe et al.•ARTICLE•The Philosophical Review•1978

  • Ignorance

    John Koethe, John L Koethe et al.•ARTICLE•The Philosophical Review•1978•Cited by: 1

    In this controversial volume (originally published in 1975) Peter Unger suggests that, not only can nothing ever be known, but no one can ever have a reason at all for anything. A consequence of this is that we cannot have any realistic emotional ties: it can never be conclusively said that someone is happy or sad about anything. Finally he argues that no one can ever say, let alone believe, that anything is the case. In order to get beyond this …

  • Putnam's Argument Against Realism

    John Koethe•ARTICLE•The Philosophical Review•1979•Cited by: 4

    IN Realism and Reason' Hilary Putnam attempts to show that certain picture the relation of any correct theory to all or part of is incoherent. According to this picture, which he dubs metaphysical realism, there is a determinate relation of reference between terms in [any language L] and pieces (or sets of pieces) of WORLD, 2 in terms of which truth for L is to be defined. Moreover, THE WORLD is supposed to be independent of any particular repres…

  • Contrary Impulses

    John Koethe•ARTICLE•Critical Inquiry•1991•Cited by: 1

  • Ignorance

    John Koethe, John L Koethe et al.•ARTICLE•The Philosophical Review•1978•Cited by: 1

    In this controversial volume (originally published in 1975) Peter Unger suggests that, not only can nothing ever be known, but no one can ever have a reason at all for anything. A consequence of this is that we cannot have any realistic emotional ties: it can never be conclusively said that someone is happy or sad about anything. Finally he argues that no one can ever say, let alone believe, that anything is the case. In order to get beyond this …

  • Paradoxes of Knowledge

    John Koethe, John L Koethe et al.•ARTICLE•The Philosophical Review•1978

  • Ignorance

    John Koethe, John L Koethe et al.•ARTICLE•The Philosophical Review•1978•Cited by: 1

    In this controversial volume (originally published in 1975) Peter Unger suggests that, not only can nothing ever be known, but no one can ever have a reason at all for anything. A consequence of this is that we cannot have any realistic emotional ties: it can never be conclusively said that someone is happy or sad about anything. Finally he argues that no one can ever say, let alone believe, that anything is the case. In order to get beyond this …

  • Meaning and the Moral Sciences

    John Koethe, John L Koethe et al.•ARTICLE•The Philosophical Review•1979

  • Putnam's Argument Against Realism

    John Koethe•ARTICLE•The Philosophical Review•1979•Cited by: 4

    IN Realism and Reason' Hilary Putnam attempts to show that certain picture the relation of any correct theory to all or part of is incoherent. According to this picture, which he dubs metaphysical realism, there is a determinate relation of reference between terms in [any language L] and pieces (or sets of pieces) of WORLD, 2 in terms of which truth for L is to be defined. Moreover, THE WORLD is supposed to be independent of any particular repres…

  • An Interview with John Ashbery

    John Koethe, John Ashbery•ARTICLE•SubStance•1983

    John Koethe: When you first started writing poetry, or when you were writing in the fifties, there seemed to be a very different poetry scene than there is nowsomething you could call an academic establishment, with which you didn't ally yourself. Could you describe the way you saw poetry then and the way the poetry world strikes you now, since it seems to be somewhat different? John Ashbery: Actually, I did identify a lot with much of the poetry…

  • The Late Wisconsin Spring

    John Koethe•BOOK•Late Wisconsin Spring•1984

  • Philosophical Relativity

    John Koethe, John R Koethe et al.•ARTICLE•The Philosophical Review•1986

  • Contrary Impulses

    John Koethe•ARTICLE•Critical Inquiry•1991•Cited by: 1

  • And they ain't outside the head either

    Open Access•John Koethe•ARTICLE•Synthese•1992•References: 15

  • Stanley Cavell and Literary Skepticism

    John Koethe, John R Koethe et al.•ARTICLE•The Philosophical Review•1992

  • Warrant

    John Koethe, Alvin Plantinga•ARTICLE•The Philosophical Review•1995

  • The Romance of Realism

    John Koethe•ARTICLE•New Literary History•1997

    New Literary History - Volume 28, Number 4, Autumn 1997

  • Poetry at One Remove

    John Koethe•ARTICLE•New Literary History•1999

    New Literary History - Volume 30, Number 1, Winter 1999

  • Sketches of Landscapes

    John Koethe, John R Koethe et al.•ARTICLE•The Philosophical Review•2000

  • Sketches of Landscapes

    John Koethe•ARTICLE•The Philosophical Review•2000

    Book Review| April 01 2000 Sketches of Landscapes: Philosophy by Example SKETCHES OF LANDSCAPES: PHILOSOPHY BY EXAMPLE. By Avrum Stroll. Cambridge: The MIT Press, 1998. Pp. Xiv, 282. John Koethe John Koethe Search for other works by this author on: This Site Google The Philosophical Review (2000) 109 (2): 293–295. https://doi.org/10.1215/00318108-109-2-293 Cite Icon Cite Share Icon Share Twitter Permissions Search Site Citation John Koethe; Sketc…

  • The Contiguity of Wittgenstein's Thought

    Heather J Gert, John Koethe et al.•ARTICLE•Philosophy and Phenomenological…•2000

  • Wittgenstein's Thought in Transition

    John Koethe, Dale Jacquette•ARTICLE•Philosophy and Phenomenological…•2001

  • Scepticism, knowledge, and forms of reasoning

    John Koethe•BOOK•Scepticism, knowledge, and forms…•2005

  • Meaning in Life and Why It Matters

    Open Access•John Koethe, Susan Wolf et al.•BOOK•Meaning in Life and Why It Matters•2010

  • Late Wisconsin Spring

    John Koethe•BOOK•Late Wisconsin Spring•2014

  • Perplexity and Plausibility

    John Koethe•ARTICLE•Common Knowledge•2014

    As part of an exchange of views on what Jan Zwicky calls "lyric philosophy," this contribution suggests a way of understanding it that brings out affinities between it and the standard discursive model of philosophy with which she is dissatisfied. Good discursive philosophy is based on perplexity and plausibility: on finding that protophilosophical experiences give rise to philosophical puzzlement, and then finding that some ways of responding to…

Philosophy (17 works) · Epistemology (15 works) · Contemporary philosophy (9 works) · Analytic philosophy (7 works) · General interest (7 works) · Computer Science (5 works) · Wittgensteinian philosophy and applications (5 works) · Art (4 works) · Classical Philosophy and Thought (4 works) · Linguistics (4 works)

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