Putnam's Argument Against Realism
Bibliographic Data
| ID | 10695794 |
|---|---|
| Authors | John Koethe (corresponding author) |
| Year | 1979 |
| Volume | 88 |
| Issue | 1 |
| Pages | 92 |
| Publication date | 1979-01-01 |
| Peer Reviewed | Yes |
| Open Access | No |
| Type | ARTICLE |
| Venue | The Philosophical Review (JOURNAL) |
| Journal identifiers | ISSN: 0031-8108 • E-ISSN: 1558-1470 |
| Publisher | JSTOR (PUBLISHER) |
| DOI | 10.2307/2184780 |
| OpenAlex | W2315928823 |
| Language | EN |
| Citations received | 7 |
IN Realism and Reason' Hilary Putnam attempts to show that certain picture the relation of any correct theory to all or part of is incoherent. According to this picture, which he dubs metaphysical realism, there is a determinate relation of reference between terms in [any language L] and pieces (or sets of pieces) of WORLD, 2 in terms of which truth for L is to be defined. Moreover, THE WORLD is supposed to be independent of any particular representation [or theory] we have of it-indeed, it is held that we might be unable to represent WORLD at all
Analytic philosophy · Argument (complex analysis) · Contemporary philosophy · Epistemology · General interest · Realism · Philosophy · Philosophy and Theoretical Science · Philosophy, Science, and History
| Unique citing works | 7 |
|---|---|
| Citations per year | 0,15 |
| Citation span | 1980 - 1996 (17) |
| Citation velocity | historical |
| Highly cited | No |
| Citation types | Neutral: 7 |