Reference and Monstrosity

Bibliographic Data

ID10694994
AuthorsPaolo Santorio (0000-0001-6840-7630, corresponding author)
Year2012
Volume121
Issue3
Pages359-406
Publication date2012-07-01
Peer ReviewedYes
Open AccessNo
TypeARTICLE
VenueThe Philosophical Review (JOURNAL)
Journal identifiersISSN: 0031-8108 • E-ISSN: 1558-1470
PublisherDuke University Press (PUBLISHER • US)
DOI10.1215/00318108-1574427
OpenAlexW2151080867
LanguageEN
Citations received19
References cited40

According to the orthodox account developed by Kaplan, indexicals like I, you, and now invariably refer to elements of the context of speech. This essay argues that the orthodoxy is wrong. I, you, and the like are shifted by certain modal operators and hence can fail to refer to elements of the context, for example, I can fail to refer to the speaker. More precisely, indexicals are syntactically akin to logical variables. They can be free, in which case they work, roughly, on the Kaplan model. But they can also be bound: this happens, in a systematic fashion, when they are in the scope of epistemic modals or attitude verbs. The new view has two interesting philosophical consequences. First, it vindicates a broadly Fregean perspective on referential expressions, essentially refuting the idea that indexicals are rigid designators. Second, it suggests a new picture of the interaction between context and linguistic meaning: compositional semantics does not need to look at the context and hence has no need for a context parameter

Contemporary philosophy · Context (archaeology) · Epistemology · Linguistics · Meaning (existential) · Modal · Modal verb · Orthodoxy · Perspective (graphical) · Scope (computer science) · Semantics (computer science) · Verb · Artificial Intelligence · Computer Science · Epistemology, Ethics, and Metaphysics · History · Philosophy · Philosophy and Theoretical Science · Syntax, Semantics, Linguistic Variation