Quantification and Epistemic Modality

Bibliographic Data

ID10692795
AuthorsDilip Ninan (0000-0003-3006-9001, Tufts University, corresponding author)
Year2018
Volume127
Issue4
Pages433-485
Publication date2018-10-01
Peer ReviewedYes
Open AccessNo
TypeARTICLE
VenueThe Philosophical Review (JOURNAL)
Journal identifiersISSN: 0031-8108 • E-ISSN: 1558-1470
PublisherDuke University Press (PUBLISHER • US)
DOI10.1215/00318108-6973010
OpenAlexW2902955541
LanguageEN
Citations received11
References cited43

This essay presents a puzzle concerning the interaction of epistemic modals, singular terms, and quantifiers. The puzzle poses a number of problems for both static and dynamic theories of epistemic modals. The trouble arises because neither approach takes into account the fact that being possibly thus-and-so (in the epistemic sense of ‘possibly’) is not a trait that an object has in and of itself, but one that an object possesses only relative to a way of thinking of the domain of quantification. I consider two theories that implement this insight: a static version of counterpart theory and a dynamic system of contingent identity. I then consider a variant on the initial puzzle that helps us to choose between the two theories. The variant also sheds light on how the phenomenon discussed in this essay relates to Frege's Puzzle about attitude ascriptions

Epistemology · Linguistics · Modal verb · Modality (human–computer interaction) · Object (grammar) · Phenomenon · Verb · Artificial Intelligence · Computer Science · Linguistics and Discourse Analysis · Philosophy · Philosophy and Theoretical Science · Syntax, Semantics, Linguistic Variation