Counterparts of Persons and Their Bodies
Bibliographic Data
| ID | 8109529 |
|---|---|
| Authors | David Lewis (0000-0002-0253-5530, corresponding author) |
| Year | 1971 |
| Volume | 68 |
| Issue | 7 |
| Pages | 203-203 |
| Publication date | 1971-04-08 |
| Peer Reviewed | Yes |
| Open Access | No |
| Type | ARTICLE |
| Venue | The Journal of Philosophy (JOURNAL) |
| Journal identifiers | ISSN: 0022-362X • E-ISSN: 1939-8549 |
| Publisher | Philosophy Documentation Center (PUBLISHER • US) |
| DOI | 10.2307/2024902 |
| OpenAlex | W133124514 |
| Language | EN |
| Citations received | 85 |
Analytic philosophy · Contemporary philosophy · Epistemology · Cultural Studies and Postmodernism · Philosophy · Posthumanist Ethics and Activism · Psychoanalysis, Philosophy, and Politics
Four-Dimensionalism
Impossible Worlds
Good news about the description theory of names
Spatio-Temporal Coincidence and the Grounding Problem
The Non-Identity of a Material Thing and Its Matter
The Language and Reality of Time
The Human Animal
Understanding Wittgenstein’s On Certainty
What Are We?
Objects and Persons
Four-dimensionalism
No Work for a Theory of Grounding
Contingent identity
The Paradox of Increase
Constitution is Identity
Modality and Explanatory Reasoning
Relativized Metaphysical Modality
A comparative approach to evidential tense in Quechua and Aymara
No Alternative to Alternatives
Health Problems
Identidad, constitución y superveniencia
An Inquiry Concerning the Persistence of Physical Information
Ambifictional Counterfactuals
Representing multiply de re epistemic modal statements
Two Physicalist Arguments for Microphysical Manyism
Indiscernibility and the grounds of identity
On Cotnoir’s two notions of proper parthood
Infinite aggregation
Ex Ante Pareto and the Opaque-Identity Puzzle
Fission theories of Original Guilt
Wholes are fusions
Is it identity all the way down? From supersubstantivalism to composition as identity and back again
Objectual aboutness
A structuralist theory of phenomenal intentionality
The personite problem remains
You could be immaterial (or not)
On a body‐switching argument in defence of the immateriality of human nature
Haecceitism and counterpart theory
(Once again) Lewis on the analysis of modality
Persistence and modality
Qua -Talk and Other Forms of Quackery
A Methodology for the Study of Historical Counterfactuals
A Semantics for the Particle αν in and outside Conditionals in Classical Greek
Absolute Actuality and the Plurality of Worlds
Contingent identity and counterpart theory
Modal Realisms
Counterfactuals and unphysical ceteris paribus
Cause and essence
The identification game
Counterpart theories for everyone
A modesty proposal
Ditching determination and dependence
Essential bundle theory and modality
Truthmakers or truthmaking supervenience
Invasive species and natural function in ecology
Extensionality for fusions and pluralities
The multiplicity objection against uploading optimism
Indeterminacy, identity and counterparts
Processes and events as rigid embodiments
Categorial modal realism
Knowing what it is
Haecceitism, Chance, and Counterfactuals
Compatibilism About Coincidence
Counteridenticals
Quantification and Epistemic Modality
Contrast and Constitution
Classical Opacity
What’s Metaphysical About Metaphysical Necessity? 1
Global Supervenience and Identity across Times and Worlds
Belief in Absolute Necessity
The Conception of a Person as a Series of Mental Events
Was I Ever a Fetus
Grounding identity in existence
Proper names as counterpart‐theoretic individual concepts
Truths qua Grounds
Person-affecting views and saturating counterpart relations
Institutional Objects, Reductionism and Theories of Persistence
Arguments by Leibniz's Law in Metaphysics
Parts and Wholes
Proportions in time
Animalism Versus Lockeanism
The meaning of the tough-construction
Theistic Modal Realism II
Counterparts
Identity Theories
| Unique citing works | 85 |
|---|---|
| Citations per year | 1,67 |
| Citation span | 1975 - 2026 (52) |
| Citation velocity | current |
| Highly cited | No |
| Citation types | Neutral: 84 |