Know-How and Gradability

Bibliographic Data

ID10695964
AuthorsCarlotta Pavese (0000-0003-0759-8853, Duke University, corresponding author)
Year2017
Volume126
Issue3
Pages345-383
Publication date2017-07-01
Peer ReviewedYes
Open AccessNo
TypeARTICLE
VenueThe Philosophical Review (JOURNAL)
Journal identifiersISSN: 0031-8108 • E-ISSN: 1558-1470
PublisherDuke University Press (PUBLISHER • US)
DOI10.1215/00318108-3878493
OpenAlexW2745381237
LanguageEN
Citations received49
References cited62

Orthodoxy has it that knowledge is absolute—that is, it cannot come in degrees (absolutism about propositional knowledge). On the other hand, there seems to be strong evidence for the gradability of know-how. Ascriptions of know-how are gradable, as when we say that one knows in part how to do something, or that one knows how to do something better than somebody else. When coupled with absolutism, the gradability of ascriptions of know-how can be used to mount a powerful argument against intellectualism about know-how—the view that know-how is a species of propositional knowledge. This essay defends intellectualism from the argument of gradability. It is argued that the gradability of ascriptions of know-how should be discounted as a rather superficial linguistic phenomenon, one that can be explained in a way compatible with the absoluteness of the state reported

Absolute (philosophy) · Absolute monarchy · Absoluteness · Argument (complex analysis) · Contemporary philosophy · Epistemology · Intellectualism · Orthodoxy · Phenomenon · Political science · Theology · Epistemology, Ethics, and Metaphysics · Law · Philosophical Ethics and Theory · Philosophy · Philosophy and Theoretical Science