Trust, cooperation, and the tradeoffs of reciprocity

Datos Bibliográficos

ID12074792
AutoresKyle Haynes (0000-0002-2713-6827, Department of Political Science, Purdue University, USA, autor de correspondencia), Brandon K Yoder (0000-0001-8815-8854, Australian National University)
Año2023
Volumen41
Número1
Páginas26-46
Fecha de publicación2023-03-15
Peer ReviewedSí
Open AccessSí
TipoARTICLE
RevistaConflict Management and Peace Science (JOURNAL)
Identificadores de la revistaISSN: 0738-8942 • E-ISSN: 1549-9219
EditorialSAGE Publishing (PUBLISHER • US)
DOI10.1177/07388942231162335
OpenAlexW4327605582
IdiomaEN
Citas recibidas5
Referencias citadas42

This article demonstrates that foreign policies of reciprocity entail previously unrecognized tradeoffs. The conventional wisdom in international relations holds that reciprocating another state's cooperative and non-cooperative actions can simultaneously promote cooperation and allow states with compatible preferences to build trust. We present a model that synthesizes recent work on signaling and cooperation to identify a tension between the goals of building long-term trust and inducing short-term cooperation. Specifically, a receiver's highly reciprocal strategy generates strong incentives for hostile senders to behave cooperatively, which reduces the credibility of cooperation as a signal of benign intentions. Conversely, a less reciprocal strategy increases the credibility of senders’ cooperative signals, but forgoes the benefits of short-term cooperation with hostile states. Thus, uncertain receivers often face a tradeoff between inducing cooperation and eliciting credible signals. We illustrate these tradeoffs in pre-First World War British foreign policy, and highlight the article's policy implications for contemporary US–China relations

Business · Cheap talk · Credibility · Economics · Incentive · Law and economics · Microeconomics · Political science · Reciprocal · Reciprocity (cultural anthropology · Game Theory and Applications · International Relations and Foreign Policy · Law · Political Conflict and Governance · Psychology · Social Psychology