On the Vote-Purchasing Behavior of Incumbent Governments

Dados Bibliográficos

ID3250823
AutoresMatz Dahlberg (0000-0002-4015-8780, Uppsala University), Eva Johansson (0000-0001-6695-7989, Institute for Evaluation of Labour Market and Education Policy)
Ano2002
Volume96
Fascículo1
Páginas27-40
Data de publicação2002-03-01
Peer ReviewedSim
Open AccessSim
TipoARTICLE
PeriódicoAmerican Political Science Review (JOURNAL)
Identificadores do periódicoISSN: 0003-0554 • E-ISSN: 1537-5943
EditoraCambridge University Press (CUP) (PUBLISHER)
DOI10.1017/s0003055402004215
OpenAlexW2170194724
IdiomaEN
Citações recebidas202
Referências citadas19

In this paper we investigate whether there are any tactical motives behind the distribution of grants from central to lower-level governments. We use a temporary grant program that is uniquely suitable for testing theories of vote-purchasing behavior of incumbent governments. The temporary grant program differs from traditional intergovernmental grants in several aspects, most importantly in the sovereign decision-making power given to the incumbent central government. We find support for the hypothesis that the incumbent government used the grant program under study to win votes. In particular, we find strong support for the Lindbeck-Weibull/Dixit-Londregan model, in which parties distribute transfers to regions where there are many swing voters. This result is statistically as well as economically significant. We do not, however, find any support for the model that predicts that the incumbent government transfers money to its own supporters

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