Policy implementation through performance measurement
A study of water pollution remediation in China's Huai River Basin
Bibliographic Data
| ID | 4075151 |
|---|---|
| Authors | Boying Li (0000-0001-7875-2323, Tongji University), Shui‐yan Tang (0000-0002-7836-8783, University of Southern California), Wang Feng (0000-0003-3241-5625, Shanghai University of Finance and Economics, corresponding author), Feng Wang (0000-0003-4825-1151), Haitao Yin (0000-0003-0084-568X, Shanghai Jiao Tong University) |
| Year | 2024 |
| Volume | 41 |
| Issue | 1 |
| Pages | 210-238 |
| Publication date | 2024-01-01 |
| Peer Reviewed | Yes |
| Open Access | Yes |
| Type | ARTICLE |
| Venue | Review of Policy Research (JOURNAL) |
| Journal identifiers | ISSN: 1541-132X • E-ISSN: 1541-1338 |
| Publisher | Wiley (PUBLISHER • GB) |
| DOI | 10.1111/ropr.12496 |
| OpenAlex | W4286491885 |
| Language | EN |
| Citations received | 3 |
| References cited | 66 |
Performance-oriented management has been proposed as a remedy to policy implementation failure, which is a persuasive woe globally. Recent scholarship on policy implementation through performance measurement and management focuses on client-oriented services, with less attention paid to the inadequacy of performance indicators in covering all desirable policy goals and in incentivizing all government officials in a non-client-oriented service arena, for instance, environmental governance. Based on station-level water quality data before and after the implementation of China's Huai River Basin Water Quality Accountability Program, we utilize a difference-in-differences (DiD) method to investigate how various water quality indicators in the Huai River Basin (HRB) have responded to the new personnel-based performance measurement system which aimed to enhance environmental policy implementation at the local level. We show that the program succeeded in motivating government officials to meet targeted indicators, but it also led to the worsening of non-targeted ones. We also find that the impact of this personnel-based program was sensitive to personal and contextual factors: it affected younger local officials more strongly than those who were older and saw a more limited prospect for promotion. These findings provide evidence for the effectiveness of the personnel-based measurement system, which may be considered by other countries, particularly those with authoritarian regimes and significant policy implementation failures. At the same time, complementary measures such as institutional arrangements that discover and report omitted important performance aspects, should be considered to safeguard the possible pitfalls of the system
Accountability · Business · China · Corporate governance · Economics · Environmental economics · Environmental planning · Environmental resource management · Local government · Operationalization · Performance indicator · Political science · Service delivery framework · China's Socioeconomic Reforms and Governance · Environmental Science · Local Government Finance and Decentralization · Public Administration · Public Policy and Administration Research · Finance · Marketing
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| Unique citing works | 3 |
|---|---|
| Citations per year | 1 |
| Citation span | 2023 - 2025 (3) |
| Citation velocity | recent |
| Highly cited | No |
| Citation types | Neutral: 3 |