Profitable inefficiency

The politics of port infrastructure in Mombasa, Kenya

Bibliographic Data

ID4775652
AuthorsHugh Lamarque (University of Edinburgh, corresponding author)
Year2019
Volume57
Issue1
Pages85-109
Publication date2019-03-01
Peer ReviewedYes
Open AccessYes
TypeARTICLE
VenueThe Journal of Modern African Studies (JOURNAL)
Journal identifiersISSN: 0022-278X • E-ISSN: 1469-7777
PublisherCambridge University Press (CUP) (PUBLISHER)
DOI10.1017/s0022278x18000630
OpenAlexW2918833099
LanguageEN
Citations received9
References cited20

This article examines the distribution of power among public, private and criminal interests invested in Mombasa port. It approaches Kenya as a gatekeeper state, in which national elites compete to control the country's points of interaction with the rest of the world. Mombasa's controversial private dry ports are used to highlight (1) how the opportunity to profit from inefficiencies in container storage has been distributed among the political elite, and (2) how the development of the country's principal seaport not only reflects Kenya's underlying political settlements, but is one of the key sites in which those settlements are tested and reshaped. The case exposes a dynamic interaction between Kenya's shifting political settlement on the one hand, and the gate itself - Mombasa port's physical infrastructure and regulations - on the other

Business · Economics · Economy · Elite · Geography · Government (linguistics · Human settlement · Inefficiency · Market economy · Payment · Political science · Politics · Port (circuit theory · Profit (economics · Settlement (finance · State (computer science · Engineering · Finance · Global Maritime and Colonial Histories · Socioeconomic Development in Asia · Water Governance and Infrastructure