Regime Change in Presidential and Congressional Budgeting
Role Discontinuity or Role Evolution
Bibliographic Data
| ID | 6231035 |
|---|---|
| Authors | James Cox, Gregory L Hager, Gregory Hager, David Lowery (0000-0002-6267-9712) |
| Year | 1993 |
| Volume | 37 |
| Issue | 1 |
| Pages | 88 |
| Publication date | 1993-02-01 |
| Peer Reviewed | Yes |
| Open Access | No |
| Type | ARTICLE |
| Venue | American Journal of Political Science (JOURNAL) |
| Journal identifiers | ISSN: 0092-5853 • E-ISSN: 1540-5907 |
| Publisher | JSTOR (PUBLISHER) |
| DOI | 10.2307/2111525 |
| OpenAlex | W2334371758 |
| Language | EN |
| Citations received | 6 |
| References cited | 17 |
The abandonment of the budgetary role theory of Fenno (1966) and Wildavsky (1964) in the wake of budgetary developments since 1970 has come at great cost. That is, we now lack a viable microlevel theory of budgeting with which to interpret our increasingly sophisticated models of aggregate budget outcomes. We attempt to reformulate budget role theory so that it can account for changes in institutional advocacy and guardianship over the course of the full post-World War II period by substituting for the assumption that roles are temporally stable the hypothesis that roles develop in a systemic and evolutionary fashion. We develop and test several substantive explanations of the gradual evolution of budgetary roles with data on the surviving 22 agencies used by Fenno in The Power of the Purse. We find that patterns of split party control of government may influence greatly the development of budget roles. The findings are discussed in terms of their implications for the further development of the political theory of the budgetary process
Abandonment (legal · Economics · Government (linguistics · Political economy · Political science · Politics · Positive economics · Presidential system · Punctuated equilibrium · Fiscal Policies and Political Economy · Law · Local Government Finance and Decentralization · Public Policy and Administration Research
Divided we govern
Reconciliation 1982
The Keynesian and Political Determinants of Unbalanced Budgets
Why The Government Budget Is Too Small in a Democracy
The New Rules of the Federal Budget Game
Shrinking Budgets and the Shrinkage of Budget Theory
Assessing Congressional Budget Reform
A Sequential Model of Congressional Appropriations
Allocation of Desirable Committee Assignments
On the Scientific Status of Rational Models
Towards A Predictive Theory of Government Expenditure
Divided Government in the States
Changes in the Vote Margins for Congressional Candidates
Roles, Rules, and Rationality in the New Institutionalism
Influences on Executive and Congressional Budgetary Priorities, 1955-1981
| Unique citing works | 6 |
|---|---|
| Citations per year | 0,2 |
| Citation span | 1996 - 2021 (26) |
| Citation velocity | historical |
| Highly cited | No |
| Citation types | Neutral: 6 |