Jean Tirole
Datos Biográficos
| ID | 1019919 |
|---|---|
| NOMBRE | Jean Tirole |
| NOMBRES | Jean |
| APELLIDO | Tirole |
| FIRMA | TIROLE J |
| AFILIACIONES | Institut d'Économie Industrielle |
| VERIFICADO | No |
| TOTAL DE OBRAS | 81 |
| TOTAL DE CITAS | 472 |
| TOTAL COMO AUTOR | 81 |
| TOTAL COMO EDITOR | 0 |
| PRIMER AÑO DE PUBLICACIÓN | 1981 |
| AÑO MÁS RECIENTE DE PUBLICACIÓN | 2025 |
| ÍNDICE H | 11 |
Moral Licensing
Laws and Norms
We analyze how private decisions and optimal public policies are shaped by personal and societal preferences, material incentives, and social norms. We show how honor and stigma interact with incentives and derive optimal taxation. We then analyze the expressive role of law as embodying society’s values and identify when it calls for a weakening or a strengthening of incentives. The law should be softened when it signals agents’ general willingne…
The Morality of Markets
Scholars and civil society have argued that competition erodes supplier morality. This paper establishes a robust irrelevance result, whereby intense market competition does not crowd out consequentialist ethics; it thereby issues a strong warning against the wholesale moral condemnation of markets and procompetitive institutions. Intense competition, while not altering the behavior of profitable suppliers, may, however, reduce the standards of h…
Hommage à Denis Kessler (1952 - 2023)
The portfolio of economic policies needed to fight climate change
Incentives In Procurement Contracting
Éducation et ascenseur social
Narratives, Imperatives, and Moral Reasoning
Price Caps as Welfare-Enhancing Coopetition
The paper analyzes the impact of price caps agreed upon by industry participants. Price caps, like mergers, allow firms to solve Cournot's multiple marginalization problem; but unlike mergers, they do not stifle price competition in case of substitutes or facilitate foreclosure in case of complements. The paper first demonstrates this for non-repeated interaction and general demand and cost functions. It then shows that allowing price caps has no…
Patent Disclosures and Standard-Setting
Bonus Culture
National audience
Mindful Economics
In this paper, we provide a perspective into the main ideas and findings emerging from the growing literature on motivated beliefs and reasoning. This perspective emphasizes that beliefs often fulfill important psychological and functional needs of the individual. Economically relevant examples include confidence in ones' abilities, moral self-esteem, hope and anxiety reduction, social identity, political ideology, and religious faith. People thu…
Standard-Essential Patents
A major policy issue in standard setting is that patents that are ex ante not that important, by being included into a standard, may become standard-essential patents. In an attempt to curb the monopoly power that they create, most standard-setting organizations require the owners of patents covered by the standard to make a loose commitment to grant licenses on reasonable terms. Such commitments unsurprisingly are conducive to litigation. This p…
Refonder l'assurance-maladie
International audience
Bonus Culture
La théorie économique de la régulation des licenciements
Bonus Culture
Rationalité, psychologie et économie
Market Power Screens Willingness-to-Pay
Laws and Norms
Identity, Morals, and Taboos
We develop a theory of moral behavior, individual and collective, based on a general model of identity in which people care about “who they are” and infer their own values from past choices. The model sheds light on many empirical puzzles inconsistent with earlier approaches. Identity investments respond nonmonotonically to acts or threats, and taboos on mere thoughts arise to protect beliefs about the “priceless” value of certain social assets. …
Illiquidity and All its Friends
Illiquidity and All Its Friends
Individual and Corporate Social Responsibility
Theorie de l'organisation industrielle
Formal and Real Authority in Organizations
This paper develops a theory of the allocation of formal and real authority within organizations. Real authority is determined by the structure of information, which in turn depends on the allocation of formal authority. An increase in an agent's real authority promotes initiative but results in a loss of control for the principal. The paper analyzes the allocation of formal authority as well as some determinants of the subordinates' real authori…
Mindful Economics
In this paper, we provide a perspective into the main ideas and findings emerging from the growing literature on motivated beliefs and reasoning. This perspective emphasizes that beliefs often fulfill important psychological and functional needs of the individual. Economically relevant examples include confidence in ones' abilities, moral self-esteem, hope and anxiety reduction, social identity, political ideology, and religious faith. People thu…
Advocates
The paper's main contribution is to provide a rational for advocacy. After observing that many organizations (corporations, judiciary, and the executive and legislative branches of government) use competition among enfranchised advocates of special interests to improve policy making, it argues that advocacy has two major benefits. First, the advocates' rewards closely track their pursuing several conflicting causes at one time. Second, advocacy e…
Private and Public Supply of Liquidity
This paper addresses a basic, yet unresolved, question: Do claims on private assets provide sufficient liquidity for an efficient functioning of the productive sector? Or does the state have a role in creating liquidity and regulating it either through adjustments in the stock of government securities or by other means? In our model, firms can meet future liquidity needs in three ways: by issuing new claims, by obtaining a credit line from a fina…
Individual and Corporate Social Responsibility
Society's demands for individual and corporate social responsibility as alternative responses to market and distributive failures are becoming increasingly prominent. We draw on recent developments in the psychology and economics of prosocial behaviour to shed light on this trend and the underlying mix of motivations. We then link individual concerns to corporate social responsibility, contrasting three possible understandings of the term: firms'…
Market Liquidity and Performance Monitoring
This paper shows that the stock price incorporates performance information that cannot be extracted from the firm's current or future profit data. The additional information is useful for structuring managerial incentives. The amount of information contained in the stock price depends on the liquidity of the market. Concentrated ownership, by reducing market liquidity, reduces the benefits of market monitoring. Integration is associated with weak…
Willpower and Personal Rules
We develop a theory of internal commitments or “personal rules” based on self-reputation over one’s willpower, which transforms lapses into precedents that undermine future self-restraint. The foundation for this mechanism is the imperfect recall of past motives and feelings, leading people to draw inferences from their past actions. The degree of self-control an individual can achieve is shown to rise with his selfconfidence and decrease with pr…
Bonus Culture
National audience
Modes of Communication
The paper develops a theory of costly communication in which the sender's and receiver's motivations and abilities endogenously determine the communication mode and the transfer of knowledge. Communication is modeled as a problem of moral hazard in teams, in which the sender and receiver select persuasion and message elaboration efforts. The model is shown to provide a rich set of insights concerning (i) the impact of incentive alignment on commu…
A Theory of Incentives in Procurement and Regulation
Journal Article A Theory of Incentives in Procurement and Regulation. Get access A Theory of Incentives in Procurement and Regulation. By Laffont Qean-Jacques and Tirole Jean. (Cambridge, Mass. and London: MIT Press, 1993. Pp. xxii + 705. £24.95 hardback. ISBN 0 262 12174 3.) Mark Armstrong Mark Armstrong University of Southampton Search for other works by this author on: Oxford Academic Google Scholar The Economic Journal, Volume 105, Issue 428,…
Procurement and Renegotiation
Parties bound by an incomplete contract have an incentive to renegotiate after acquiring new information. The issue of the parties' investment in the relationship before renegotiation is analyzed in a simple two-period procurement model. The firm invests in the first period. It then learns its production cost, and the sponsor learns its value for the project. Williamson's underinvestment presumption is shown to hold under very general assumptions…
A Theory of Income and Dividend Smoothing Based on Incumbency Rents
Income smoothing is the process of manipulating the time profile of earnings or earnings reports to make the reported income stream less variable. This paper builds a theory of income smoothing based on the managers' concern about keeping their position or avoiding interference, and on the idea that current performance receives more weight than past performance when one is assessing the future. When investment is added to the model, so that incom…
Auctioning Incentive Contracts
This paper draws a remarkably simple bridge between auction theory and incentive theory. It considers the auctioning of an indivisible project among several fi rms. The firms have private information about their future cost at th e bidding stage, and the selected firm ex post invests in cost reduct ion. The authors show that (1) the optimal auction can be implemented by a dominant strategy auction that uses information about both the first bid an…
Standard-Essential Patents
A major policy issue in standard setting is that patents that are ex ante not that important, by being included into a standard, may become standard-essential patents. In an attempt to curb the monopoly power that they create, most standard-setting organizations require the owners of patents covered by the standard to make a loose commitment to grant licenses on reasonable terms. Such commitments unsurprisingly are conducive to litigation. This p…
Laws and Norms
We analyze how private decisions and optimal public policies are shaped by personal and societal preferences, material incentives, and social norms. We show how honor and stigma interact with incentives and derive optimal taxation. We then analyze the expressive role of law as embodying society’s values and identify when it calls for a weakening or a strengthening of incentives. The law should be softened when it signals agents’ general willingne…
Motivation intrinsèque, incitations et normes sociales
Le Congrès de l’ afse 2008 a accueilli, pour sa conférence Jean-Jacques Laffont, un exposé de Jean Tirole qui explore la frontière entre économie et psychologie en étudiant les relations entre incitations, normes sociales et motivation. Sur la base de ses travaux avec Roland Bénabou, il revisite le débat sur l’efficacité des incitations, en particulier quant à l’impact de celles-ci sur la perception et la signification des actes de chacun. Il exp…
The Morality of Markets
Scholars and civil society have argued that competition erodes supplier morality. This paper establishes a robust irrelevance result, whereby intense market competition does not crowd out consequentialist ethics; it thereby issues a strong warning against the wholesale moral condemnation of markets and procompetitive institutions. Intense competition, while not altering the behavior of profitable suppliers, may, however, reduce the standards of h…
The Economics of Technology Sharing
he open source process of production and innovation seems very unlike what most economists expect. Private firms usually pay their workers, direct and manage their efforts, and control the output and intellectual property thus created. In an open source project, however, a body of original material is made publicly available for others to use, under certain conditions. In many cases, anyone who makes use of the material must agree to make all enh…
L'économie de la recherche-développement
Guesnerie Roger, Tirole Jean. L'économie de la recherche-développement : introduction à certains travaux théoriques. In: Revue économique, volume 36, n°5, 1985. pp. 843-872
Taux d'actualisation et optimum second
[fre] Cet article considère la littérature sur le taux d'actualisation en situation d'optimum second. Après examen des raisons pour lesquelles l'approche en termes d'optimum premier est inadéquate, et des quelques arguments s'y rattachant, distinction est faite entre modèles « de politique optimale » et modèles « de réforme ». L'accent est mis sur la notion importante de coût d'opportunité des fonds publics. Celle-ci ne doit pas être confondue …
Planning under Incomplete Information and the Ratchet Effect
Central planning of production is usually performed under asymmetric information which leads to use of an incentive scheme. As the planner revises the scheme over time to take into account information provided by the firm's performance, this induces firms to underproduce to avoid more demanding schedules in the future—the ratchet effect. This paper explores this phenomenon under the realistic assumption that the planner cannot commit himself to a…
L'économie de la recherche-développement
Guesnerie Roger, Tirole Jean. L'économie de la recherche-développement : introduction à certains travaux théoriques. In: Revue économique, volume 36, n°5, 1985. pp. 843-872
Procurement and Renegotiation
Parties bound by an incomplete contract have an incentive to renegotiate after acquiring new information. The issue of the parties' investment in the relationship before renegotiation is analyzed in a simple two-period procurement model. The firm invests in the first period. It then learns its production cost, and the sponsor learns its value for the project. Williamson's underinvestment presumption is shown to hold under very general assumptions…
Comparative statics of the optimal dynamic incentive contract
Auctioning Incentive Contracts
This paper draws a remarkably simple bridge between auction theory and incentive theory. It considers the auctioning of an indivisible project among several fi rms. The firms have private information about their future cost at th e bidding stage, and the selected firm ex post invests in cost reduct ion. The authors show that (1) the optimal auction can be implemented by a dominant strategy auction that uses information about both the first bid an…
Theory of Industrial Organization
In Honor of David Kreps, Winner of the John Bates Clark Medal
David Kreps is the winner of the 1989 John Bates Clark Medal, given to “that American economist under forty who is adjudged to have made a significant contribution to economic thought and knowledge.” I will try to explain where Kreps's contributions fit in the food chain of economic ideas, why they have a high nutritional content, and why they should be in the diet of the common economist. I will arbitrarily divide this review into three major th…
Market Liquidity and Performance Monitoring
This paper shows that the stock price incorporates performance information that cannot be extracted from the firm's current or future profit data. The additional information is useful for structuring managerial incentives. The amount of information contained in the stock price depends on the liquidity of the market. Concentrated ownership, by reducing market liquidity, reduces the benefits of market monitoring. Integration is associated with weak…
Game Theory
Game Theory
Journal Article Game Theory Get access Game Theory. By Drew Fudenberg and Jean Tirole. (Cambridge, Mass. and London: MIT Press, 1991. Pp. xxiii + 579. £21.50 hardback. ISBN 0 262 06141 4.)Game Theory: Analysis of Conflict. By B. Myerson Roger. (Cambridge, Mass. and London: Harvard University Press, 1991. Pp. xiii + 568. £29.95 hardback. ISBN 0 674 34115 5.) Jurgen Eichberger Jurgen Eichberger University of Melbourne Search for other works by this…
The Internal Organization of Government
Journal Article THE INTERNAL ORGANIZATION OF GOVERNMENT Get access JEAN TIROLE JEAN TIROLE IDEI, Université des Sciences Sociales de Toulouse, Place Anatole FranceF-31042 Toulouse cedex, France; MIT; and CERAS Search for other works by this author on: Oxford Academic Google Scholar Oxford Economic Papers, Volume 46, Issue 1, January 1994, Pages 1–29, https://doi.org/10.1093/oxfordjournals.oep.a042114 Published: 01 January 1994
A Theory of Income and Dividend Smoothing Based on Incumbency Rents
Income smoothing is the process of manipulating the time profile of earnings or earnings reports to make the reported income stream less variable. This paper builds a theory of income smoothing based on the managers' concern about keeping their position or avoiding interference, and on the idea that current performance receives more weight than past performance when one is assessing the future. When investment is added to the model, so that incom…
A Theory of Incentives in Procurement and Regulation
Journal Article A Theory of Incentives in Procurement and Regulation. Get access A Theory of Incentives in Procurement and Regulation. By Laffont Qean-Jacques and Tirole Jean. (Cambridge, Mass. and London: MIT Press, 1993. Pp. xxii + 705. £24.95 hardback. ISBN 0 262 12174 3.) Mark Armstrong Mark Armstrong University of Southampton Search for other works by this author on: Oxford Academic Google Scholar The Economic Journal, Volume 105, Issue 428,…
A Theory of Collective Reputations (with Applications to the Persistence of Corruption and to Firm Quality)
The paper is a first attempt at modelling the idea of group reputation as an aggregate of individual reputations. A member's current incentives are affected by his past behaviour and, because his track record is observed only with noise, by the group's past behaviour as well. The paper thus studies the joint dynamics of individual and collective reputations and derives the existence of stereotypes from history dependence rather than from a multip…
Formal and Real Authority in Organizations
This paper develops a theory of the allocation of formal and real authority within organizations. Real authority is determined by the structure of information, which in turn depends on the allocation of formal authority. An increase in an agent's real authority promotes initiative but results in a loss of control for the principal. The paper analyzes the allocation of formal authority as well as some determinants of the subordinates' real authori…
Private and Public Supply of Liquidity
This paper addresses a basic, yet unresolved, question: Do claims on private assets provide sufficient liquidity for an efficient functioning of the productive sector? Or does the state have a role in creating liquidity and regulating it either through adjustments in the stock of government securities or by other means? In our model, firms can meet future liquidity needs in three ways: by issuing new claims, by obtaining a credit line from a fina…
The Economics of Career Concerns, Part II
The paper uses a simple multitask career concern model in order to analyse the incentives of government agencies' officials. Incentives are impaired by the agency pursuing multiple missions. A lack of focus is even more problematic in the case of fuzzy missions, that is when outsiders are uncertain about the exact nature of the missions actually pursued by the agency. Consequently agencies pursuing multiple missions receive less autonomy. The pap…
Incomplete Contracts
The paper takes stock of the advances and directions for research on the incomplete contracting front. It first illustrates some of the main ideas of the incomplete contract literature through an example. It then offers methodological insights on the standard approach to modeling incomplete contracts; in particular it discusses a tension between two assumptions made in the literature, namely rationality and the existence of transaction costs. Las…
Advocates
The paper's main contribution is to provide a rational for advocacy. After observing that many organizations (corporations, judiciary, and the executive and legislative branches of government) use competition among enfranchised advocates of special interests to improve policy making, it argues that advocacy has two major benefits. First, the advocates' rewards closely track their pursuing several conflicting causes at one time. Second, advocacy e…
Self Confidence
Lapm
The Simple Economics of Open Source
Corporate Governance
The paper first develops an economic analysis of the concept of shareholder value, describes its approach, and discusses some open questions. It emphasizes the relationship between pledgeable income, monitoring, and control rights using a unifying and simple framework. The paper then provides a first and preliminary analysis of the concept of the stakeholder society. It investigates whether the managerial incentives and the control structure desc…
The Scope of Open Source Licensing
Economics (54 obras) · Business (36 obras) · Political science (32 obras) · Microeconomics (29 obras) · Incentive (22 obras) · Computer Science (21 obras) · Experimental Behavioral Economics Studies (18 obras) · Psychology (18 obras) · Law (17 obras) · Social Psychology (14 obras)