A Theory of Incentives in Procurement and Regulation

Datos Bibliográficos

ID9713844
AutoresMark Armstrong (0000-0003-0962-8112, University of Southampton, autor de correspondencia), Jean-Jacques Laffont, Jean‐jacques Laffont, Jean Tirole
Año1995
Volumen105
Número428
Páginas193
Fecha de publicación1995-01-01
Peer ReviewedSí
Open AccessNo
TipoARTICLE
RevistaThe Economic Journal (JOURNAL)
Identificadores de la revistaISSN: 0013-0133 • E-ISSN: 1468-0297
EditorialOxford University Press (OUP) (PUBLISHER)
DOI10.2307/2235329
OpenAlexW2322057973
IdiomaEN
Citas recibidas17

Journal Article A Theory of Incentives in Procurement and Regulation. Get access A Theory of Incentives in Procurement and Regulation. By Laffont Qean-Jacques and Tirole Jean. (Cambridge, Mass. and London: MIT Press, 1993. Pp. xxii + 705. £24.95 hardback. ISBN 0 262 12174 3.) Mark Armstrong Mark Armstrong University of Southampton Search for other works by this author on: Oxford Academic Google Scholar The Economic Journal, Volume 105, Issue 428, 1 January 1995, Pages 193–194, https://doi.org/10.2307/2235329 Published: 01 January 1995

Economics · Incentive · Law and economics · Management · Microeconomics · Political science · Procurement · Public Procurement and Policy