Maitreesh Ghatak
Datos Biográficos
| ID | 1036211 |
|---|---|
| NOMBRE | Maitreesh Ghatak |
| NOMBRES | Maitreesh |
| APELLIDO | Ghatak |
| FIRMA | GHATAK M |
| AFILIACIONES | London School of Economics and Political Science |
| ORCID | 0000-0002-6231-5580 |
| VERIFICADO | Sí |
| TOTAL DE OBRAS | 18 |
| TOTAL DE CITAS | 427 |
| TOTAL COMO AUTOR | 18 |
| TOTAL COMO EDITOR | 0 |
| PRIMER AÑO DE PUBLICACIÓN | 1999 |
| AÑO MÁS RECIENTE DE PUBLICACIÓN | 2026 |
| ÍNDICE H | 8 |
Rise of Unpaid Family Workers
While the surge in India’s Labour Force Participation Rate (LFPR) and Worker Population Ratio (WPR) since 2017-18 has reversed the earlier decline in female labour force participation, it raises the crucial question of whether this trend is driven by robust economic growth or underlying economic hardship. This paper addresses this debate by focusing on the rapid increase in the most vulnerable employment categories: unpaid family helpers (UFH) an…
Is the Credit Worth It? For‐profit Lenders in Microfinance With Rational and Behavioral Borrowers
The bulk of the literature on microcredit has focused on either not‐for‐profit lenders or assumes a perfectly competitive, zero‐profit market equilibrium. Yet the market has experienced a significant shift toward for‐profit lending and the assumptions of perfect competition are likely to be too strong in many locations. We review the state of the literature on for‐profit lending in microcredit, consider its implications for both conventionally ‘r…
Market Structure and Borrower Welfare in Microfinance
Motivated by recent controversies surrounding the role of commercial lenders in microfinance, we analyze borrower welfare under different market structures, considering a benevolent non-profit lender, a for-profit monopolist, and a competitive credit market. To understand the magnitude of the effects analyzed, we simulate the model with parameters estimated from the MIX Market database. Our results suggest that market power can have severe implic…
Motivating Knowledge Agents
This paper studies the interaction of incentive pay and social distance \nin the dissemination of information. We analyse theoretically as well as \nempirically the e ect of incentive pay when agents have pro-social objectives, \nbut also preferences over dealing with one social group relative to \nanother. In a randomised eld experiment undertaken across 151 villages \nin South India, local agents were hired to spread information about a \npubli…
Two States
We examine the growth performance of two states, Gujarat and Bihar, whose economic turnaround under the leadership of Narendra Modi and Nitish Kumar has received a lot of attention in the run up to the recently concluded national elections. We study if there are trend breaks in the growth rates in Gujarat and Bihar relative to the national average after these respective leaders came to power. We decompose the growth rates in these two states by s…
Group lending without joint liability
Contractual structure in agriculture with endogenous matching
Land acquisition for industrialization and compensation of displaced farmers
This paper addresses the question of how farmers displaced by acquisition of agricultural land for the purpose of industrialization ought to be compensated. Prior to acquisition, the farmers are leasing in land from a private owner or local government with a legally mandated sharecropping contract. Compensation rules affect the decision of the landlord to sell the land ex post to an industrial developer, and ex ante incentives of tenants and land…
Property Rights and Economic Development
Subcontractors for tractors
Joint Liability Lending and the Peer Selection Effect
We show that the joint liability lending contracts derived in Ghatak (2000) violate an "ex post" incentive-compatibility constraint which says that the amount of joint liability cannot exceed the amount of individual liability. We derive and characterise optimal separating joint liability contracts incorporating this constraint. Copyright 2005 Royal Economic Society
Competition and Incentives with Motivated Agents
A unifying theme in the literature on organizations such as public bureaucracies and private nonprofits is the importance of mission, as opposed to profit, as an organizational goal. Such mission-oriented organizations are frequently staffed by motivated agents who subscribe to the mission. This paper studies incentives in such contexts and emphasizes the role of matching the mission preferences of principals and agents in increasing organization…
Eviction threats and investment incentives
A simple model of inequality, occupational choice, and development
Empowerment and Efficiency
The paper analyzes the effect of agricultural tenancy laws offering security of tenure to tenants and regulating the share of output that is paid as rent on farm productivity. Theoretically, the net impact of tenancy reform is shown to be a combination of two effects: a bargaining power effect and a security of tenure effect. Analysis of evidence on how contracts and productivity changed after a tenancy reform program was implemented in the India…
Contract choice in agriculture with joint moral hazard in effort and risk
The economics of lending with joint liability
Institutions that rely on joint liability to facilitate lending to the poor have a long history and are now a common feature of many developing countries. Economists have proposed several theories of joint-liability lending that stress various aspects of its informational and enforcement advantages over other forms of lending. This paper analyzes how joint-liability lending promotes screening, monitoring, state verification and enforcement of rep…
Group lending, local information and peer selection
Competition and Incentives with Motivated Agents
A unifying theme in the literature on organizations such as public bureaucracies and private nonprofits is the importance of mission, as opposed to profit, as an organizational goal. Such mission-oriented organizations are frequently staffed by motivated agents who subscribe to the mission. This paper studies incentives in such contexts and emphasizes the role of matching the mission preferences of principals and agents in increasing organization…
Empowerment and Efficiency
The paper analyzes the effect of agricultural tenancy laws offering security of tenure to tenants and regulating the share of output that is paid as rent on farm productivity. Theoretically, the net impact of tenancy reform is shown to be a combination of two effects: a bargaining power effect and a security of tenure effect. Analysis of evidence on how contracts and productivity changed after a tenancy reform program was implemented in the India…
The economics of lending with joint liability
Institutions that rely on joint liability to facilitate lending to the poor have a long history and are now a common feature of many developing countries. Economists have proposed several theories of joint-liability lending that stress various aspects of its informational and enforcement advantages over other forms of lending. This paper analyzes how joint-liability lending promotes screening, monitoring, state verification and enforcement of rep…
Group lending, local information and peer selection
Land acquisition for industrialization and compensation of displaced farmers
This paper addresses the question of how farmers displaced by acquisition of agricultural land for the purpose of industrialization ought to be compensated. Prior to acquisition, the farmers are leasing in land from a private owner or local government with a legally mandated sharecropping contract. Compensation rules affect the decision of the landlord to sell the land ex post to an industrial developer, and ex ante incentives of tenants and land…
A simple model of inequality, occupational choice, and development
Group lending without joint liability
Joint Liability Lending and the Peer Selection Effect
We show that the joint liability lending contracts derived in Ghatak (2000) violate an "ex post" incentive-compatibility constraint which says that the amount of joint liability cannot exceed the amount of individual liability. We derive and characterise optimal separating joint liability contracts incorporating this constraint. Copyright 2005 Royal Economic Society
Market Structure and Borrower Welfare in Microfinance
Motivated by recent controversies surrounding the role of commercial lenders in microfinance, we analyze borrower welfare under different market structures, considering a benevolent non-profit lender, a for-profit monopolist, and a competitive credit market. To understand the magnitude of the effects analyzed, we simulate the model with parameters estimated from the MIX Market database. Our results suggest that market power can have severe implic…
Eviction threats and investment incentives
Contract choice in agriculture with joint moral hazard in effort and risk
Motivating Knowledge Agents
This paper studies the interaction of incentive pay and social distance \nin the dissemination of information. We analyse theoretically as well as \nempirically the e ect of incentive pay when agents have pro-social objectives, \nbut also preferences over dealing with one social group relative to \nanother. In a randomised eld experiment undertaken across 151 villages \nin South India, local agents were hired to spread information about a \npubli…
Contractual structure in agriculture with endogenous matching
Is the Credit Worth It? For‐profit Lenders in Microfinance With Rational and Behavioral Borrowers
The bulk of the literature on microcredit has focused on either not‐for‐profit lenders or assumes a perfectly competitive, zero‐profit market equilibrium. Yet the market has experienced a significant shift toward for‐profit lending and the assumptions of perfect competition are likely to be too strong in many locations. We review the state of the literature on for‐profit lending in microcredit, consider its implications for both conventionally ‘r…
Subcontractors for tractors
The economics of lending with joint liability
Institutions that rely on joint liability to facilitate lending to the poor have a long history and are now a common feature of many developing countries. Economists have proposed several theories of joint-liability lending that stress various aspects of its informational and enforcement advantages over other forms of lending. This paper analyzes how joint-liability lending promotes screening, monitoring, state verification and enforcement of rep…
Group lending, local information and peer selection
Contract choice in agriculture with joint moral hazard in effort and risk
A simple model of inequality, occupational choice, and development
Empowerment and Efficiency
The paper analyzes the effect of agricultural tenancy laws offering security of tenure to tenants and regulating the share of output that is paid as rent on farm productivity. Theoretically, the net impact of tenancy reform is shown to be a combination of two effects: a bargaining power effect and a security of tenure effect. Analysis of evidence on how contracts and productivity changed after a tenancy reform program was implemented in the India…
Eviction threats and investment incentives
Joint Liability Lending and the Peer Selection Effect
We show that the joint liability lending contracts derived in Ghatak (2000) violate an "ex post" incentive-compatibility constraint which says that the amount of joint liability cannot exceed the amount of individual liability. We derive and characterise optimal separating joint liability contracts incorporating this constraint. Copyright 2005 Royal Economic Society
Competition and Incentives with Motivated Agents
A unifying theme in the literature on organizations such as public bureaucracies and private nonprofits is the importance of mission, as opposed to profit, as an organizational goal. Such mission-oriented organizations are frequently staffed by motivated agents who subscribe to the mission. This paper studies incentives in such contexts and emphasizes the role of matching the mission preferences of principals and agents in increasing organization…
Subcontractors for tractors
Property Rights and Economic Development
Contractual structure in agriculture with endogenous matching
Land acquisition for industrialization and compensation of displaced farmers
This paper addresses the question of how farmers displaced by acquisition of agricultural land for the purpose of industrialization ought to be compensated. Prior to acquisition, the farmers are leasing in land from a private owner or local government with a legally mandated sharecropping contract. Compensation rules affect the decision of the landlord to sell the land ex post to an industrial developer, and ex ante incentives of tenants and land…
Group lending without joint liability
Two States
We examine the growth performance of two states, Gujarat and Bihar, whose economic turnaround under the leadership of Narendra Modi and Nitish Kumar has received a lot of attention in the run up to the recently concluded national elections. We study if there are trend breaks in the growth rates in Gujarat and Bihar relative to the national average after these respective leaders came to power. We decompose the growth rates in these two states by s…
Motivating Knowledge Agents
This paper studies the interaction of incentive pay and social distance \nin the dissemination of information. We analyse theoretically as well as \nempirically the e ect of incentive pay when agents have pro-social objectives, \nbut also preferences over dealing with one social group relative to \nanother. In a randomised eld experiment undertaken across 151 villages \nin South India, local agents were hired to spread information about a \npubli…
Is the Credit Worth It? For‐profit Lenders in Microfinance With Rational and Behavioral Borrowers
The bulk of the literature on microcredit has focused on either not‐for‐profit lenders or assumes a perfectly competitive, zero‐profit market equilibrium. Yet the market has experienced a significant shift toward for‐profit lending and the assumptions of perfect competition are likely to be too strong in many locations. We review the state of the literature on for‐profit lending in microcredit, consider its implications for both conventionally ‘r…
Market Structure and Borrower Welfare in Microfinance
Motivated by recent controversies surrounding the role of commercial lenders in microfinance, we analyze borrower welfare under different market structures, considering a benevolent non-profit lender, a for-profit monopolist, and a competitive credit market. To understand the magnitude of the effects analyzed, we simulate the model with parameters estimated from the MIX Market database. Our results suggest that market power can have severe implic…
Rise of Unpaid Family Workers
While the surge in India’s Labour Force Participation Rate (LFPR) and Worker Population Ratio (WPR) since 2017-18 has reversed the earlier decline in female labour force participation, it raises the crucial question of whether this trend is driven by robust economic growth or underlying economic hardship. This paper addresses this debate by focusing on the rapid increase in the most vulnerable employment categories: unpaid family helpers (UFH) an…
Economics (16 obras) · Business (11 obras) · Microeconomics (11 obras) · Microfinance and Financial Inclusion (8 obras) · Finance (7 obras) · Incentive (7 obras) · Actuarial science (5 obras) · Computer Science (5 obras) · Economic growth (5 obras) · Joint and several liability (5 obras)