Joint Liability Lending and the Peer Selection Effect
Datos Bibliográficos
| ID | 9712431 |
|---|---|
| Autores | Ira N Gang (0000-0003-3788-8798, India Diabetes Research Foundation), Shubhashis Gangopadhyay (India Development Foundation), Maitreesh Ghatak (0000-0002-6231-5580, London School of Economics and Political Science), Robert Lensink (0000-0001-6448-5164, University of Groningen) |
| Año | 2005 |
| Volumen | 115 |
| Número | 506 |
| Páginas | 1005-1015 |
| Fecha de publicación | 2005-10-01 |
| Peer Reviewed | Sí |
| Open Access | Sí |
| Tipo | ARTICLE |
| Revista | The Economic Journal (JOURNAL) |
| Identificadores de la revista | ISSN: 0013-0133 • E-ISSN: 1468-0297 |
| Editorial | Oxford University Press (OUP) (PUBLISHER) |
| DOI | 10.1111/j.1468-0297.2005.01029.x |
| OpenAlex | W2024035021 |
| Idioma | EN |
| Citas recibidas | 14 |
| Referencias citadas | 14 |
We show that the joint liability lending contracts derived in Ghatak (2000) violate an "ex post" incentive-compatibility constraint which says that the amount of joint liability cannot exceed the amount of individual liability. We derive and characterise optimal separating joint liability contracts incorporating this constraint. Copyright 2005 Royal Economic Society
Actuarial science · Business · Compatibility (geochemistry · Constraint (computer-aided design · Economics · Incentive · Incentive compatibility · Joint (building · Joint and several liability · Liability · Limited liability · Microeconomics · Strict liability · Economic Growth and Development · Engineering · Finance · Microfinance and Financial Inclusion · Taxation and Compliance Studies
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The economics of lending with joint liability
Group lending, local information and peer selection
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| Obras citantes distintas | 14 |
|---|---|
| Citas por año | 0,74 |
| Intervalo de citas | 2007 - 2023 (17) |
| Velocidad de citación | historical |
| Altamente citado | No |
| Tipos de cita | Neutras: 14 |