T Raleigh
Datos Biográficos
| ID | 1055751 |
|---|---|
| NOMBRE | T Raleigh |
| NOMBRES | T |
| APELLIDO | Raleigh |
| FIRMA | RALEIGH T |
| AFILIACIONES | University of Luxembourg |
| ORCID | 0000-0001-5056-0039 |
| VERIFICADO | Sí |
| TOTAL DE OBRAS | 17 |
| TOTAL DE CITAS | 29 |
| TOTAL COMO AUTOR | 17 |
| TOTAL COMO EDITOR | 0 |
| PRIMER AÑO DE PUBLICACIÓN | 1895 |
| AÑO MÁS RECIENTE DE PUBLICACIÓN | 2026 |
| ÍNDICE H | 2 |
How not to argue against AI thought
This paper identifies and criticizes a common line of argument for the negative conclusion that Large Language Models (LLMs) cannot think, or for the closely related conclusions that they cannot understand or that their outputs are meaningless. This line of argument can be found in several recent papers. We begin by discussing a representative example – Stoljar, D., and Z. Zhang. 2026. “Why ChatGPT doesn’t Think: An Argument from Rationality.” In…
Two or Three Strands To the Concept of Ignorance
On Being Debased’
A standard form of skeptical scenario, in the tradition of Descartes’ evil demon, raises the prospect that our sensory experiences are deceptive. A less familiar and importantly different kind of skeptical scenario raises the prospect that our beliefs have been debased (Schaffer, 2010). This paper provides a new and improved way of resisting this latter kind of debasing skepticism. Along the way, I explore how the debasing demon scenario connects…
Skepticism about Post-hoc Explainability and Idealized Models
peer reviewed
The Emptiness of Naturalism
I argue that the term ‘naturalism’ is so empty of meaning that it is not suitable for serious theorizing in philosophy. In particular, I argue that the question of whether or not some theory or thesis should count as naturalistic is an empty verbal dispute with no further theoretical significance. I also discuss naturalism construed as a methodological thesis and argue that any plausible version will collapse into triviality. Lastly, I briefly di…
What can We Know about Unanswerable Questions
I present two arguments that aim to establish logical limits on what we can know. More specifically, I argue for two results concerning what we can know about questions that we cannot answer. I also discuss a line of thought, found in the writings of Pierce and of Rescher, in support of the idea that we cannot identify specific scientific questions that will never be answered
The argument from small improvement is a red herring
The much-discussed ‘Argument from Small Improvement’ has been advanced both as a reason to reject (tripartite) Completeness, one of the standard axioms of decision theory, and to accept the possibility of rationally incomparable choices. But this form of argument cannot be an effective basis for either of these conclusions, unless one already has some prior, independent reason to prefer Transitivity to Completeness as a constraint on rational pre…
Perceptual Content, Phenomenal Contrasts, and Externalism
According to Sparse views of perceptual content, the phenomenal character of perceptual experience is exhausted by the experiential presentation of ‘low-level’ properties such as (in the case of vision) shapes, colors, and textures Whereas, according to Rich views of perceptual content, the phenomenal character of perceptual experience can also sometimes involve experiencing ‘high-level’ properties such as natural kinds, artefactual kinds, causal…
Visual acquaintance, action and the explanatory gap
Suspending is believing
A new anti-expertise dilemma
Perceptual Experience and Degrees of Belief
According to the recent Perceptual Confidence view, perceptual experiences possess not only a representational content, but also a degree of confidence in that content. The motivations for this view are partly phenomenological and partly epistemic. We discuss both the phenomenological and epistemic motivations for the view, and the resulting account of the interface between perceptual experiences and degrees of belief. We conclude that, in their …
Against an inferentialist dogma
Another Argument Against Uniqueness
I present an argument against the thesis of Uniqueness and in favour of Permissivism. Counterexamples to Uniqueness are provided, based on ‘Safespot’ propositions – i.e. a proposition that is guaranteed to be true provided the subject adopts a certain attitude towards it. The argument relies on a plausible principle: (roughly stated) If S knows that her believing p would be a true belief, then it is rationally permitted for S to believe p. One mo…
Lectures on the Relation Between Law and Public Opinion in England During the Nineteenth Century
Municipal Home Rule
Trusts, or Industrial Combinations and Coalitions in the United States
Lectures on the Relation Between Law and Public Opinion in England During the Nineteenth Century
Suspending is believing
Visual acquaintance, action and the explanatory gap
Municipal Home Rule
Another Argument Against Uniqueness
I present an argument against the thesis of Uniqueness and in favour of Permissivism. Counterexamples to Uniqueness are provided, based on ‘Safespot’ propositions – i.e. a proposition that is guaranteed to be true provided the subject adopts a certain attitude towards it. The argument relies on a plausible principle: (roughly stated) If S knows that her believing p would be a true belief, then it is rationally permitted for S to believe p. One mo…
Municipal Home Rule
Trusts, or Industrial Combinations and Coalitions in the United States
Lectures on the Relation Between Law and Public Opinion in England During the Nineteenth Century
Another Argument Against Uniqueness
I present an argument against the thesis of Uniqueness and in favour of Permissivism. Counterexamples to Uniqueness are provided, based on ‘Safespot’ propositions – i.e. a proposition that is guaranteed to be true provided the subject adopts a certain attitude towards it. The argument relies on a plausible principle: (roughly stated) If S knows that her believing p would be a true belief, then it is rationally permitted for S to believe p. One mo…
Against an inferentialist dogma
Visual acquaintance, action and the explanatory gap
Suspending is believing
A new anti-expertise dilemma
Perceptual Experience and Degrees of Belief
According to the recent Perceptual Confidence view, perceptual experiences possess not only a representational content, but also a degree of confidence in that content. The motivations for this view are partly phenomenological and partly epistemic. We discuss both the phenomenological and epistemic motivations for the view, and the resulting account of the interface between perceptual experiences and degrees of belief. We conclude that, in their …
Perceptual Content, Phenomenal Contrasts, and Externalism
According to Sparse views of perceptual content, the phenomenal character of perceptual experience is exhausted by the experiential presentation of ‘low-level’ properties such as (in the case of vision) shapes, colors, and textures Whereas, according to Rich views of perceptual content, the phenomenal character of perceptual experience can also sometimes involve experiencing ‘high-level’ properties such as natural kinds, artefactual kinds, causal…
The argument from small improvement is a red herring
The much-discussed ‘Argument from Small Improvement’ has been advanced both as a reason to reject (tripartite) Completeness, one of the standard axioms of decision theory, and to accept the possibility of rationally incomparable choices. But this form of argument cannot be an effective basis for either of these conclusions, unless one already has some prior, independent reason to prefer Transitivity to Completeness as a constraint on rational pre…
The Emptiness of Naturalism
I argue that the term ‘naturalism’ is so empty of meaning that it is not suitable for serious theorizing in philosophy. In particular, I argue that the question of whether or not some theory or thesis should count as naturalistic is an empty verbal dispute with no further theoretical significance. I also discuss naturalism construed as a methodological thesis and argue that any plausible version will collapse into triviality. Lastly, I briefly di…
What can We Know about Unanswerable Questions
I present two arguments that aim to establish logical limits on what we can know. More specifically, I argue for two results concerning what we can know about questions that we cannot answer. I also discuss a line of thought, found in the writings of Pierce and of Rescher, in support of the idea that we cannot identify specific scientific questions that will never be answered
Two or Three Strands To the Concept of Ignorance
On Being Debased’
A standard form of skeptical scenario, in the tradition of Descartes’ evil demon, raises the prospect that our sensory experiences are deceptive. A less familiar and importantly different kind of skeptical scenario raises the prospect that our beliefs have been debased (Schaffer, 2010). This paper provides a new and improved way of resisting this latter kind of debasing skepticism. Along the way, I explore how the debasing demon scenario connects…
Skepticism about Post-hoc Explainability and Idealized Models
peer reviewed
How not to argue against AI thought
This paper identifies and criticizes a common line of argument for the negative conclusion that Large Language Models (LLMs) cannot think, or for the closely related conclusions that they cannot understand or that their outputs are meaningless. This line of argument can be found in several recent papers. We begin by discussing a representative example – Stoljar, D., and Z. Zhang. 2026. “Why ChatGPT doesn’t Think: An Argument from Rationality.” In…
Epistemology (11 obras) · Philosophy (11 obras) · Philosophy and Theoretical Science (8 obras) · Epistemology, Ethics, and Metaphysics (7 obras) · Computer Science (6 obras) · Philosophy of language (6 obras) · Mathematics (5 obras) · Metaphysics (5 obras) · Philosophy of science (5 obras) · Psychology (5 obras)