What can We Know about Unanswerable Questions
Datos Bibliográficos
| ID | 10691933 |
|---|---|
| Autores | T Raleigh (0000-0001-5056-0039, University of Luxembourg, autor de correspondencia) |
| Año | 2024 |
| Volumen | 75 |
| Número | 1 |
| Páginas | 213-227 |
| Fecha de publicación | 2024-11-27 |
| Peer Reviewed | Sí |
| Open Access | Sí |
| Tipo | ARTICLE |
| Revista | The Philosophical Quarterly (JOURNAL) |
| Identificadores de la revista | ISSN: 0031-8094 • E-ISSN: 1467-9213 |
| Editorial | Oxford University Press (PUBLISHER • GB) |
| DOI | 10.1093/pq/pqad109 |
| OpenAlex | W4389137394 |
| Idioma | EN |
| Referencias citadas | 22 |
I present two arguments that aim to establish logical limits on what we can know. More specifically, I argue for two results concerning what we can know about questions that we cannot answer. I also discuss a line of thought, found in the writings of Pierce and of Rescher, in support of the idea that we cannot identify specific scientific questions that will never be answered
Epistemology · Need to know · Computability, Logic, AI Algorithms · Computer Science · Philosophy · Philosophy and History of Science · Philosophy and Theoretical Science
| Velocidad de citación | historical |
|---|---|
| Altamente citado | No |