Ben Holguín
Datos Biográficos
| ID | 1078142 |
|---|---|
| NOMBRE | Ben Holguín |
| NOMBRES | Ben |
| APELLIDO | Holguín |
| FIRMA | BEN HOLGUÍN |
| AFILIACIONES | Johns Hopkins University |
| VERIFICADO | No |
| TOTAL DE OBRAS | 8 |
| TOTAL DE CITAS | 10 |
| TOTAL COMO AUTOR | 8 |
| TOTAL COMO EDITOR | 0 |
| PRIMER AÑO DE PUBLICACIÓN | 2019 |
| AÑO MÁS RECIENTE DE PUBLICACIÓN | 2025 |
| ÍNDICE H | 2 |
The vague, the assertable, and the omega-knowable
It is widely accepted that knowledge is necessary for proper assertion. More controversial is the thesis that omega-knowledge – infinitely higher-order knowledge – is necessary for proper assertion. Proponents of the ‘KK’ principle take the former thesis to entail the latter, since they take knowledge to entail omega-knowledge. But in Iterated Knowledge, Simon Goldstein argues against the KK principle and in favor of the thesis that omega-knowled…
Fictional Reality
This article defends a theory of fictional truth. According to this theory, there is a fact of the matter concerning the number of hairs on Sherlock Holmes’s head, and likewise for any other meaningful question one could ask about what’s true in a work of fiction. This article argues that a theory of this form is needed to account for the patterns in our judgments about attitude reports that embed fictional claims. It contrasts this view with one…
Trying without fail
Thinking and being sure
How is what we believe related to how we act? That depends on what we mean by ‘believe’. On the one hand, there is what we're sure of: what our names are, where we were born, whether we are sitting in front of a screen. Surety, in this sense, is not uncommon — it does not imply Cartesian absolute certainty, from which no possible course of experience could dislodge us. But there are many things that we think that we are not sure of. For example, …
Knowledge in the face of conspiracy conditionals
Knowledge by constraint
This paper considers some puzzling knowledge ascriptions and argues that they present prima facie counterexamples to credence, belief, and justification conditions on knowledge, as well as to many of the standard meta‐semantic assumptions about the context‐sensitivity of ‘know’. It argues that these ascriptions provide new evidence in favor of contextualist theories of knowledge—in particular those that take the interpretation of ‘know’ to be sen…
Lying and knowing
Embedded Attitudes
This paper presents a puzzle involving embedded attitude reports. We resolve the puzzle by arguing that attitude verbs take restricted readings: in some environments the denotation of attitude verbs can be restricted by a given proposition. For example, when these verbs are embedded in the consequent of a conditional, they can be restricted by the proposition expressed by the conditional’s antecedent. We formulate and motivate two conditions on t…
Thinking and being sure
How is what we believe related to how we act? That depends on what we mean by ‘believe’. On the one hand, there is what we're sure of: what our names are, where we were born, whether we are sitting in front of a screen. Surety, in this sense, is not uncommon — it does not imply Cartesian absolute certainty, from which no possible course of experience could dislodge us. But there are many things that we think that we are not sure of. For example, …
Lying and knowing
Embedded Attitudes
This paper presents a puzzle involving embedded attitude reports. We resolve the puzzle by arguing that attitude verbs take restricted readings: in some environments the denotation of attitude verbs can be restricted by a given proposition. For example, when these verbs are embedded in the consequent of a conditional, they can be restricted by the proposition expressed by the conditional’s antecedent. We formulate and motivate two conditions on t…
Knowledge in the face of conspiracy conditionals
Knowledge by constraint
This paper considers some puzzling knowledge ascriptions and argues that they present prima facie counterexamples to credence, belief, and justification conditions on knowledge, as well as to many of the standard meta‐semantic assumptions about the context‐sensitivity of ‘know’. It argues that these ascriptions provide new evidence in favor of contextualist theories of knowledge—in particular those that take the interpretation of ‘know’ to be sen…
Lying and knowing
Thinking and being sure
How is what we believe related to how we act? That depends on what we mean by ‘believe’. On the one hand, there is what we're sure of: what our names are, where we were born, whether we are sitting in front of a screen. Surety, in this sense, is not uncommon — it does not imply Cartesian absolute certainty, from which no possible course of experience could dislodge us. But there are many things that we think that we are not sure of. For example, …
Trying without fail
The vague, the assertable, and the omega-knowable
It is widely accepted that knowledge is necessary for proper assertion. More controversial is the thesis that omega-knowledge – infinitely higher-order knowledge – is necessary for proper assertion. Proponents of the ‘KK’ principle take the former thesis to entail the latter, since they take knowledge to entail omega-knowledge. But in Iterated Knowledge, Simon Goldstein argues against the KK principle and in favor of the thesis that omega-knowled…
Fictional Reality
This article defends a theory of fictional truth. According to this theory, there is a fact of the matter concerning the number of hairs on Sherlock Holmes’s head, and likewise for any other meaningful question one could ask about what’s true in a work of fiction. This article argues that a theory of this form is needed to account for the patterns in our judgments about attitude reports that embed fictional claims. It contrasts this view with one…
Epistemology, Ethics, and Metaphysics (8 obras) · Philosophy (8 obras) · Epistemology (6 obras) · Computer Science (5 obras) · Linguistics (4 obras) · Philosophy and Theoretical Science (4 obras) · Psychology (4 obras) · Metaphysics (3 obras) · Philosophy of language (3 obras) · Assertion (2 obras)