Fictional Reality

Datos Bibliográficos

ID10693216
AutoresKyle Blumberg (0000-0002-5047-0313, University of Melbourne; University of Johannesburg), Ben Holguín (Johns Hopkins University)
Año2025
Volumen134
Número2
Páginas149-201
Fecha de publicación2025-04-01
Peer ReviewedSí
Open AccessNo
TipoARTICLE
RevistaThe Philosophical Review (JOURNAL)
Identificadores de la revistaISSN: 0031-8108 • E-ISSN: 1558-1470
EditorialDuke University Press (PUBLISHER • US)
DOI10.1215/00318108-11676103
OpenAlexW4408868658
IdiomaEN
Citas recibidas1
Referencias citadas84

This article defends a theory of fictional truth. According to this theory, there is a fact of the matter concerning the number of hairs on Sherlock Holmes’s head, and likewise for any other meaningful question one could ask about what’s true in a work of fiction. This article argues that a theory of this form is needed to account for the patterns in our judgments about attitude reports that embed fictional claims. It contrasts this view with one of the dominant approaches to fictional truth, which originates with David Lewis. Along the way it explores the relationship between fiction, counterfactuals, and vagueness

Analytic philosophy · Contemporary philosophy · Epistemology · General interest · Classical Philosophy and Thought · Epistemology, Ethics, and Metaphysics · Narrative Theory and Analysis · Philosophy