D Marc Kilgour
Datos Biográficos
| ID | 1082885 |
|---|---|
| NOMBRE | D Marc Kilgour |
| NOMBRES | D Marc |
| APELLIDO | Kilgour |
| FIRMA | KILGOUR D M |
| AFILIACIONES | Wilfrid Laurier University |
| ORCID | 0000-0001-8810-8937 |
| VERIFICADO | Sí |
| TOTAL DE OBRAS | 47 |
| TOTAL DE CITAS | 239 |
| TOTAL COMO AUTOR | 46 |
| TOTAL COMO EDITOR | 1 |
| PRIMER AÑO DE PUBLICACIÓN | 1983 |
| AÑO MÁS RECIENTE DE PUBLICACIÓN | 2025 |
| ÍNDICE H | 9 |
Condorcet efficiency
Two-Person Fair Division with Additive Valuations
In the literature, many desirable properties for allocations of indivisible goods have been proposed, including envy-freeness, Pareto optimality, and maximization of either the total welfare of all agents, the welfare of the worst-off agent, or the Nash product of agents’ welfares. In the two-person context, we study relationships among these properties using both analytical models and simulation in a setting where individual preferences are give…
Two-Person Fair Division of Indivisible Items
Suppose two players wish to divide a finite set of indivisible items, over which each distributes a specified number of points. Assuming the utility of a player’s bundle is the sum of the points it assigns to the items it contains, we analyze what divisions are fair. We show that if there is an envy-free (EF) allocation of the items, two other desirable properties—Pareto-optimality (PO) and Maximinality (MM)—can also be satisfied, rendering these…
Weighted scoring elections
Modeling threats and promises
The use of an incomplete information game model to explore the strategic characteristics of the carrot and stick approach to coercive diplomacy shows that the dynamics of this manipulative bargaining tactic are much more nuanced than standard atheoretical accounts suggest. One unexpected finding is that when information is incomplete, there always exists a deterrence equilibrium under which no attempt is made to overturn the status quo. An all-ou…
Handbook of Group Decision and Negotiation
The prevalence and consequences of ballot truncation in ranked-choice elections
Multiwinner approval voting
Paths to victory in presidential elections
How to Divide Things Fairly
We propose an intuitively simple sequential algorithm (SA) for the fair division of indivisible items that are strictly ranked by two or more players. We analyze several properties of the allocations that it yields and discuss SA's application to real-life problems, such as dividing the marital property in a divorce or assigning people to committees or projects. Additional informationNotes on contributorsSteven J. BramsSTEVEN J. BRAMS (MR Author …
Presidential address
Narrowing the field in elections
We suggest a new approach to narrowing the field in elections, based on the ‘deservingness’ of candidates to be contenders in a runoff, or to be declared one of several winners. Instead of specifying some minimum percentage (e.g., 50) that the leading candidate must surpass to avoid a runoff (usually between the top two candidates), we propose that the number of contenders depends on the distribution of votes among all candidates. Divisor methods…
Explaining Limited Conflicts
This report uses a generic two-stage escalation model to ask whether and when limited conflicts can occur. There are two players in the model: Challenger and Defender. Challenger can either initiate a conflict or not. If Challenger initiates, Defender can concede, respond-in-kind, or escalate. If Defender does not concede, Challenger can escalate. The process continues until one side concedes or both escalate. Limited conflicts do not occur in ou…
A minimax procedure for electing committees
The Deterrence-Versus-Restraint Dilemma in Extended Deterrence
This essay explores the deterrence-versus-restraint dilemma in extended deterrence in the context of the Tripartite Crisis Game under incomplete information. This model was developed specifically to capture the mixed motives and contradictory impulses that oftentimes frame extended deterrence encounters. To focus the analysis and to gain tractability, we make specific assumptions about the utilities of the players: Challenger, Defender, and Proté…
Separable discrete preferences
Forming stable coalitions
Alignment Patterns, Crisis Bargaining, and Extended Deterrence
To explore the impact of alignment patterns in a rudimentary state system, we develop and analyze the Tripartite Crisis Game, a three-person game among Challenger, Defender, and Protégé. This model captures some of the tensions implicit in the "Alliance" and "Adversary" games, two related but theoretically isolated models due to Snyder. Our analysis enables us to delineate and explore the circumstances that give rise to the "deterrence versus res…
Single-Peakedness and Disconnected Coalitions
Ordinally single-peaked preferences are distinguished from cardinally single-peaked preferences, in which all players have a similar perception of distances in some one-dimensional ordering. While ordinal single-peakedness can lead to disconnected coalitions that have a ‘hole’ in the ordering, cardinal single-peakedness precludes this possibility, based on two models of coalition formation: • Fallback (FB): Players seek coalition partners by desc…
Competitive Fair Division
Several indivisible goods are to be divided among two or more players, whose bids for the goods determine their prices. An equitable assignment of the goods at competitive prices is given by a fair-division procedure, called the Gap Procedure, that ensures (1) nonnegative prices that never exceed the bid of the player receiving the good; (2) Pareto optimality, though coupled with possible envy; (3) monotonicity, such that higher bids never hurt i…
Perfect Deterrence
An important and timely contribution to International Relations and political science, this is the first general analysis of deterrence since the end of the Cold War. Using non-cooperative game theory, the authors develop a new approach to deterrence (Perfect Deterrence Theory), which they apply to unilateral and mutual direct-deterrence relationships, and to extended-deterrence relationships supported by deployment policies such as Massive Retal…
Perfect Deterrence (Cambridge Studies in International Relations)
Voting on referenda
Assume that voters choose between yes (Y) and no (N) on two related propositions in a referendum, where YN, for example, signifies voting Y on the first and N on the second. If a voter's preference order for the four possible combinations is, say, YY>NN>YN>NY, then this voter's preferences are nonseparable, because whether he or she will prefer Y or N on either proposition depends on whether Y or N is the outcome selected on the other. Since vote…
Assessing Competing Defense Postures
A two-stage Asymmetric Escalation Game is developed to explore the connection between stage credibility and deterrence stability. There are two players in the model: Challenger and Defender. Challenger may initiate or not. If Challenger initiates, Defender may do nothing, respond in kind, or escalate; Challenger may then escalate or counterescalate, and so on. Each player is uncertain about the other's intentions at the final stage of the game. E…
Uncertainty and the role of the pawn in extended deterrence
Asymmetric Deterrence
Deterrence of a challenger by a defender is modeled by explicitly relating uncertainty and the credibility of retaliatory threats to the stability of an asymmetric deterrence relationship. In the two-person game model, each player either prefers to fight rather than back down or prefers the reverse. A player knows its own preference, but is uncertain of its adversary's. The challenger may choose to accept the status quo or initiate a crisis; in t…
Credibility, Uncertainty, and Deterrence
In this paper the connection between deterrence stability and threat credibility is examined conceptually and theoretically. We formulate as a model of bilateral deterrence a game of incomplete information in which each player is uncertain about its opponent's preferences should it unilaterally alter the status quo. Uncertainty about the preferences of one's opponent leads to uncertainty about the opponent's willingness to retaliate. By identifyi…
Alignment Patterns, Crisis Bargaining, and Extended Deterrence
To explore the impact of alignment patterns in a rudimentary state system, we develop and analyze the Tripartite Crisis Game, a three-person game among Challenger, Defender, and Protégé. This model captures some of the tensions implicit in the "Alliance" and "Adversary" games, two related but theoretically isolated models due to Snyder. Our analysis enables us to delineate and explore the circumstances that give rise to the "deterrence versus res…
Threat Escalation and Crisis Stability
We develop a model of crisis stability based on a deterrence game. Players are assumed to be able to choose any level of initial cooperation or noncooperation; the more cooperative player (if there is one) may then choose to retaliate. In a crisis, players are assumed to have escalated their conflict and desire to stabilize it before it explodes. Players can, by threatening their opponent, stabilize the new status quo. In addition, points of thre…
Voting on referenda
Assume that voters choose between yes (Y) and no (N) on two related propositions in a referendum, where YN, for example, signifies voting Y on the first and N on the second. If a voter's preference order for the four possible combinations is, say, YY>NN>YN>NY, then this voter's preferences are nonseparable, because whether he or she will prefer Y or N on either proposition depends on whether Y or N is the outcome selected on the other. Since vote…
Domestic Political Structure and War Behavior
A natural approach to understanding the tendencies of nations to enter or avoid wars is through the study of national decision making in international crises. Recent game-theoretic models of national crisis behavior can be used to generate research hypotheses about how specific features of national political structures and political culture are related to war-proneness. To illustrate, propositions about the relationships of several national chara…
A Formal Analysis of the Amending Formula of Canada's Constitution Act, 1982
A formal analysis of the amending formula of Canada's Constitution Act, 1982 is presented. It is shown that larger provinces have greater voices in determining constitutional amendments, except that there are two groupings of provinces within which power with respect to constitutional amendments is exactly equal. Further, it is argued that differences in power among the provinces are disproportionately small in comparison to differences in popula…
Assessing Competing Defense Postures
A two-stage Asymmetric Escalation Game is developed to explore the connection between stage credibility and deterrence stability. There are two players in the model: Challenger and Defender. Challenger may initiate or not. If Challenger initiates, Defender may do nothing, respond in kind, or escalate; Challenger may then escalate or counterescalate, and so on. Each player is uncertain about the other's intentions at the final stage of the game. E…
Single-Peakedness and Disconnected Coalitions
Ordinally single-peaked preferences are distinguished from cardinally single-peaked preferences, in which all players have a similar perception of distances in some one-dimensional ordering. While ordinal single-peakedness can lead to disconnected coalitions that have a ‘hole’ in the ordering, cardinal single-peakedness precludes this possibility, based on two models of coalition formation: • Fallback (FB): Players seek coalition partners by desc…
The prevalence and consequences of ballot truncation in ranked-choice elections
Winding Down if Preemption or Escalation Occurs
Game-theoretic models of deterrence and escalation, based on Chicken and Prisoners' Dilemma, are developed in which two players can initially choose any level of preemption in a crisis (Deterrence Game) or escalation in an arms race (Deescalation Game). The greater this level, the more likely an opponent will interpret this choice as a noncooperative action and retaliate. Given that both players make noncooperative choices in these games—either i…
Deterrence versus Defense
A game-theoretic model of the Strategic Defense Initiative, or "Star Wars," is developed based on a deterrence model founded on the game of Chicken. In this model, two players can choose any level of preemption, and threaten any level of retaliation against preemption, whereas in the Star Wars Game they are constrained in these choices by the defensive capabilities of an opponent. Nash equilibria, or stable outcomes, are derived in this game and …
Uncertainty and the role of the pawn in extended deterrence
Putting the Other Side “On Notice” Can Induce Compliance in Arms Control
Arms-control inspection is modeled by two games, one played simultaneously and one sequentially, between an inspector (O) and an inspectee (E). In each game, E may choose to comply with or violate an arms-control agreement and O may choose to inspect, or not, for a possible violation by E. Besides various costs and benefits, the parameters of the games include the conditional probability that a violation will be detected if there is an inspection…
The Deterrence-Versus-Restraint Dilemma in Extended Deterrence
This essay explores the deterrence-versus-restraint dilemma in extended deterrence in the context of the Tripartite Crisis Game under incomplete information. This model was developed specifically to capture the mixed motives and contradictory impulses that oftentimes frame extended deterrence encounters. To focus the analysis and to gain tractability, we make specific assumptions about the utilities of the players: Challenger, Defender, and Proté…
Separable discrete preferences
Competitive Fair Division
Several indivisible goods are to be divided among two or more players, whose bids for the goods determine their prices. An equitable assignment of the goods at competitive prices is given by a fair-division procedure, called the Gap Procedure, that ensures (1) nonnegative prices that never exceed the bid of the player receiving the good; (2) Pareto optimality, though coupled with possible envy; (3) monotonicity, such that higher bids never hurt i…
Modeling 'Massive Retaliation
A generic asymmetric two-stage escalation model of incomplete information is used to examine strategic relationships in which one player adopts a defense posture akin to the “Massive Retaliation” policy of the Eisenhower administration that relies only on the threat of escalation to deter aggression. In the model, a challenger must decide whether to contest the status quo and a defender must choose between capitulation and escalation. Each player…
A minimax procedure for electing committees
The Canadian constitutional amending formula
Explaining Limited Conflicts
This report uses a generic two-stage escalation model to ask whether and when limited conflicts can occur. There are two players in the model: Challenger and Defender. Challenger can either initiate a conflict or not. If Challenger initiates, Defender can concede, respond-in-kind, or escalate. If Defender does not concede, Challenger can escalate. The process continues until one side concedes or both escalate. Limited conflicts do not occur in ou…
Holding power in sequential games 1
Holding power is simply the ability of a player to stay at one position longer than his opponent, thereby forcing the opponent to make the next move in a sequential game. In this paper, we illustrate the real world relevance of this concept by examining the Berlin crisis of 1948 and showing that only a holding power interpretation provides a satisfying explanation of the eventual resolution. We define holding power formally and find that, when on…
The geometry of the uncovered set in the three-voter spatial model
The Choice of a Permanent Amending Formula for Canada's Constitution
Modeling threats and promises
The use of an incomplete information game model to explore the strategic characteristics of the carrot and stick approach to coercive diplomacy shows that the dynamics of this manipulative bargaining tactic are much more nuanced than standard atheoretical accounts suggest. One unexpected finding is that when information is incomplete, there always exists a deterrence equilibrium under which no attempt is made to overturn the status quo. An all-ou…
Approval VotingSteven J. Brams and Peter C. Fishburn Boston
An abstract is not available for this content so a preview has been provided. Please use the Get access link above for information on how to access this content
A Formal Analysis of the Amending Formula of Canada's Constitution Act, 1982
A formal analysis of the amending formula of Canada's Constitution Act, 1982 is presented. It is shown that larger provinces have greater voices in determining constitutional amendments, except that there are two groupings of provinces within which power with respect to constitutional amendments is exactly equal. Further, it is argued that differences in power among the provinces are disproportionately small in comparison to differences in popula…
The Choice of a Permanent Amending Formula for Canada's Constitution
The Canadian constitutional amending formula
Optimal Deterrence
1. Introduction The policy of deterrence, at least to avert nuclear war between the superpowers, has been a controversial one. The main controversy arises from the threat of each side to visit destruction on the other in response to an initial attack. This threat would seem irrational if carrying it out would lead to a nuclear holocaust – the worst outcome for both sides. Instead, it would seem better for the side attacked to suffer some destruct…
Dynamic Models of International Conflict
Brings together the best minds of the time in mathematical modeling of conflict dynamics to show that international conflict is an ever-evolving process
Is Nuclear Deterrence Rational
An abstract is not available for this content so a preview has been provided. Please use the Get access link above for information on how to access this content
Exploring the Stability of Deterrence
To provide a firmer foundation for evaluating the consequences of deploying nuclear weapons, this book explores the theoretical underpinnings of the uneasy relationships among nuclear powers
Holding power in sequential games 1
Holding power is simply the ability of a player to stay at one position longer than his opponent, thereby forcing the opponent to make the next move in a sequential game. In this paper, we illustrate the real world relevance of this concept by examining the Berlin crisis of 1948 and showing that only a holding power interpretation provides a satisfying explanation of the eventual resolution. We define holding power formally and find that, when on…
Is Nuclear Deterrence Rational, and Will Star Wars Help
Deterrence means threatening to retaliate against an attack in order to deter it in the first place. The central problem with a policy of deterrence is that the threat of retaliation may not be credible if retaliation leads to a worse outcome - perhaps a nuclear holocaust - than a side would suffer from absorbing a limited first strike and not retaliating. - The optimality of deterrence is analyzed by means of a Deterrence Game based on Chicken, …
The geometry of the uncovered set in the three-voter spatial model
Winding Down if Preemption or Escalation Occurs
Game-theoretic models of deterrence and escalation, based on Chicken and Prisoners' Dilemma, are developed in which two players can initially choose any level of preemption in a crisis (Deterrence Game) or escalation in an arms race (Deescalation Game). The greater this level, the more likely an opponent will interpret this choice as a noncooperative action and retaliate. Given that both players make noncooperative choices in these games—either i…
Threat Escalation and Crisis Stability
We develop a model of crisis stability based on a deterrence game. Players are assumed to be able to choose any level of initial cooperation or noncooperation; the more cooperative player (if there is one) may then choose to retaliate. In a crisis, players are assumed to have escalated their conflict and desire to stabilize it before it explodes. Players can, by threatening their opponent, stabilize the new status quo. In addition, points of thre…
National security games
Deterrence versus Defense
A game-theoretic model of the Strategic Defense Initiative, or "Star Wars," is developed based on a deterrence model founded on the game of Chicken. In this model, two players can choose any level of preemption, and threaten any level of retaliation against preemption, whereas in the Star Wars Game they are constrained in these choices by the defensive capabilities of an opponent. Nash equilibria, or stable outcomes, are derived in this game and …
The Probability of Nuclear War
A theoretical analysis of the probability of nuclear war is developed that assumes a starting probability and an annual reduction factor. Whatever the starting probability is, a constant reduction factor leads to an eventual probability that is less than 1, whereas the eventual probability goes to 1 if there is no reduction or if the reduction proportion decreases at a constant rate. Numerical calculations and graphical results illustrate trade-o…
Game Theory and National Security
Domestic Political Structure and War Behavior
A natural approach to understanding the tendencies of nations to enter or avoid wars is through the study of national decision making in international crises. Recent game-theoretic models of national crisis behavior can be used to generate research hypotheses about how specific features of national political structures and political culture are related to war-proneness. To illustrate, propositions about the relationships of several national chara…
Credibility, Uncertainty, and Deterrence
In this paper the connection between deterrence stability and threat credibility is examined conceptually and theoretically. We formulate as a model of bilateral deterrence a game of incomplete information in which each player is uncertain about its opponent's preferences should it unilaterally alter the status quo. Uncertainty about the preferences of one's opponent leads to uncertainty about the opponent's willingness to retaliate. By identifyi…
Putting the Other Side “On Notice” Can Induce Compliance in Arms Control
Arms-control inspection is modeled by two games, one played simultaneously and one sequentially, between an inspector (O) and an inspectee (E). In each game, E may choose to comply with or violate an arms-control agreement and O may choose to inspect, or not, for a possible violation by E. Besides various costs and benefits, the parameters of the games include the conditional probability that a violation will be detected if there is an inspection…
Modeling 'Massive Retaliation
A generic asymmetric two-stage escalation model of incomplete information is used to examine strategic relationships in which one player adopts a defense posture akin to the “Massive Retaliation” policy of the Eisenhower administration that relies only on the threat of escalation to deter aggression. In the model, a challenger must decide whether to contest the status quo and a defender must choose between capitulation and escalation. Each player…
Asymmetric Deterrence
Deterrence of a challenger by a defender is modeled by explicitly relating uncertainty and the credibility of retaliatory threats to the stability of an asymmetric deterrence relationship. In the two-person game model, each player either prefers to fight rather than back down or prefers the reverse. A player knows its own preference, but is uncertain of its adversary's. The challenger may choose to accept the status quo or initiate a crisis; in t…
Uncertainty and the role of the pawn in extended deterrence
Assessing Competing Defense Postures
A two-stage Asymmetric Escalation Game is developed to explore the connection between stage credibility and deterrence stability. There are two players in the model: Challenger and Defender. Challenger may initiate or not. If Challenger initiates, Defender may do nothing, respond in kind, or escalate; Challenger may then escalate or counterescalate, and so on. Each player is uncertain about the other's intentions at the final stage of the game. E…
Voting on referenda
Assume that voters choose between yes (Y) and no (N) on two related propositions in a referendum, where YN, for example, signifies voting Y on the first and N on the second. If a voter's preference order for the four possible combinations is, say, YY>NN>YN>NY, then this voter's preferences are nonseparable, because whether he or she will prefer Y or N on either proposition depends on whether Y or N is the outcome selected on the other. Since vote…
Political science (35 obras) · Computer Science (34 obras) · Economics (31 obras) · Law (31 obras) · Law (26 obras) · Mathematics (23 obras) · Game Theory and Applications (21 obras) · Mathematical economics (20 obras) · Law and economics (19 obras) · Microeconomics (16 obras)