Putting the Other Side “On Notice” Can Induce Compliance in Arms Control
Datos Bibliográficos
| ID | 6284628 |
|---|---|
| Autores | D Marc Kilgour (0000-0001-8810-8937, Wilfrid Laurier University), Steven J Bram (0000-0003-3650-0392, New York University), Steven J Brams (New York University) |
| Año | 1992 |
| Volumen | 36 |
| Número | 3 |
| Páginas | 395-414 |
| Fecha de publicación | 1992-09-01 |
| Peer Reviewed | Sí |
| Open Access | Sí |
| Tipo | ARTICLE |
| Revista | Journal of Conflict Resolution (JOURNAL) |
| Identificadores de la revista | ISSN: 0022-0027 • E-ISSN: 1552-8766 |
| Editorial | SAGE Publications Inc (PUBLISHER) |
| DOI | 10.1177/0022002792036003001 |
| OpenAlex | W2075772193 |
| Idioma | EN |
| Citas recibidas | 6 |
| Referencias citadas | 6 |
Arms-control inspection is modeled by two games, one played simultaneously and one sequentially, between an inspector (O) and an inspectee (E). In each game, E may choose to comply with or violate an arms-control agreement and O may choose to inspect, or not, for a possible violation by E. Besides various costs and benefits, the parameters of the games include the conditional probability that a violation will be detected if there is an inspection, reflecting the uncertainty of inspection. In the simultaneous game, O and E make simultaneous choices. Because none of the three possible equilibria involves certain compliance by E, O is not always able to deter E from violating an agreement. In the sequential game, by contrast, O, by announcing in advance an inspection strategy and credibly committing itself to carrying it out, can, with certainty, deter E from violating, which in general leads to an equilibrium in the sequential form Pareto-superior to that in the simultaneous form. Thus there are evident benefits for both O and E when O “moves” first, given that its detection probability is above a certain threshold. Policy implications of this finding, especially in regional conflicts today, are briefly discussed
Arms control · Certainty · Compliance (psychology · Control (management · Economics · Game theory · Law and economics · Mathematical economics · Notice · Operations management · Pareto principle · Political science · Artificial Intelligence · Computer Science · Defense, Military, and Policy Studies · Game Theory and Applications · Law · Law, Economics, and Judicial Systems · Mathematics · Psychology · Social Psychology
| Obras citantes distintas | 6 |
|---|---|
| Citas por año | 0,18 |
| Intervalo de citas | 1992 - 2017 (26) |
| Velocidad de citación | historical |
| Altamente citado | No |
| Tipos de cita | Neutras: 6 |