Engineering Cooperation

A Game Theoretic Analysis of Phased International Agreements

Datos Bibliográficos

ID6232483
AutoresCatherine C Langlois, Jean-Pierre P Langlois
Año2001
Volumen45
Número3
Páginas599
Fecha de publicación2001-07-01
Peer ReviewedSí
Open AccessNo
TipoARTICLE
RevistaAmerican Journal of Political Science (JOURNAL)
Identificadores de la revistaISSN: 0092-5853 • E-ISSN: 1540-5907
EditorialJSTOR (PUBLISHER)
DOI10.2307/2669241
OpenAlexW2332532458
IdiomaEN
Citas recibidas3
Referencias citadas9

odern international treaties are often phased agreements that specify a goal to be reached together with a time frame within which to achieve it. This is a characteristic of arms-reduction agreements, but it is also pervasive in free-trade agreements as well as treaties designed to protect the environment. Our goal in this article is to understand the rational underpinnings of such phasing. To this end, we will exhibit a class of strategies in the repeated Prisoner's Dilemma game that prescribe a gradual approach to cooperation. We will show that, in the presence of noise, these strategies promise better dynamic stability of the coop

Business · Dilemma · Economics · Frame (networking · Game theory · International trade · Law and economics · Microeconomics · Political science · Prisoner's dilemma · Repeated game · Telecommunications · Computer Science · Evolutionary Game Theory and Cooperation · Experimental Behavioral Economics Studies · Game Theory and Applications · Mathematics