Paul Noordhof
Datos Biográficos
| ID | 1089006 |
|---|---|
| NOMBRE | Paul Noordhof |
| NOMBRES | Paul |
| APELLIDO | Noordhof |
| FIRMA | NOORDHOF P |
| AFILIACIONES | University of Nottingham |
| ORCID | 0000-0001-5222-2439 |
| VERIFICADO | Sí |
| TOTAL DE OBRAS | 12 |
| TOTAL DE CITAS | 10 |
| TOTAL COMO AUTOR | 11 |
| TOTAL COMO EDITOR | 1 |
| PRIMER AÑO DE PUBLICACIÓN | 1997 |
| AÑO MÁS RECIENTE DE PUBLICACIÓN | 2025 |
| ÍNDICE H | 2 |
Sub-Category Generalism About Conspiracy Theories
I argue for a kind of sub-category generalism about conspiracy theories. I identify four features that negatively contribute to the evaluation of any conspiracy theory that has them. I argue that particularism about conspiracy theories is in conflict even with this moderate position. I explain the implications of sub-category generalism for questions about the epistemic environment in which epistemic agents operate. I argue that even if there are…
The clinical significance of anomalous experience in the explanation of monothematic delusions
Monothematic delusions involve a single theme, and often occur in the absence of a more general delusional belief system. They are cognitively atypical insofar as they are said to be held in the absence of evidence, are resistant to correction, and have bizarre contents. Empiricism about delusions has it that anomalous experience is causally implicated in their formation, whilst rationalism has it that delusions result from top down malfunctions …
A Variety of Causes
Metaphysicians often focus on what is vertically fundamental, appealing to grounding or truth-making, rather than what is horizontally fundamental: what must be common to any metaphysical picture of the universe. There is a case for causation being one such feature. But how should it be characterized? A revised semantics for counterfactuals provides the basis for a new counterfactual analysis of causation that is compatible with Humean supervenie…
Art and Belief
This volume brings together recent work on belief and its connection to truth with issues concerning belief that arise in the philosophy of art. In the twelve new essays collected here, contributors address questions at the intersection of philosophy of mind and philosophy of art, while also advancing these debates. Some of the chapters herein discuss the cognitive contributions artworks can make, for example, whether authors of fiction can testi…
Truth and Trust in Fiction
This chapter examines two pathways through which fictions may affect beliefs: by invading readers’ cognitive system via heuristics and other sub-rational devices, and by expressing authorial beliefs that readers take to be reliable. Focusing mostly on the latter pathway, the chapter distinguishes fiction as a mechanism for the transmission of uncontroversial factual information from fiction as a means of expressing distinctive perspectives on eva…
The Essential Instability of Self-Deception
Environment-Dependent Content and the Virtues of Causal Explanation
Cause and Chance
Peer-reviewed
Self‐Deception, Interpretation and Consciousness
I argue that the extant theories of self‐deception face a counterexample which shows the essential role of instability in the face of attentive consciousness in characterising self‐deception. I argue further that this poses a challenge to the interpretist approach to the mental. I consider two revisions of the interpretist approach which might be thought to deal with this challenge and outline why they are unsuccessful. The discussion reveals a m…
XII*-Believe What You Want
Do Tropes Resolve the Problem of Mental Causation
David Robb has argued (in ‘The Properties of Mental Causation’, The Philosophical Quarterly, 47 (1997), pp. 178–94), that tropes are the properties of causation, i.e., the properties in virtue of which causal relations hold. He thinks that the welcome upshot of this is that there is no problem of mental causation. I argue that his reasons for thinking that tropes are the properties of causation are unsound. In addition, even if one takes the trop…
Making the Change
The paper defends Functionalism against the charge that it would make mental properties inefficacious. It outlines two ways of formulating the doctrine that mental properties are Functional properties and shows that both allow mental properties to be efficacious. The first (Lewis) approach takes functional properties to be the occupants of causal roles. Block [1990] has argued that mental properties should not be characterized in this way because…
The clinical significance of anomalous experience in the explanation of monothematic delusions
Monothematic delusions involve a single theme, and often occur in the absence of a more general delusional belief system. They are cognitively atypical insofar as they are said to be held in the absence of evidence, are resistant to correction, and have bizarre contents. Empiricism about delusions has it that anomalous experience is causally implicated in their formation, whilst rationalism has it that delusions result from top down malfunctions …
Making the Change
The paper defends Functionalism against the charge that it would make mental properties inefficacious. It outlines two ways of formulating the doctrine that mental properties are Functional properties and shows that both allow mental properties to be efficacious. The first (Lewis) approach takes functional properties to be the occupants of causal roles. Block [1990] has argued that mental properties should not be characterized in this way because…
Self‐Deception, Interpretation and Consciousness
I argue that the extant theories of self‐deception face a counterexample which shows the essential role of instability in the face of attentive consciousness in characterising self‐deception. I argue further that this poses a challenge to the interpretist approach to the mental. I consider two revisions of the interpretist approach which might be thought to deal with this challenge and outline why they are unsuccessful. The discussion reveals a m…
Do Tropes Resolve the Problem of Mental Causation
David Robb has argued (in ‘The Properties of Mental Causation’, The Philosophical Quarterly, 47 (1997), pp. 178–94), that tropes are the properties of causation, i.e., the properties in virtue of which causal relations hold. He thinks that the welcome upshot of this is that there is no problem of mental causation. I argue that his reasons for thinking that tropes are the properties of causation are unsound. In addition, even if one takes the trop…
Making the Change
The paper defends Functionalism against the charge that it would make mental properties inefficacious. It outlines two ways of formulating the doctrine that mental properties are Functional properties and shows that both allow mental properties to be efficacious. The first (Lewis) approach takes functional properties to be the occupants of causal roles. Block [1990] has argued that mental properties should not be characterized in this way because…
Do Tropes Resolve the Problem of Mental Causation
David Robb has argued (in ‘The Properties of Mental Causation’, The Philosophical Quarterly, 47 (1997), pp. 178–94), that tropes are the properties of causation, i.e., the properties in virtue of which causal relations hold. He thinks that the welcome upshot of this is that there is no problem of mental causation. I argue that his reasons for thinking that tropes are the properties of causation are unsound. In addition, even if one takes the trop…
XII*-Believe What You Want
Self‐Deception, Interpretation and Consciousness
I argue that the extant theories of self‐deception face a counterexample which shows the essential role of instability in the face of attentive consciousness in characterising self‐deception. I argue further that this poses a challenge to the interpretist approach to the mental. I consider two revisions of the interpretist approach which might be thought to deal with this challenge and outline why they are unsuccessful. The discussion reveals a m…
Cause and Chance
Peer-reviewed
Environment-Dependent Content and the Virtues of Causal Explanation
The Essential Instability of Self-Deception
Art and Belief
This volume brings together recent work on belief and its connection to truth with issues concerning belief that arise in the philosophy of art. In the twelve new essays collected here, contributors address questions at the intersection of philosophy of mind and philosophy of art, while also advancing these debates. Some of the chapters herein discuss the cognitive contributions artworks can make, for example, whether authors of fiction can testi…
Truth and Trust in Fiction
This chapter examines two pathways through which fictions may affect beliefs: by invading readers’ cognitive system via heuristics and other sub-rational devices, and by expressing authorial beliefs that readers take to be reliable. Focusing mostly on the latter pathway, the chapter distinguishes fiction as a mechanism for the transmission of uncontroversial factual information from fiction as a means of expressing distinctive perspectives on eva…
A Variety of Causes
Metaphysicians often focus on what is vertically fundamental, appealing to grounding or truth-making, rather than what is horizontally fundamental: what must be common to any metaphysical picture of the universe. There is a case for causation being one such feature. But how should it be characterized? A revised semantics for counterfactuals provides the basis for a new counterfactual analysis of causation that is compatible with Humean supervenie…
The clinical significance of anomalous experience in the explanation of monothematic delusions
Monothematic delusions involve a single theme, and often occur in the absence of a more general delusional belief system. They are cognitively atypical insofar as they are said to be held in the absence of evidence, are resistant to correction, and have bizarre contents. Empiricism about delusions has it that anomalous experience is causally implicated in their formation, whilst rationalism has it that delusions result from top down malfunctions …
Sub-Category Generalism About Conspiracy Theories
I argue for a kind of sub-category generalism about conspiracy theories. I identify four features that negatively contribute to the evaluation of any conspiracy theory that has them. I argue that particularism about conspiracy theories is in conflict even with this moderate position. I explain the implications of sub-category generalism for questions about the epistemic environment in which epistemic agents operate. I argue that even if there are…
Epistemology (9 obras) · Philosophy (9 obras) · Psychology (7 obras) · Metaphysics (5 obras) · Philosophy and History of Science (5 obras) · Social Psychology (5 obras) · Computer Science (4 obras) · Philosophy of mind (4 obras) · Epistemology, Ethics, and Metaphysics (3 obras) · Mathematics (3 obras)