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Making the Change

The Functionalist's Way

Datos Bibliográficos

ID8399338
AutoresPaul Noordhof (0000-0001-5222-2439, University of Nottingham, autor de correspondencia)
Año1997
Volumen48
Número2
Páginas233-250
Fecha de publicación1997-06-01
Peer ReviewedSí
Open AccessNo
TipoARTICLE
RevistaThe British Journal for the Philosophy of Science (JOURNAL)
Identificadores de la revistaISSN: 0007-0882 • E-ISSN: 1464-3537
EditorialOxford University Press (PUBLISHER • GB)
DOI10.1093/bjps/48.2.233
OpenAlexW2092711805
IdiomaEN
Citas recibidas2
Referencias citadas15

The paper defends Functionalism against the charge that it would make mental properties inefficacious. It outlines two ways of formulating the doctrine that mental properties are Functional properties and shows that both allow mental properties to be efficacious. The first (Lewis) approach takes functional properties to be the occupants of causal roles. Block [1990] has argued that mental properties should not be characterized in this way because it would make them properties of the ‘implementing science’, e. g. neuroscience. I show why this is not a problem. The second way of formulating the doctrine takes functional properties to be causal role properties. I claim that mental properties so understood would only be inefficacious if a law-centred rather than a property-centred approach is adopted to the introduction of efficacy into the world. I develop a property-centred account that explains how mental properties can be efficacacious without introducing systematic overdetermination. At the close, I provide a better characterization of the difference between these two approaches and offer an explanation as to why my way of resolving the problems has been missed.

Doctrine · Epistemology · Functionalism (philosophy of mind) · Overdetermination · Political science · Property (philosophy) · Sociology · Structural functionalism · Computer Science · Embodied and Extended Cognition · Law · Philosophy · Philosophy and History of Science · Philosophy and Theoretical Science · Psychology

  • Environment-Dependent Content and the Virtues of Causal Explanation

    Open Access•Paul Noordhof•Synthese•2006

  • An Argument for Power Inheritance

    Umut Baysan•The Philosophical Quarterly•2016

  • How to Define Theoretical Terms

    David Lewis•The Journal of Philosophy•1970

  • Dispositional essentialism

    Brian Ellis, Caroline Lierse•Australasian Journal of Philosophy•1994

  • The nature of natural laws

    Chris Swoyer•Australasian Journal of Philosophy•1982

  • Psychophysical and theoretical identifications

    David Lewis•Australasian Journal of Philosophy•1972

  • In Defense of Dispositions

    D H Mellor•The Philosophical Review•1974

  • Are Absent Qualia Impossible

    Ned Block•The Philosophical Review•1980

  • The World as One of a Kind

    John Bigelow, Brian Ellis et al.•The British Journal for the…•1992

  • Causal Relevance and Thought Content

    Kirk Ludwig, Kirk A Ludwig•The Philosophical Quarterly•1994

Obras citantes distintas2
Citas por año0,1
Intervalo de citas2006 - 2016 (11)
Velocidad de citaciónhistorical
Altamente citadoNo
Tipos de citaNeutras: 2
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