Russ Shafer-Landau
Datos Biográficos
| ID | 1090474 |
|---|---|
| NOMBRE | Russ Shafer-Landau |
| NOMBRES | Russ |
| APELLIDO | Shafer-Landau |
| FIRMA | SHAFER-LANDAU R |
| AFILIACIONES | Professor of Philosophy, University of Wisconsin-Madison |
| VERIFICADO | No |
| TOTAL DE OBRAS | 50 |
| TOTAL DE CITAS | 273 |
| TOTAL COMO AUTOR | 38 |
| TOTAL COMO EDITOR | 19 |
| PRIMER AÑO DE PUBLICACIÓN | 1994 |
| AÑO MÁS RECIENTE DE PUBLICACIÓN | 2024 |
| ÍNDICE H | 6 |
The Moral Universe
The Moral Universe develops a metaethical theory that is both realist and nonnaturalist. Employing a distinctive methodology, the book constructs a view designed to capture the idea that moral standards regarding what to do and how to be are not only objectively authoritative, but essentially so. Rather than arising from personal schemes or collective ideals, morality flows from the nature of things. One of the principal aims of the book is to sh…
Moral Conceptual Truths
This chapter defends the view that a set of substantive moral propositions qualify as conceptual truths: they are true in virtue of the essences of their constituent concepts. The discussion has four distinctive features. First, it encompasses concrete moral claims regarding the moral status of richly intentional actions, specific character traits, and the like. Second, the view is backed by a systematic account of what it is to be a conceptual t…
Pricean reflection
We offer a reconstruction of Richard Price’s intuition-based epistemology of normative essences, highlighting its key elements and showing how it differs from the approaches taken by other intuitionists such as Thomas Reid and G. E. Moore, as well as sentimentalists such as Francis Hutcheson and David Hume. While our analysis aims to shed light on Price’s moral epistemology, it also seeks to contribute to contemporary debates about the epistemolo…
Oxford Studies in Metaethics Volume 16
This series is devoted to original philosophical work in the foundations of ethics. It provides an annual selection of much of the best new scholarship being done in the field. Its broad purview includes work being done at the intersection of ethical theory and metaphysics, epistemology, philosophy of language, and philosophy of mind. The chapters included in the series provide a basis for understanding recent developments in the field. Chapters …
Oxford Studies in Metaethics Volume 16
Living Ethics
Oxford Studies in Metaethics Volume 15
This series is devoted to original philosophical work in the foundations of ethics. It provides an annual selection of much of the best new scholarship being done in the field. Its broad purview includes work being done at the intersection of ethical theory and metaphysics, epistemology, philosophy of language, and philosophy of mind. The chapters included in the series provide a basis for understanding recent developments in the field. Chapters …
Oxford Studies in Metaethics Volume 15
Oxford Studies in Metaethics Volume 14
This series is devoted to original philosophical work in the foundations of ethics. It provides an annual selection of much of the best new scholarship being done in the field. Its broad purview includes work being done at the intersection of ethical theory and metaphysics, epistemology, philosophy of language, and philosophy of mind. The chapters included in the series provide a basis for understanding recent developments in the field. Chapters …
Oxford Studies in Metaethics Volume 14
Oxford Studies in Metaethics 13
This series is devoted to original philosophical work in the foundations of ethics. It provides an annual selection of much of the best new scholarship being done in the field. Its broad purview includes work being done at the intersection of ethical theory and metaphysics, epistemology, philosophy of language, and philosophy of mind. The chapters included in the series provide a basis for understanding recent developments in the field. Chapters …
The Authority of Formality
Etiquette and other merely formal normative standards like legality, honor, and rules of games are taken less seriously than they should be. While these standards are not intrinsically reason-providing (or “substantive”) in the way morality is often taken to be, they also play an important role in our practical lives: we collectively treat them as important for assessing the behavior of ourselves and others and as licensing particular forms of sa…
Living Ethics
Oxford Studies in Metaethics 12
This series is devoted to original philosophical work in the foundations of ethics. It provides an annual selection of much of the best new scholarship being done in the field. Its broad purview includes work being done at the intersection of ethical theory and metaphysics, epistemology, philosophy of language, and philosophy of mind. The chapters included in the series provide a basis for understanding recent developments in the field. Chapters …
The Ethical Life
The fundamentals of ethics
Oxford Studies in Metaethics
The eleventh volume of Oxford Studies in Metaethics includes essays that span the broad range of metaethical investigation. The contents comprise the following contributions: J. L. Dowell, The Metaethical Insignificance of Moral Twin Earth; Philip Stratton-Lake, Intuition, Self-Evidence, and Understanding; Guy Fletcher, Moral Testimony: Once More with Feeling; Graham Oddie, Fitting Attitudes, Finkish Goods, and Value Appearances; Brian Hedden, Do…
Oxford Studies in Metaethics 11
Oxford Studies in Metaethics, Volume 10
This series is devoted to original philosophical work in the foundations of ethics. It provides an annual selection of much of the best new scholarship being done in the field. Its broad purview includes work being done at the intersection of ethical theory and metaphysics, epistemology, philosophy of language, and philosophy of mind. The chapters included in the series provide a basis for understanding recent developments in the field.
Oxford Studies in Metaethics
Oxford Studies in Metaethics, Volume 9
Oxford Studies in Metaethics' is the only publication devoted exclusively to original philosophical work in the foundations of ethics. It provides an annual selection of much of the best new scholarship being done in the field. Its broad purview includes work being done at the intersection of ethical theory and metaphysics, epistemology, philosophy of language, and philosophy of mind
The moral fixed points
Oxford Studies in Metaethics, Volume 8
'Oxford Studies in Metaethics' is devoted exclusively to original philosophical work in the foundations of ethics. It provides an annual selection of much of the best new scholarship being done in the field.
Oxford Studies in Metaethics
Evolutionary Debunking, Moral Realism and Moral Knowledge
This paper reconstructs what I take to be the central evolutionary debunking argument that underlies recent critiques of moral realism. The argument claims that given the extent of evolutionary influence on our moral faculties, and assuming the truth of moral realism, it would be a massive coincidence were our moral faculties reliable ones. Given this coincidence, any presumptive warrant enjoyed by our moral beliefs is defeated. So if moral reali…
Moral Realism
This is a book in metaethics that defends a brand of moral realism known as non‐naturalism. The book has five Parts. Part I outlines the sort of moral realism that the author wishes to defend, and then offers critiques of expressivism and constructivism. Part II is devoted to issues in metaphysics. It argues that moral realists have adequate replies to worries based on supervenience and the alleged causal inefficacy of moral facts. Part III is de…
The moral fixed points
Oxford Studies in Metaethics 12
This series is devoted to original philosophical work in the foundations of ethics. It provides an annual selection of much of the best new scholarship being done in the field. Its broad purview includes work being done at the intersection of ethical theory and metaphysics, epistemology, philosophy of language, and philosophy of mind. The chapters included in the series provide a basis for understanding recent developments in the field. Chapters …
Ethical Disagreement, Ethical Objectivism and Moral Indeterminacy
What should we say when two reasonable, well-informed individuals disagree on some moral matter? There seem to be two basic analyses, each tied to a broad view of the nature of ethics. Objectivists of various stripes say that intractable moral disagreement does not undermine the claim that there is a fact of the matter awaiting discovery.' Rather, such disagreement suggests a fault of at least one of the interlocutors: a lack of information, a de…
Oxford Studies in Metaethics 13
This series is devoted to original philosophical work in the foundations of ethics. It provides an annual selection of much of the best new scholarship being done in the field. Its broad purview includes work being done at the intersection of ethical theory and metaphysics, epistemology, philosophy of language, and philosophy of mind. The chapters included in the series provide a basis for understanding recent developments in the field. Chapters …
Oxford Studies in Metaethics
Oxford Studies in Metaethics is the only publication devoted exclusively to original philosophical work in the foundations of ethics. It provides an annual selection of much of the best new scholarship being done in the field. Its broad purview includes work being done at the intersection of ethical theory and metaphysics, epistemology, philosophy of language, and philosophy of mind. The essays included in the series provide an excellent basis fo…
Oxford Studies in Metaethics, Volume 9
Oxford Studies in Metaethics' is the only publication devoted exclusively to original philosophical work in the foundations of ethics. It provides an annual selection of much of the best new scholarship being done in the field. Its broad purview includes work being done at the intersection of ethical theory and metaphysics, epistemology, philosophy of language, and philosophy of mind
The Authority of Formality
Etiquette and other merely formal normative standards like legality, honor, and rules of games are taken less seriously than they should be. While these standards are not intrinsically reason-providing (or “substantive”) in the way morality is often taken to be, they also play an important role in our practical lives: we collectively treat them as important for assessing the behavior of ourselves and others and as licensing particular forms of sa…
Through the Moral Maze
A variety of moral and spiritual matters in today's world are addressed in this book. These include: the erosion of shared beliefs about right and wrong; the rift between public and private morality; the uncertain fate of religion; and answers to the question, Why be moral
The Moral Universe
The Moral Universe develops a metaethical theory that is both realist and nonnaturalist. Employing a distinctive methodology, the book constructs a view designed to capture the idea that moral standards regarding what to do and how to be are not only objectively authoritative, but essentially so. Rather than arising from personal schemes or collective ideals, morality flows from the nature of things. One of the principal aims of the book is to sh…
Moral Judgement and Moral Motivation
I criticize an important argument of Michael Smith, from his recent book The Moral Problem (Oxford: Blackwell, 1994). Smith's argument, if sound, would undermine one form of moral externalism – that which insists that moral judgements only contingently motivate their authors. Smith claims that externalists must view good agents as always prompted by the motive of duty, and that possession of such a motive impugns the goodness of the agent. I argu…
Ethical Disagreement, Ethical Objectivism and Moral Indeterminacy
What should we say when two reasonable, well-informed individuals disagree on some moral matter? There seem to be two basic analyses, each tied to a broad view of the nature of ethics. Objectivists of various stripes say that intractable moral disagreement does not undermine the claim that there is a fact of the matter awaiting discovery.' Rather, such disagreement suggests a fault of at least one of the interlocutors: a lack of information, a de…
Moral Rules
Through the Moral Maze
A variety of moral and spiritual matters in today's world are addressed in this book. These include: the erosion of shared beliefs about right and wrong; the rift between public and private morality; the uncertain fate of religion; and answers to the question, Why be moral
Moral Judgement and Moral Motivation
I criticize an important argument of Michael Smith, from his recent book The Moral Problem (Oxford: Blackwell, 1994). Smith's argument, if sound, would undermine one form of moral externalism – that which insists that moral judgements only contingently motivate their authors. Smith claims that externalists must view good agents as always prompted by the motive of duty, and that possession of such a motive impugns the goodness of the agent. I argu…
Moral judgement and normative reasons
Moral judgement and normative reasons Get access Russ Shafer-Landau Russ Shafer-Landau University of KansasLawrence, KS 66045, [email protected] Search for other works by this author on: Oxford Academic Google Scholar Analysis, Volume 59, Issue 1, January 1999, Pages 33–40, https://doi.org/10.1093/analys/59.1.33 Published: 01 January 1999
Motivational Humeanism 5
Discusses the role of motivational Humeanism is a classic anti‐realist argument. Provides some reasons to reject this theory of action, and then offers criticisms of the most powerful arguments favouring motivational Humeanism.
The Constructivist Challenge 2
Examines the challenges to moral realism posed by constructivism. Poses a central challenge to constructivism: the initial constraints that define the context of choice for the agents whose responses are determinative of moral reality are either moralized or are not. If the former, then constructivism presupposes moral realism. If the latter, we have no good reason for thinking that the relevant constructors are really well suited to their task.
The Justification of Moral Principles 11
Defends the existence of self‐evident moral principles. Considers a number of objections to a moral epistemology that is based on classical intuitionism, and finds each such objection wanting.
Moral Scepticism 10
Presents and tries to defuse some classic arguments for moral scepticism, and against the possibility of moral knowledge. Considers the regress argument, an argument from relevant alternatives, and a vicious circle argument, and tries to show why we can continue to justifiably believe moral claims even in the absence of a decisive means of undermining these sceptical arguments.
Supervenience and Causation 4
Addresses two outstanding worries about ethical non‐naturalism. The first, developed primarily by Simon Blackburn, is that this form of moral realism cannot provide an adequate account of the supervenience of the moral upon the non‐moral. The second, prompted by Gilbert Harman, is that moral facts lack any independent causal power, and so we have excellent reason to regard them as unreal.
Moral Rationalism 8
Defends the idea that moral facts constitute excellent reasons for action, regardless of one's antecedent commitments. Provides some presumptive support for this claim, and then proceeds to criticize the best arguments against moral rationalism (the idea that moral duties entail powerful reasons for action), including a prominent argument by Philippa Foot. Ends by arguing that the idea of intrinsic normativity is not as implausible as many have t…
Rationality and Disagreement 9
Distinguishes two strands of the classic antirealist argument from moral disagreement. The first has it that the extent of actual disagreement provides the basis of an inference to best explanation to antirealism. The second claims that ideal observers would disagree about moral matters, and this justifies an antirealist verdict. The author Replies to these criticisms in a number of ways, but the one the author likes the most invokes an ethics‐ph…
The Justification of Verdictive Beliefs 12
Develops a version of reliabilism about moral knowledge, in an effort to explain how we can have knowledge of all‐things‐considered moral verdicts. Considers a number of objections to reliabilism, and seeks to show how we might begin the task of identifying reliable moral belief‐forming processes.
Motivational Judgement Internalism 6
Presents a taxonomy of internalisms, considers the amoralist as a counter‐example to motivational judgement internalism, provides the author's own examples to bolster the prospect of genuine amoralism, and tries to defuse the two primary worries about the author's form of motivational externalism.
The Non-cognitivist Challenge 1
Sets out the contours of the moral realism that the author wishes to defend, and provides an extended series of arguments against non‐cognitivism and expressivism. Seeks to establish a presumptive case for moral cognitivism.
Reasons Internalism 7
Discusses the varieties of internalism about reasons, and argues against the most powerful arguments on its behalf, including those offered by Bernard Williams and Christine Korsgaard. Provides two arguments to favour externalism about reasons.
Ethical Non-naturalism 3
Defends ethical non‐naturalism. Presents G. E. Moore's open question argument as the basis for drawing a natural/non‐natural divide, and discusses various ways of marking the distinction between the natural and the non‐natural. Includes criticisms of ethical naturalism.
Moral Realism
This is a book in metaethics that defends a brand of moral realism known as non‐naturalism. The book has five Parts. Part I outlines the sort of moral realism that the author wishes to defend, and then offers critiques of expressivism and constructivism. Part II is devoted to issues in metaphysics. It argues that moral realists have adequate replies to worries based on supervenience and the alleged causal inefficacy of moral facts. Part III is de…
Whatever Happened to Good and Evil
Writing in a clear style and employing many examples to illustrate theoretical arguments, Russ Shafer-Landau identifies the many weaknesses in contemporary moral skepticism and devotes considerable attention to presenting, and critiquing, the most difficult objections to his view. Also included in the book are a helpful summary of all the major arguments covered, as well as a glossary of key philosophical terms. Whatever Happened to Good and Evil…
Liberalism and Paternalism
Joel Feinberg's brief against legal paternalism, which is the central focus of his Harm to Self , is undoubtedly the most scrupulous, nuanced, and thorough critique of the view yet provided by a liberal philosopher. I was once convinced of Feinberg's case and am now less sure. This makes me uneasy, both because I have strong liberal instincts that I would prefer to be able to justify, and also because I suppose I have not thought about the matter…
Oxford Studies in Metaethics
Oxford Studies in Metaethics is the only periodical publication devoted exclusively to original philosophical work on the foundations of ethics. It provides an annual selection of much of the best new scholarship being done in the field. Its broad purview includes work being done at the intersections of ethical theory with metaphysics, epistemology, philosophy of language, and philosophy of mind. OSME provides an excellent basis for understanding…
Oxford studies in metaethics
Oxford Studies in Metaethics
Oxford Studies in Metaethics is the only periodical publication devoted exclusively to original philosophical work on the foundations of ethics. It provides an annual selection of much of the best new scholarship being done in the field. Its broad purview includes work being done at the intersections of ethical theory with metaphysics, epistemology, philosophy of language, and philosophy of mind. OSME provides an excellent basis for understanding…
Oxford studies in metaethics
Oxford Studies in Metaethics
Oxford Studies in Metaethics is the only publication devoted exclusively to original philosophical work in the foundations of ethics. It provides an annual selection of much of the best new scholarship being done in the field. Its broad purview includes work being done at the intersection of ethical theory and metaphysics, epistemology, philosophy of language, and philosophy of mind. The essays included in the series provide an excellent basis fo…
Epistemology (42 obras) · Philosophy (38 obras) · Philosophical Ethics and Theory (36 obras) · Ethics in medical practice (23 obras) · Metaphysics (21 obras) · Ethics (20 obras) · Epistemology, Ethics, and Metaphysics (16 obras) · Political science (16 obras) · Computer Science (15 obras) · Sociology (14 obras)