Oxford Studies in Metaethics 13
Datos Bibliográficos
| ID | 8090969 |
|---|---|
| Editores | Russ Shafer-Landau (autor de correspondencia) |
| Año | 2018 |
| Fecha de publicación | 2018-08-22 |
| Open Access | No |
| Tipo | BOOK |
| Revista | Oxford Studies in Metaethics 13 (SOURCE_BOOK) |
| Editorial | Oxford University Press (PUBLISHER • GB) |
| DOI | 10.1093/oso/9780198823841.001.0001 |
| OpenAlex | W2601967293 |
| ISBN | 9780198823841 |
| Idioma | EN |
| Citas recibidas | 57 |
| Referencias citadas | 3 |
This series is devoted to original philosophical work in the foundations of ethics. It provides an annual selection of much of the best new scholarship being done in the field. Its broad purview includes work being done at the intersection of ethical theory and metaphysics, epistemology, philosophy of language, and philosophy of mind. The chapters included in the series provide a basis for understanding recent developments in the field. Chapters in this volume cover normative supervenience; non-naturalism; non-descriptive relativism; learning about aesthetics and morality through acquaintance and deference; the possibility of moral epistemology; pure moral motivation; virtue ethics; moral uncertainty and value comparison; (in)coherence; the authority of formality; authoritatively normative concepts; ‘ought’ simpliciter ; and the rationality of ends
Epistemology · Internalism and externalism · Metaphysics · Naturalism · Normative · Philosophy of language · Rationality · Relativism · Classical Philosophy and Thought · Ethics in medical practice · Philosophical Ethics and Theory · Philosophy
Moral Contingentism
Morality first
How are ethical theories explanatory
Normative realism and Brentanian accounts of fittingness
Propositional Attitudes as Commitments
There Are No Reasons for Affective Attitudes
Negation, expressivism, and intentionality
An unjustified orthodoxy
A Fitting Definition of Epistemic Emotions
Moral Principles as Generics
Generic Moral Grounding
Cognitivism and the argument from evidence non-responsiveness
Living with Moral Disagreement
Fittingness and Well-Being
It’s common sense – you don’t need to believe to disagree
Imperfection, Accuracy, and Structural Rationality
The Type-B Moral Error Theory
Belief
The Real Myth of Coherence
A Puzzle About the Unity and Normativity of Structural Rationality
The New Puzzle of Moral Deference
Making Moral Judgments on Adequate Grounds
Normativity in Contemporary (and the History of) Ethics
Moral laws and moral worth
The weight of reasons
Naturalism and normative cognition
Handling rejection
Normative principles and the nature of mind-dependence
Why bother with so what
A puzzle about enkratic reasoning
Living without microphysical supervenience
Moral uncertainty, noncognitivism, and the multi‐objective story
Legal grounds
Grounding and properties
The varieties of idealization and the politics of economic growth
Mind Independence versus Mind Nongroundedness
Coherence as Joint Satisfiability
Admiration, Appreciation, and Aesthetic Worth
Armchair Evaluative Knowledge and Sentimental Perceptualism
Ground, Essence, and the Metaphysics of Metanormative Non-Naturalism
Suppositional Desires and Rational Choice Under Moral Uncertainty
Of Soulmates and Old Spouses
Advice for Analytic Naturalists
Moral explanation of moral judgements
The knowledge norm of assertion
Normative uncertainty and probabilistic moral knowledge
Non-naturalistic moral explanation
The alchemists
Could Morality be a Social Construction
Can desire-satisfaction alienate our good
The Normative, the Practical, and the Deliberatively Indispensable
Enkratic Rationality Is Instrumental Rationality
One Desire Too Many 1
Standing up for supervenience
A new problem for rules
Grounding Legalism
Normative roles, conceptual variance, and ardent realism about normativity
| Obras citantes distintas | 57 |
|---|---|
| Citas por año | 7,13 |
| Intervalo de citas | 2018 - 2026 (9) |
| Velocidad de citación | current |
| Altamente citado | No |
| Tipos de cita | Neutras: 52 |