An unjustified orthodoxy

Why theists need not be (so) metaethically constrained

Datos Bibliográficos

ID10691996
AutoresJustin Morton (0000-0002-6048-2553, Tarrant County College), Dan Kemp (0000-0002-0155-510X, New Saint Andrews College)
Año2025
Fecha de publicación2025-09-05
Peer ReviewedSí
Open AccessSí
TipoARTICLE
RevistaThe Philosophical Quarterly (JOURNAL)
Identificadores de la revistaISSN: 0031-8094 • E-ISSN: 1467-9213
EditorialOxford University Press (PUBLISHER • GB)
DOI10.1093/pq/pqaf077
OpenAlexW4414039406
IdiomaEN
Referencias citadas37

In this paper we discuss the popular claim that theists must endorse some combination of theological voluntarism and theistic platonism. We argue that this claim is usually held because of a commitment to divine sovereignty/aseity. Yet the inference from sovereignty to the claim that theists must be so metaethically constrained relies on the assumption that sovereignty requires that divine facts immediately ground all non-divine facts. We argue that this assumption is mistaken, and we propose a distinct understanding of divine sovereignty, which allows a much broader metaethical landscape to theists committed to divine sovereignty

Epistemology · Orthodoxy · Theism · Theology · Epistemology, Ethics, and Metaphysics · Philosophy · Philosophy and Theoretical Science · Theology and Philosophy of Evil