Turtles All the Way Down

Regress, Priority and Fundamentality

Datos Bibliográficos

ID4351987
AutoresRoss P Cameron (0000-0002-0959-965X, University of Leeds, autor de correspondencia)
Año2007
Volumen0
Número0
Páginas070503042632004
Fecha de publicación2007-05-03
Peer ReviewedSí
Open AccessNo
TipoARTICLE
RevistaThe Philosophical Quarterly (JOURNAL)
Identificadores de la revistaISSN: 0031-8094 • E-ISSN: 1467-9213
EditorialOxford University Press (OUP) (PUBLISHER)
DOI10.1111/j.1467-9213.2007.509.x
OpenAlexW1991306637
IdiomaEN
Citas recibidas60
Referencias citadas3

I address an intuition commonly endorsed by metaphysicians, that there must be a fundamental layer of reality, i.e., that chains of ontological dependence must terminate: there cannot be turtles all the way down. I discuss applications of this intuition with reference to Bradley's regress, composition, realism about the mental and the cosmological argument. I discuss some arguments for the intuition, but argue that they are unconvincing. I conclude by making some suggestions for how the intuition should be argued for, and discussing the ramifications of giving the justification I think best

Epistemology · Intuition · Realism · Epistemology, Ethics, and Metaphysics · Philosophy · Philosophy and History of Science · Philosophy and Theoretical Science