Ross P Cameron
Datos Biográficos
| ID | 969221 |
|---|---|
| NOMBRE | Ross P Cameron |
| NOMBRES | Ross P |
| APELLIDO | Cameron |
| FIRMA | CAMERON R P |
| AFILIACIONES | University of Leeds |
| ORCID | 0000-0002-0959-965X |
| VERIFICADO | Sí |
| TOTAL DE OBRAS | 14 |
| TOTAL DE CITAS | 55 |
| TOTAL COMO AUTOR | 13 |
| TOTAL COMO EDITOR | 2 |
| PRIMER AÑO DE PUBLICACIÓN | 2007 |
| AÑO MÁS RECIENTE DE PUBLICACIÓN | 2021 |
| ÍNDICE H | 5 |
“It made me feel brighter in myself”- The health and well-being impacts of a residential front garden horticultural intervention
The Moving Spotlight
Ross P. Cameron argues that the flow of time is a genuine feature of reality. He suggests that the best version of the A-Theory is a version of the Moving Spotlight view, according to which past and future beings are real, but there is nonetheless an objectively privileged present. Cameron argues that the Moving Spotlight theory should be viewed as having more in common with Presentism (the view that reality is limited to the present) than with t…
Back to the Open Future1
Composition as Identity Doesn’t Settle the Special Composition Question 1
Orthodoxy says that the thesis that composition is identity (CAI) entails universalism: the claim that any collection of entities has a sum. If this is true it counts in favour of CAI, since a thesis about the nature of composition that settles the otherwise intractable special composition question (SCQ) is desirable. But I argue that it is false: CAI is compatible with the many forms of restricted composition, and SCQ is no easier to answer give…
The Grounds of Necessity
Some truths are necessary, others could have been false. Why? What is the source of the distinction between the necessary and the contingent? What's so special about the necessary truths that account for their necessity? In this article, we look at some of the most promising accounts of the grounds of necessity: David Lewis' reduction of necessity to truth at all possible worlds; Kit Fine's reduction of necessity to essence; and accounts of neces…
The Routledge Companion to Metaphysics
The Routledge companion to metaphysics
God exists at every (modal realist) world
Paul Sheehy has argued that the modal realist cannot satisfactorily allow for the necessity of God's existence. In this short paper I show that she can, and that Sheehy only sees a problem because he has failed to appreciate all the resources available to the modal realist. God may be an abstract existent outside spacetime or He may not be: but either way, there is no problem for the modal realist to admit that He exists at every concrete possibl…
What’s Metaphysical About Metaphysical Necessity? 1
I begin by contrasting three approaches one can take to the distinction between the essential and accidental properties: an ontological, a deflationary, and a mind‐dependent approach. I then go on to apply that distinction to the necessary a posteriori, and defend the deflationist view. Finally I apply the distinction to modal truth in general and argue that the deflationist position lets us avoid an otherwise pressing problem for the actualist: …
Truthmakers and necessary connections
Truthmakers and modality
Truth and Ontology - Trenton Merricks
Journal Article Truth and Ontology – Trenton Merricks Get access Truth and Ontology. Trenton Merricks, (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 2007. Pp. xviii + 202. Price £27.50.) Ross Cameron Ross Cameron University of Leeds Search for other works by this author on: Oxford Academic Google Scholar The Philosophical Quarterly, Volume 58, Issue 232, July 2008, Pages 544–546, https://doi.org/10.1111/j.1467-9213.2008.572_03.x Published: 28 June 2008
Lewisian Realism
Subtractability and Concreteness
I consider David Efird and Tom Stoneham's recent version of the subtraction argument for metaphysical nihilism, the view that there could have been no concrete objects at all. I argue that the two premises of their argument are only jointly acceptable if the quantifiers in one range over a different set of objects from those which the quantifiers in the other range over, in which case the argument is invalid. So either the argument is invalid or …
Turtles All the Way Down
I address an intuition commonly endorsed by metaphysicians, that there must be a fundamental layer of reality, i.e., that chains of ontological dependence must terminate: there cannot be turtles all the way down. I discuss applications of this intuition with reference to Bradley's regress, composition, realism about the mental and the cosmological argument. I discuss some arguments for the intuition, but argue that they are unconvincing. I conclu…
Composition as Identity Doesn’t Settle the Special Composition Question 1
Orthodoxy says that the thesis that composition is identity (CAI) entails universalism: the claim that any collection of entities has a sum. If this is true it counts in favour of CAI, since a thesis about the nature of composition that settles the otherwise intractable special composition question (SCQ) is desirable. But I argue that it is false: CAI is compatible with the many forms of restricted composition, and SCQ is no easier to answer give…
Back to the Open Future1
Turtles All the Way Down
I address an intuition commonly endorsed by metaphysicians, that there must be a fundamental layer of reality, i.e., that chains of ontological dependence must terminate: there cannot be turtles all the way down. I discuss applications of this intuition with reference to Bradley's regress, composition, realism about the mental and the cosmological argument. I discuss some arguments for the intuition, but argue that they are unconvincing. I conclu…
Truth and Ontology - Trenton Merricks
Journal Article Truth and Ontology – Trenton Merricks Get access Truth and Ontology. Trenton Merricks, (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 2007. Pp. xviii + 202. Price £27.50.) Ross Cameron Ross Cameron University of Leeds Search for other works by this author on: Oxford Academic Google Scholar The Philosophical Quarterly, Volume 58, Issue 232, July 2008, Pages 544–546, https://doi.org/10.1111/j.1467-9213.2008.572_03.x Published: 28 June 2008
What’s Metaphysical About Metaphysical Necessity? 1
I begin by contrasting three approaches one can take to the distinction between the essential and accidental properties: an ontological, a deflationary, and a mind‐dependent approach. I then go on to apply that distinction to the necessary a posteriori, and defend the deflationist view. Finally I apply the distinction to modal truth in general and argue that the deflationist position lets us avoid an otherwise pressing problem for the actualist: …
Truthmakers and modality
Lewisian Realism
Truthmakers and necessary connections
The Grounds of Necessity
Some truths are necessary, others could have been false. Why? What is the source of the distinction between the necessary and the contingent? What's so special about the necessary truths that account for their necessity? In this article, we look at some of the most promising accounts of the grounds of necessity: David Lewis' reduction of necessity to truth at all possible worlds; Kit Fine's reduction of necessity to essence; and accounts of neces…
Lewisian Realism
Subtractability and Concreteness
I consider David Efird and Tom Stoneham's recent version of the subtraction argument for metaphysical nihilism, the view that there could have been no concrete objects at all. I argue that the two premises of their argument are only jointly acceptable if the quantifiers in one range over a different set of objects from those which the quantifiers in the other range over, in which case the argument is invalid. So either the argument is invalid or …
Turtles All the Way Down
I address an intuition commonly endorsed by metaphysicians, that there must be a fundamental layer of reality, i.e., that chains of ontological dependence must terminate: there cannot be turtles all the way down. I discuss applications of this intuition with reference to Bradley's regress, composition, realism about the mental and the cosmological argument. I discuss some arguments for the intuition, but argue that they are unconvincing. I conclu…
Truthmakers and necessary connections
Truthmakers and modality
Truth and Ontology - Trenton Merricks
Journal Article Truth and Ontology – Trenton Merricks Get access Truth and Ontology. Trenton Merricks, (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 2007. Pp. xviii + 202. Price £27.50.) Ross Cameron Ross Cameron University of Leeds Search for other works by this author on: Oxford Academic Google Scholar The Philosophical Quarterly, Volume 58, Issue 232, July 2008, Pages 544–546, https://doi.org/10.1111/j.1467-9213.2008.572_03.x Published: 28 June 2008
The Routledge Companion to Metaphysics
The Routledge companion to metaphysics
God exists at every (modal realist) world
Paul Sheehy has argued that the modal realist cannot satisfactorily allow for the necessity of God's existence. In this short paper I show that she can, and that Sheehy only sees a problem because he has failed to appreciate all the resources available to the modal realist. God may be an abstract existent outside spacetime or He may not be: but either way, there is no problem for the modal realist to admit that He exists at every concrete possibl…
What’s Metaphysical About Metaphysical Necessity? 1
I begin by contrasting three approaches one can take to the distinction between the essential and accidental properties: an ontological, a deflationary, and a mind‐dependent approach. I then go on to apply that distinction to the necessary a posteriori, and defend the deflationist view. Finally I apply the distinction to modal truth in general and argue that the deflationist position lets us avoid an otherwise pressing problem for the actualist: …
The Grounds of Necessity
Some truths are necessary, others could have been false. Why? What is the source of the distinction between the necessary and the contingent? What's so special about the necessary truths that account for their necessity? In this article, we look at some of the most promising accounts of the grounds of necessity: David Lewis' reduction of necessity to truth at all possible worlds; Kit Fine's reduction of necessity to essence; and accounts of neces…
Back to the Open Future1
Composition as Identity Doesn’t Settle the Special Composition Question 1
Orthodoxy says that the thesis that composition is identity (CAI) entails universalism: the claim that any collection of entities has a sum. If this is true it counts in favour of CAI, since a thesis about the nature of composition that settles the otherwise intractable special composition question (SCQ) is desirable. But I argue that it is false: CAI is compatible with the many forms of restricted composition, and SCQ is no easier to answer give…
The Moving Spotlight
Ross P. Cameron argues that the flow of time is a genuine feature of reality. He suggests that the best version of the A-Theory is a version of the Moving Spotlight view, according to which past and future beings are real, but there is nonetheless an objectively privileged present. Cameron argues that the Moving Spotlight theory should be viewed as having more in common with Presentism (the view that reality is limited to the present) than with t…
“It made me feel brighter in myself”- The health and well-being impacts of a residential front garden horticultural intervention
Philosophy (12 obras) · Epistemology (11 obras) · Philosophy and Theoretical Science (11 obras) · Epistemology, Ethics, and Metaphysics (5 obras) · Metaphysics (5 obras) · Classical Philosophy and Thought (4 obras) · Philosophical Ethics and Theory (4 obras) · Philosophy and History of Science (4 obras) · Philosophy of language (4 obras) · Theology and Philosophy of Evil (4 obras)