Artūrs Logins
Datos Biográficos
| ID | 1296532 |
|---|---|
| NOMBRE | Artūrs Logins |
| NOMBRES | Artūrs |
| APELLIDO | Logins |
| FIRMA | LOGINS A |
| AFILIACIONES | University of Zurich |
| ORCID | 0000-0003-4760-9027 |
| VERIFICADO | Sí |
| TOTAL DE OBRAS | 11 |
| TOTAL DE CITAS | 3 |
| TOTAL COMO AUTOR | 11 |
| TOTAL COMO EDITOR | 0 |
| PRIMER AÑO DE PUBLICACIÓN | 2013 |
| AÑO MÁS RECIENTE DE PUBLICACIÓN | 2026 |
| ÍNDICE H | 1 |
Suspension as a mood
Suspension of judgment is a ubiquitous phenomenon in our lives. It is also relevant for several debates in contemporary epistemology (e.g., evidentialism/pragmatism; peer-disagreement/higher-order evidence; inquiry). The goal of this paper is to arrive at a better understanding of what suspension of judgment is. We first question the popular assumption that we call the Triad view according to which there are three and only three (paradigmatic) do…
How to argue with a pragmatist
According to recently popular pragmatist views, it may be rational for one to believe p when one’s evidence doesn’t favour p over not-p. This may happen according to pragmatists in situations where one can gain something practically important out of believing p. In this paper, I argue that given some independently plausible assumptions about the argumentative nature of philosophy and the irrelevance of bribes for good arguments, pragmatism leads …
Inquiry and reasons
Justification and gradability
Normative Reasons
Reasons matter greatly to us in both ordinary and theoretical contexts, being connected to two fundamental normative concerns: figuring out what we should do and what attitudes to have, and understanding the duties and responsibilities that apply to us. This book introduces and critiques most of the contemporary theories of normative reasons considerations that speak in favor of an action, belief, or emotion - to explore how they work. Artūrs Log…
Persistent burglars and knocks on doors
The aim of the present article is to accomplish two things. The first is to show that given some further plausible assumptions, existing challenges to the indispensability of knowledge in causal explanation of action fail. The second is to elaborate an overlooked and distinct argument in favor of the causal efficacy of knowledge. In short, even if knowledge were dispensable in causal explanation of action, it is still indispensable in causal expl…
Is an Increase in Probability Always an Increase in Evidential Support
Graded epistemic justification
The adjective ‘is justified’ has all the hallmarks of a gradable adjective. But the relationship between gradable uses and straightforward predications of the form ‘x is justified’ has been underexplored by epistemologists. In this paper we undertake to do some ground clearing as a prelude to better understanding this relationship
Normative Reasons without (Good) Reasoning
According to the good reasoning view of normative reasons, p is a reason to F, just in case p is a premise of a good pattern of reasoning. This article presents two counterexamples to the most promising version of the good reasoning view
Common Sense and Evidence
In this article I focus on some unduly neglected common‐sense considerations supporting the view that one's evidence is the propositions that one knows. I reply to two recent objections to these considerations
Scepticisme, fidéisme et évidentialisme
Les principales attitudes adoptées devant les questions centrales de l’épistémologie générale (en particulier la question de la croyance justifiée) sont selon nous l’évidentialisme, le scepticisme (pyrrhonien) et le fidéisme. Dans cet article, nous présentons d’une part les arguments permettant d’accepter une forme de l’évidentialisme selon laquelle aucune croyance fausse ne peut être justifiée sur la base de raisons probantes. D’autre part, nous…
Normative Reasons without (Good) Reasoning
According to the good reasoning view of normative reasons, p is a reason to F, just in case p is a premise of a good pattern of reasoning. This article presents two counterexamples to the most promising version of the good reasoning view
Scepticisme, fidéisme et évidentialisme
Les principales attitudes adoptées devant les questions centrales de l’épistémologie générale (en particulier la question de la croyance justifiée) sont selon nous l’évidentialisme, le scepticisme (pyrrhonien) et le fidéisme. Dans cet article, nous présentons d’une part les arguments permettant d’accepter une forme de l’évidentialisme selon laquelle aucune croyance fausse ne peut être justifiée sur la base de raisons probantes. D’autre part, nous…
Common Sense and Evidence
In this article I focus on some unduly neglected common‐sense considerations supporting the view that one's evidence is the propositions that one knows. I reply to two recent objections to these considerations
Normative Reasons without (Good) Reasoning
According to the good reasoning view of normative reasons, p is a reason to F, just in case p is a premise of a good pattern of reasoning. This article presents two counterexamples to the most promising version of the good reasoning view
Graded epistemic justification
The adjective ‘is justified’ has all the hallmarks of a gradable adjective. But the relationship between gradable uses and straightforward predications of the form ‘x is justified’ has been underexplored by epistemologists. In this paper we undertake to do some ground clearing as a prelude to better understanding this relationship
Normative Reasons
Reasons matter greatly to us in both ordinary and theoretical contexts, being connected to two fundamental normative concerns: figuring out what we should do and what attitudes to have, and understanding the duties and responsibilities that apply to us. This book introduces and critiques most of the contemporary theories of normative reasons considerations that speak in favor of an action, belief, or emotion - to explore how they work. Artūrs Log…
Persistent burglars and knocks on doors
The aim of the present article is to accomplish two things. The first is to show that given some further plausible assumptions, existing challenges to the indispensability of knowledge in causal explanation of action fail. The second is to elaborate an overlooked and distinct argument in favor of the causal efficacy of knowledge. In short, even if knowledge were dispensable in causal explanation of action, it is still indispensable in causal expl…
Is an Increase in Probability Always an Increase in Evidential Support
Justification and gradability
How to argue with a pragmatist
According to recently popular pragmatist views, it may be rational for one to believe p when one’s evidence doesn’t favour p over not-p. This may happen according to pragmatists in situations where one can gain something practically important out of believing p. In this paper, I argue that given some independently plausible assumptions about the argumentative nature of philosophy and the irrelevance of bribes for good arguments, pragmatism leads …
Inquiry and reasons
Suspension as a mood
Suspension of judgment is a ubiquitous phenomenon in our lives. It is also relevant for several debates in contemporary epistemology (e.g., evidentialism/pragmatism; peer-disagreement/higher-order evidence; inquiry). The goal of this paper is to arrive at a better understanding of what suspension of judgment is. We first question the popular assumption that we call the Triad view according to which there are three and only three (paradigmatic) do…
Epistemology (10 obras) · Epistemology, Ethics, and Metaphysics (10 obras) · Philosophy (9 obras) · Mathematics (5 obras) · Philosophy and Theoretical Science (5 obras) · Psychology (4 obras) · Metaphysics (3 obras) · Philosophy of language (3 obras) · Adjective (2 obras) · Classical Philosophy and Thought (2 obras)